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Fara's Paradox and Semantic Gaps

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2012, (14), pp.111~132
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities

LEE JINHEE 1

1아주대학교

Candidate

ABSTRACT

The goal of this paper is to provide a way out of Fara’s paradox for defending truth value gap theories of vagueness. Fara argued that if we accept truth value gap theories, we should accept 'D-intro' which is inference from P to definitely P. (P⊧DP). Fara said that we have contradictory result such as Dm-1P(an) and -Dm-1P(an) from gap theory and D-intro. In this paper, I show that D-intro isn’t a generally acceptable rule for D-operator. Actually, there were many critics against Fara’s paradox, especially D-intro. Against those critics, Fara justified D-intro on the basis of 'Neg-B-intro' which is inference from P to not borderline P (P ⊧-BP). I argue that Fara’s justification isn’t sound by showing that P and -DP are compatible. It is easy to discharge D-intro and Neg-B-intro when P and -DP are compatible. Futhermore, it appears that Neg-B-intro and D-intro don’t accord with basic intuitions of vagueness in the process of my argument.

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