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On Kant' position about Moral Standing of Animals

Kim Hak-taek 1

1대진대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The traditional position on animal moral standing did not acknowledge their moral standing. Animals are indirect moral objects to be considered only in relation to humans. This is why we have been indifferent to animal welfare so far. It is common sense that Kant represents this traditional position. However, in Kant's view of nature, beings of nature have theirs own ends according to its inner purposiveness; also, according to its outer purposiveness, nature as a whole has a unified system which has the relation between means and ends. Every being in nature has its own intrinsic end because it is a purposeful existence by itself. This means that humans have a direct duty to non-rational beings. The duty Kant denies to non-rational beings is merely 'a duty to someone to do something'. It brings about the problem of rights. He does not deny 'a duty to do something' to non-rational beings. Kant does not deny the moral standing of non-rational beings, nor does he deny the direct duty to them. He also does not deny their intrinsic good. What he denies is only their moral significance. Kant's main concern lies in the act of a moral subject or agent with moral importance. He focuses on the act and motive of the moral subject, and on the moral rules and principles that guide their actions. Ultimately he concerns the world in which rational beings realize their ends. In Kant, animals, i.e. non-rational beings, have no moral significance, but have moral standing as objects to be morally considered.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.