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On the View of B. Blanshard about A Priori Knowledge

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2012, (14), pp.91~110
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities

Kim Hak-taek 1

1대진대학교

Candidate

ABSTRACT

The traditional concept of a priori knowledge was completed by Kant. He extended a kind of it and specified its nature by classifying analytic and synthetic judgments. Many of issues about Kant's epistemology have been raised so far, one of them was about the kind and nature of a priori knowledge suggested by the Kant. By giving examples of synthetic a priori knowledge, Kant insisted that a priori knowledge can provide information about fact. In addition, by regarding necessity and universality as nature of a priori knowledge, he argued that necessary knowledge is a priori knowledge. This view of Kant has been criticized by many scholars, especially Logical Positivists. Logical Positivists contend that a priori knowledge is analytic judgment, the reports of linguistic usages, conventions and they assert nothing about facts or world. However, B. Blanshard criticizes Logical positivism's argument as too excessive. His view on a priori knowledge has room for synthetic a priori knowledge suggested by the Kant, and room for the tradition of philosophical speculation. But according to the coherence theory, Blanshard denies that only a priori knowledge is necessary. So not only he does not agree Kant's argument, but also rejects the view of logical positivism that a priori knowledge is analytic, necessary. Eventually, he, along with Kripke, denies an equation that a priori knowledge is analytic.

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