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The concept of "things in themselves" in Kant's Metaphysics

이재헌 1

1동국대학교

ABSTRACT

According to Kant, the possibility of Metaphysics as science is based on the concept of freedom and the "things in themselves". In this paper, I will take up the concept of the "things in themselves", and enter into the matter of this subject to explore the problems. Kant's critique is propaeduetic of Metaphysics, and transcendental idealism has been estimated as an accomplishment of the critique. Transcendental idealism says that we have cognition only of "appearances", not of "things in themselves". But it is far from clear what the doctrine means, and especially unclear what sort of restriction it is supposed to place on our knowledge. Some researchers of Kant have seen the restriction as trivial, so trivial as to be utterly meaningless, even bordering on incoherence. But it is no exaggeration to say the concept of "things in themselves" is one of the important motif of Kant's critical philosophy. And without presupposing the affection by the concept, transcendental idealism could not be established. Therefore, we have to follow the Kant's consequent problem which he has tried to establish the Metaphysics as new science. Because only in this case, we can estimate his effort exactly that he try to regulate the human's situation.

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