@article{ART001935573},
author={LEE PYO KYU},
title={A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s},
journal={military history},
issn={1598-317X},
year={2014},
number={93},
pages={307-348},
doi={10.29212/mh.2014..93.307}
TY - JOUR
AU - LEE PYO KYU
TI - A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s
JO - military history
PY - 2014
VL - null
IS - 93
PB - Military History Institute, MND
SP - 307
EP - 348
SN - 1598-317X
AB - Alfred D. Chandler has been received the evaluation that he was one of the most influential scholar at the field of social science in the 20th century, and that he created his own unique research area of business history. His ‘Strategy and Structure’ theory was established by analysing the four major enterprises’ It is known as a pioneer of corroborative evidence study regarding on the strategic developmental process of the organizations. The main purpose of this study is to seek some lessons for a future construction of the ROKMC’s Marine Air Ground Task Force Type unit structure after analysing the decision processes and the results of the USMC’s MAGTF Combat Commanding System establishment in 1960s using the ‘Strategy and Structure’ theory posited in the book of Alfred D. Chandler.
In order to do this, I summarized the major actions, contents, effectiveness of the adaptive(creative) response and the creative innovation from the book, ‘the strategy and structure’ of Chandler, and transferred them into relative variables suitable to the USMC’s situation at that time. The MAGTF Combat Commanding System structure and innovation process are analysed on the basis of the current and upcoming years’ missions with the background of the necessity, combat structure and organization status of the USMC in the dimension of the US military strategy. According to the results, the MAGTF Combat Commanding System was not focused on the military forces construction in peace time, but it was an inevitable option to increase the combat capability responding to a crisis using the maximum effort of the organizational components.
Except for point as above, the following three lessons learned are extracted. Firstly, the HQs of the ROKMC should clearly establish the location of a future Marine air group which will be built-up from 2017, and its future operational concept and direction, in order to decrease burden of subordinate commanders generated by the ROKMC’s future MAGTF type forces structure. Secondly, in order to integrate the air group with the existing the ground and service support group, it would be necessary to establish the system for maximum integration of the Marine Air Power Group within a short time by strengthening the joint/combine/team-up, and its own exercises, and by doing the units experiments and a lot of education for the top and high/middle level executives to get the readiness posture. Thirdly, it is inevitable to make responsive logics suitable to the situational environment, by itemizing the mission types or functions capable by the ROKMC’s MAGTF Combat Commanding system, and threats, and crisis circumstances.
One of the main achievements of this study is to provide the point that the theories and analytical frameworks for business could be employed in the process of the military organization innovation. Up to the present time, the military community has achieved numerous theoretical developments in the areas of the administration, organization, personnel, strategy, and so on. However, it is time to review any missing points stemmed from the characteristics of the closed organization system of the military communities. All organizations including the governmental agencies, military organizations and business enterprises are continuously pursuing the maximum effort to effectively use available resources. It is necessary to remind that the organizations are not to follow this atmosphere would be retrogressive.
KW - USMC;ROKMC;MAGTF;Combat Commanding System;Alfred D. Chandler;Strategy & Structure Theory;The Functional Departments;The Central Office;Commanding Structure;Miliary Structure
DO - 10.29212/mh.2014..93.307
ER -
LEE PYO KYU. (2014). A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s. military history, 93, 307-348.
LEE PYO KYU. 2014, "A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s", military history, no.93, pp.307-348. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2014..93.307
LEE PYO KYU "A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s" military history 93 pp.307-348 (2014) : 307.
LEE PYO KYU. A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s. 2014; 93 : 307-348. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2014..93.307
LEE PYO KYU. "A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s" military history no.93(2014) : 307-348.doi: 10.29212/mh.2014..93.307
LEE PYO KYU. A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s. military history, 93, 307-348. doi: 10.29212/mh.2014..93.307
LEE PYO KYU. A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s. military history. 2014; 93 307-348. doi: 10.29212/mh.2014..93.307
LEE PYO KYU. A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s. 2014; 93 : 307-348. Available from: doi:10.29212/mh.2014..93.307
LEE PYO KYU. "A study on the Lessons learned and the Establishment of Battle command systems by US marine MAGTF(Marine Air Ground Task Force) in 1960s" military history no.93(2014) : 307-348.doi: 10.29212/mh.2014..93.307