PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.5
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pISSN : 1975-1621 / eISSN : 2092-0873
- https://journal.kci.go.kr/insewtdgu
KJCKorea
Journal Central
Subpersonal States and Non-conceptual Content
- PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
- 2017, (23), pp.1~27
- DOI : 10.33639/ptc.2017..23.001
- Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
- Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
- Published : January 31, 2017
1한국과학기술원
Accredited
ABSTRACT
Philosophers, who advocate conceptualism on perceptual experience, particularly John McDowell and Bill Brewer, have argued that perceptual experience has conceptual contents because those contents could be engaged with the three major types of conceptual capacities that we have. As such, the notion of experience that the conceptualists hold is conscious state, which allows our conscious access involving the conceptual capacities. Whereas, philosophers called neuro-philosophers, particularly Raftopoulos and Müller recently argue that the contents of experience can be non-conceptual only if they are not cognitively penetrated, otherwise it is conceptual. Hence, the range of experience defined by the neuro-philosophers refers to both conscious and non-conscious states of mind. As such the criterion of having either conceptual contents or non-conceptual contents is dependent on whether a perceptual state is cognitively penetrated.
This paper reveals the initial problem of the non-conceptualism that there is no way to prove the existence of non-conceptual content in subpersonal mental states without considering conceptual cognitive penetration. Non-conceptualists attempt to find that there could be a particular type of perceptual content, which cannot be engaged with a perceiver's conceptual capacity when we consider only subpersonal level of experience in order to prove the existence of non-conceptual content in experience. However, I argue that without being conceptually engaged with, no perceptual content can be found in those lower level of experience.
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