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Critical Reception of Kant's Theory of Self ― the Case of Fichte and Schelling ―

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2010, (9), pp.21~49
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities

Nam Jung Woo 1

1경희대학교

Candidate

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to expose the characteristics and functions of the theory of ‘self’ of Kant and his successors. Therefore, the study focuses on the theory of transcendental apperception of Kant and the dialectics of self-positing of Fichte and Schelling. Kant's theory of transcendental apperception has to do with the representation of self in the process of transcendental self-consciousness. The self-conscious ‘I’ is conscious of self as a representation of self-identity (Identität). But this self-identity is applied not only to the oneness of self, but to the identities of the objects, while the self-identity is the only principle of unification in the process of recognition of cognitive subject. This shows that the principle of self-consciousness can function as a the first principle of the objects, and this is Kant's plan of new metaphysics with the synthetic a priori propositions. However, the successors of Kant's plan accept the theory of self-identity critically. They, Fichte and Schelling, denies the characteristic of being -consciousness of Kant's self-identity, because is a consciousness cannot be a existence itself but just a content of cognitive self. So they regard that the self posits itself already as a based on the theory of self. However, Kant's plan was a metaphysics of synthetic a priori propositions based on the system of epistemology, while Science of knowledge of Fichte and philosophy of nature are based on the self-positing principle of metaphysics of existence

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