2020, Vol., No.117

military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992
https://journal.kci.go.kr/imhc

There is no war without any POWs and then POW camps are needed. If there is a camp for POWs, there must be always their routines with sports, theater and music etc.. The Geoje POW camp during the Korean War was no exception. However, so far, the music of prisoners in Geoje POW camp has not been researched, though the Geoje POW camp was such a noisy singing camp that it was hardly to see in any other POW camps of previous wars. The Geoje POW camp was noisy with demonstrations, riots and slogans, but the prisoners sang whenever they had the chances to sing. For prisoners, songs can always be easily mobilized anytime, anywhere, making them the simplest and most convenient instruments of expressing their demands, joys, grievances and resistance. Especially for pro-communist prisoners, singing was important as a means of struggle against anti-communist ideology and against the policies of the camp authorities. In this context, it is highly likely that the second volume of "The Songs for the Soldiers" published in November 1951 reflects the intention of the General Political Bureau in Pyeongyang to support the song struggle of pro-communist prisoners at the Geoje POW camp. This paper explored the songs of the prisoners of Geoje POW camp which have not been studied so far. In conclusion, the diverse value of the song in the Geoje POW camp was hard to imagine in other POW camps of previous wars, which can also be seen as a characteristic of the Geoje POW camp, which was born as the first result of the Cold War period.

The study attempts to research the Fire employment of the Battle of White Horse Hill, in which the 9th ROK Infantry Division won against the 38th Corps of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in October 1952. Although many studies have been conducted officially and academically on the battle, however most of them are the study of analyzing the battle centered on maneuvers, whereas the role of firepower had been accepted less interests, in some cases, to extent of the just amount of ammunition that used during the battle. Even the numbers of artillery units participating are different based on studies. In this regard, this study analyzes the strength of firepower mobilized, operational plans, command and control systems, and actual performance of those units, based on primary historical records, like combat situation reports(sitreps) from the 9th ID, special reports from the Ⅸ U.S. Army Corps, reports from the U.S. Military Advisory Group, and testimonies from veterans. According to the study, the 9th ID put more firepower assets into the battle than previously known. even though the 9th ID operated the division-level fire support control center for the first time in the ROK Army, it smoothly commanded and controlled huge amount of firepower assets through flexible measures and pre-preparation. Although there were also negative incidents such as misfires during the battle, they carried out the battle in a variety of ways in the joint operation with the U.S. military. The effectiveness and efficiency of these fire employment was well illustrated by the 9th ID's success to dispel incoming Chinese troops through the front lines by rapid fire employment. In conclusion, by using firepower effectively and efficiently, the 9th ID was able to win the Chinese troops three times more than themselves.

This study is to understand the military capabilities of Cestius Gallus who led the Jewish War in 66. Josephus found the cause for the defeat of the Romans in Cestius' strategic error and military incompetence. But I think that the judgment of Cestius, who retreated troops after giving them accurate recognition of the situation, was reasonable. The Roman cavalry was used to protect the flanks of the military formation, and a convoy of military supplies was placed in the rear of the convoy to increase the mobility and safety of other troops. The defeat of Cestius was due to the lack of consideration for the terrain features of the ties of guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas. In response to the withdrawal after the battle of Beth Horon, Josephus claimed that he had missed the chance to take control of Jerusalem. All conditions, such as troop, munitions, armed conditions, topography, and weather, were inappropriate for attacking Jerusalem. In this situation, a strategic withdrawal could have been better than an unreasonable challenge. It was a good judgment that Cestius to give up his attack on Jerusalem and withdraw most of his troops overnight. Of the Cestius, Vespasianus, Titus and Silva who exercised command in the Jewish War, it is Cestius whose military role has been underestimated. Cestius' careful judgment and strategic withdrawal provided a foundation for subsequent commanders to take control of Judaea. The supply and demand of troops, the securing of supply lines, and the establishment of siege equipment became important to the Roman army. In addition, the guerrilla tactics of the Judaea and the tactics of utilizing the mountainous terrain became a reference to the Roman army's strategy. In the Jewish War, Cestius was not the cause of the prolonged war, but the foundation for victory.