2017, Vol., No.103

A Study on the activities of Education and Mobilization of North Korea’s Propaganda Office during the period of the Korean War

Kim Sangbum | 2017, (103) | pp.1~54 | number of Cited : 2

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A comparative Study in the Military Strategies Adopted by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia respectively at the Initial Stage of the Russo-German War during the Second World War's period

전갑기 , Lee,Jongho | 2017, (103) | pp.55~88 | number of Cited : 2

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A Study on the Strategic Implication of the Employment for the Amphibious Operational Forces of the U.S.S.R and USA During the WWII

Choi, Jungjoon | 2017, (103) | pp.89~130 | number of Cited : 3

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Amphibious operation has developed with war history and it’s been conducting decisive role at the war. Amphibious troops did a key role when they swept the enemies and changed the war status from defensive to offensive direction. The U.S. and U.S.S.R fully understood the usefulness and flexibilities of amphibious troops. Although the U.S.S.R was known as a continental state, it built up amphibious power. On the contrary, the U.S. was a maritime nation it utilized the Marines when it expanded it's power to the West Pacific area. This article examined how the U.S. Marines and U.S.S.R Naval Infantry were employed during the World War II and found out its strategic implication. There were several similarities and differences between them. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. employed the amphibious troops when they tried to secure the lands and islands which were strongly defended by the enemies. The Marines and Naval Infantry showed off their sufficient capacities as an assault troops to recover the lost territories. In the beginning of the World War II the Marines and Naval Infantry of both countries hadn't full-fledged power to project, but they have expanded their size and grown their capacities during the wartime. However, there were lots of differences between them in conducting national strategy, building up the military powers, the strategy and tactics. The U.S. Marines usually did amphibious assault which was a large scale and from the long distance. In contrast, the U.S.S.R. Naval Infantry operated within the short distance and small groups but it developed the unique tactics called “Desant” that aimed at the enemy’s side and rear area attack to support the Army. It was totally different from the U.S.’s tactics. The former not only made progress amphibious doctrine, and built up enough ships but also supported by coordinated ship and air fire when they performed the mission. It usually conducted the amphibious operation by the systematic procedures from its first step to end. The latter made use of temporary amphibious ships, since improvisational assault and Navy’s fire support was limited. Although the U.S. Marines and U.S.S.R.’s Naval infantry were small sizes when compared with Army and Navy, they not only verified the efficiency but also showed the flexibilities of the amphibious troops. In this study we found that the U.S Marines and U.S.S.R Naval Infantry contributed the development of various amphibious operational skills and reminded the value of their existence. The amphibious troops can be easily affected by nation’s strategy and their performances when they try to survive as an independent military service.

A Study on the implication of the Chinese's military reform of national defense in the Era of Xi Jinping

ShimHyunseop | 2017, (103) | pp.131~172 | number of Cited : 8

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A Study on the Suppression of Donghak Peasant Army by the government forces of Joseon and the Japanese Army 1n Chung Nam Naepo(內浦) Region

kim, yang sik | 2017, (103) | pp.173~204 | number of Cited : 1

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This thesis is an analysis of the suppression of the Donghak Peasant Army by the government forces of Joseon and the Japanese army in the Chung Nam Naepo region and its peculiarities. Particularly, with the recent discovery of new information in 『Kabogunjeongsilgi(甲午軍政實記)』, it is an attempt to get closer to the truth about the Donghak Peasant War in the Naepo region. The Donghak Peasant Army had already gained control of the Chung Nam Naepo Region in September 1894. The concerned government and Japanese army, in effect, turned their attention to suppressing the Donghak Peasant Army in the Naepo region from the beginning to the middle of October. However, following the last 10 days in October, the main force of the Donghak Peasant Army had begun moving north to capture the, Gonju region. Forcing the Japanese army as well as the government to direct their troops to focus on protecting the the Gonju region. For that reason, The region of Hongju had been dropped off the radar of the government forces of Joseon and the Japanese army. Japan and the government of Joseon received reports of the greatest battle in the Naepo region, the battle at the castle of Hongju on October 28, much later, than after the event took place. That’s why the government forces, led by Lee Du Hwang, arrived at the Naepo region on October 29, when the battle at the castle of Hongju was over, and the Japanese army departed for the Naepo region from Incheon on November 3. The enthusiasm of the Donghak Peasant Army in the Naepo region quickly cooled following the battle at the castle of Hongju. The Japanese army, The Joseon government army and Minbogun(民堡軍) caught up to the Donghak Peasant Army and executed them. In fact, the Japanese army shot and killed 48 members of the Donghak Peasant Army in Haemi on November 11 and killed 30 more members in Taean on November 15. Hongju region governor Lee Seong U concluded the suppression of the Donghak Peasant Army with a big celebration outside the south gate of the castle of Hongju on November 30.

Military and Government Response of Eulmyo Invasion During the King Myeongjong Era of Joseon Dynasty

MoonJunho | 2017, (103) | pp.205~232 | number of Cited : 6

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Perpetually invading the coastal regions and harming people as well as stealing properties, the Japanese invaders were considered as the main enemy to the national defense policy of Joseon. Accordingly, Joseon used the lord of Tsushima in order to subdue the invaders. However, as the Japanese invaders consisted of pirates of different nationalities, the Tsushima lord did not have absolute power or authority over them. Nevertheless, Joseon maintained a hard-line policy instead of developing more sophisticated policy based on thorough analysis of the likelihood of invasion and preparing measures against different groups. As a result, with rigorous preparation including selection of landing site in advance, the Japanese invaders carried out Eulmyo Invasion. They used a deceptive tactic in order to induce minimal army from Joseon and secured a dominant position. Also, by dominating a major site as their foothold, they blocked assistance from other regions and destroyed the Joseon army including the regional commander during battle. This not only caused mayhem in the command system but also demoralized Joseon army. However, despite the disadvantageous situation, the commanders in Jeollado provided soldiers based on the regional defense system, and strove to limit the invasion by the Japanese. Particularly, the Yeongamseong battle, which marked a watershed in the invasion, demonstrated the rational response of the commanders who succeeded in preventing the Japanese invaders from expanding their domain. Later, the regional commanders were recognized for their achievement by being granted honor. Meanwhile, during Eulmyo Invasion, the central government failed to operate effectively. Especially, it did not provide adequate military force and supplies, causing difficulties to the regional army. Furthermore, during the invasion, the central government officials of Joseon failed to take practical measures and only used the invasion as a pretext to expand their political authority. Therefore, it is necessary to reevaluate Eulmyo Invasion based on the efficient response provided in the battle, as opposed to unsuccessful diplomatic policy and strategically inadequate measures provided by the central government.

Secretive Contacts between Joseon and the Ming Dynasty after the Second Manchu Invasion of Joseon in 1637

Lee Jae-kyung | 2017, (103) | pp.233~278 | number of Cited : 9

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Previous works on Joseon’s foreign relations have focused on Joseon’s response to the Ming-Qing transition. In the course, the year of 1637, when the Qing dynasty subjugated Joseon, was regarded as a turning point. However, the Ming dynasty had not perished until 1644, and unofficial contacts between Joseon and the Ming dynasty through the smuggling route across the Yellow Sea continued even after their official relationship was cut off. Secret contacts between Joseon and the Ming dynasty can be divided into three phases. During the first phase(1637-1638), Ming admiral Chen Hongfan(陳洪範) tried to appease Joseon in order to get Joseon’s cooperation on his attempt to construct a new military base on the Yellow Sea, which would replace destroyed Dongjiangzhen(東江鎭) Garrison on Gado(椵島) Island. The Joseon court appreciated his sympathy for Joseon’s difficult situation, but denied his demands and rejected future contacts from him. For the second phase(1638-1640), the Qing dynasty ordered Joseon to send its troops to attack Ming territory. In response, Joseon sent the monk Dokbo(獨步) as a secret envoy to Ming to inform that Joseon inevitably had to send soldiers for Qing’s aid. The third phase(1640-1644) was composed of two sub-phase. From 1640 to 1642, Ming dispatched its navy to Joseon for three times to gain Joseon’s military support. Joseon ostensibly welcomed Ming officials but rejected any urge of military cooperation. From 1642 to 1644, the Qing dynasty noticed the secretive contacts and cracked down on Joseon. Meanwhile, the agents of secret contacts got arrested and removed from power in both countries. Thereafter, secretive contacts between the two countries were cut off to the end of the Ming dynasty. While secretive contacts with Joseon was just a diplomatic and military choice to Ming, for Joseon they were an ideological way to practice its moral obligation to the Ming dynasty(對明義理) and a realistic policy to guarantee its survival in unpredictable chaos of the war between Ming and Qing. Ming’s goal was to acquire Joseon’s military support, whereas Joseon only wanted the Ming dynasty to understand its inevitable situation. Thus, secret contacts between the two states naturally ended in vain. Meanwhile, secretive contacts between Joseon and the Ming dynasty made possible by smuggling network across the Yellow Sea. In the process, the will of the two central governments had to be filtered and distorted by the agents with their own personal and economic aims. As a result, their participation affected the course of the secretive contacts.

General Lee Bang-sil's life and his Military activities

HONG Young Eui | 2017, (103) | pp.279~322 | number of Cited : 10

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Born in 1298, Lee Bang-Sil is Hamahn Lee Clan’s Middle founder. In 1337, he was appointed to the Fuzhou Sarok(福州司錄) as the Tongdeok-rang(通德郞), and in 1344, when the prince, who became King Chung-mog later, entered Yuan Dynasty at the age of eight, he escorted the prince, was recognized for his service, and was appointed Gangwan(諫官) after undergoing Chungranggun(中郞將), Hogun(護軍). In 1354, he participated in the battle of Gowoosung(高郵城) at the request of Yuan Dynasty as the Great Hogun(大護軍) On June 16, 1357, when the Red Turban(紅巾賊) invaded, Lee Bang-Sil was appointed to the pyunbee(偏裨), after that defeated the Red Turban by fighting with Ahn Woo(安祐) in Cheolju(鐵州) On December 11, 1359, and won over Cheolhwa(鐵和) battle as the Above General(上將軍) in January 16, 1360. After that he was promoted to the Ahnjoo(安州) Above Manho(上萬戶) in 1360. He won the battle several times, including battle of Hamjong(咸從), and swept away the remnants of the Red Turban who had stayed in Pungju(豊州), and he was awarded for his merits and went up to the Choosung hyeubbo meritorious retainer(推誠協輔功臣) Royal Secretariat(Chumilweon) Boosa(副使). He became the seebukmyundo commander(西北面都指揮使) in 1361, preparing for the second invasion of the Red Turban, and then was appointed to the joongseo(中書) pyungjangjeongsa(平章政事). As a marshal, he led the repulsion of the Red Turban and the successful operation of the capture of Gaegeong(開京). However, he made a mistake to remove Jung Se-un(鄭世雲) who made a contribution to recapture Gaegeong in the conspiracy of Kim Yong(金鏞), an aide of King Gongmin(恭愍王). After that, Lee Bang-Sil was also killed with Ahnwoo, Kim Deuk-bae in the plot of Kim Yong. In 1391, the three marshal murder case by the declaration became a lottery by the request of Bang Sa-rang(房士良). However, historians of the Joseon Dynasty also made it clear that it was difficult to say that it was not what King Gongmin ordered. In the end, it is thought that the death of Lee Bang-sil, and others. were an event that was revealed, due to the head of the military power of the three marshal, the king's doubt concerning the major, and confrontation and conflict between the senior statesman and the highest rank general at the time of a big change in the invasion of the Red Turban. There was also a problem inside the command system.

Preparing the new leap forward of the Korean Military History of the Thoughts - Baek Ki In, 『the study of Korean military thoughts』(Institute for Military History, MND, 2016)

Choi hyeong guk | 2017, (103) | pp.323~336 | number of Cited : 0

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Expecting one step leaping forward for the media study taking the first step. - Kim Young Hee, 『The media and Society during the period of Korean War』 (Communication Books, 2016)-

Noe Youngi Gi | 2017, (103) | pp.337~350 | number of Cited : 1

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2017, Vol., No.103