2010, Vol., No.9

PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.5

pISSN : 1975-1621 / eISSN : 2092-0873
https://journal.kci.go.kr/insewtdgu

The theory of content is concerned with pinning down various features of cognitive, representational content of the mind. Recently an interesting, important disputation has occurred in the name of “conceptualism versus non-conceptualism”. Conceptualism takes it that all the cognitive, representational contents that the mind entertains are entirely determined by conceptual apparatus and capacities given to us. Meanwhile non-conceptualism simply denies the claim, and maintains that our cognitive, representational contents are, at least partly, non-conceptual. Considering the varieties of our mental experiences, non-conceptualism appears to be, to some extent, plausible. But the difficulty is that there do not yet seem to be clear-cut and definitive arguments for non-conceptualism. In this respect Cane's and Heck's philosophical strategy for laying out the existence, and the significance, of non-conceptual content, i.e. pinning down the character of non-conceptual content via explicating and specifying what conceptual content could be, surely deserves notice. In this paper, while giving an exposition of Crane's and Heck's ideas of non-conceptual content, the author provides a critical notice of Crane's and Heck's philosophical strategy characterized above.

The aim of this study is to expose the characteristics and functions of the theory of ‘self’ of Kant and his successors. Therefore, the study focuses on the theory of transcendental apperception of Kant and the dialectics of self-positing of Fichte and Schelling. Kant's theory of transcendental apperception has to do with the representation of self in the process of transcendental self-consciousness. The self-conscious ‘I’ is conscious of self as a representation of self-identity (Identität). But this self-identity is applied not only to the oneness of self, but to the identities of the objects, while the self-identity is the only principle of unification in the process of recognition of cognitive subject. This shows that the principle of self-consciousness can function as a the first principle of the objects, and this is Kant's plan of new metaphysics with the synthetic a priori propositions. However, the successors of Kant's plan accept the theory of self-identity critically. They, Fichte and Schelling, denies the characteristic of being -consciousness of Kant's self-identity, because is a consciousness cannot be a existence itself but just a content of cognitive self. So they regard that the self posits itself already as a based on the theory of self. However, Kant's plan was a metaphysics of synthetic a priori propositions based on the system of epistemology, while Science of knowledge of Fichte and philosophy of nature are based on the self-positing principle of metaphysics of existence

Egoistic style of life in an age of the neo-liberalism and religious conflict, especially between Christianity and Buddhism, must be overcome in the light of a new ethic Christianity and Buddhism will develop in their tradition. I examine here how two religious and cultural traditions can construct a dialogue under a ethical perspective. For that purpose, the Christian ethical tradition is compared with a Buddhistic ethics, which has been based on zen-buddhism of Mahayana Buddhism tradition and which I call Nishida's ethic. One can find an ethical alternative to over come our egoistic and competition-based way of life by comparing the two traditions, when one sees the common denominators in them. In this comparison, it will be clear that there is an ethical Way, which both christians and buddhists can actualize through praxis of kenosis or sunyata.