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Dretske’s Naturalistic Idea of Intentionality - Its Significance and Difficulty -

Youngjin Kiem 1

1숭실대학교

ABSTRACT

In opposition to the Brentanian view of the intentionality of the mind, Fred Dretske proposes that there are different levels of intentionality ranging from lower-levels to higher-levels. Even he thinks that a simple physical device such as thermometer or galvanometer could have a certain degree of intentionality. In this regard Dretske succeeds in setting the concept of intentionality as the mark of the mental apart from the general idea of aboutness. However, when Dretske tries to specify some feature of higher-level intentionality, it seems, though he does not intend it explicitly, that intentionality as the mark of the mental reappears in an uncritical way. I think that that is a theoretical difficulty that can nullify a fundamental aspect of the Dretskean naturalistic level theory of intentionality. In this paper, while clarifying Dretske’s view of intentionality, I suggest that the difficulty can be overcome when we avoid characterizing intentionality by means of intensionality.

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