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Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of Life -Going beyond Husserl's intentionality to non-intentional pathos-

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2022, (39), pp.63~84
  • DOI : 10.33639/ptc.2022..39.004
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
  • Received : May 20, 2022
  • Accepted : June 30, 2022
  • Published : June 30, 2022

Eun-Jeong Lee 1

1동국대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

In this paper, Michel Henry's phenomenology of life is discussed. The phenomenology of life suggests going beyond Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl’s phenomenology is Henry's starting point, and Henry owes thought to it. But Henry wants to be more fundamental than Husserl, or to be more phenomenological. Beyond Husserl's phenomenology, the phenomenology of life he constructed responds to his consistent demands. What Henry is trying to overcome in Husserl's phenomenology is the long-standing prejudice that Husserl's phenomenology has captured, phenomenological monism. Against phenomenological monism, Henry advocates phenomenological duality. Phenomenological duality is the recognition of a phenomenality that is fundamentally different from intentionality. That's pathos. This pathos is the essence of life and its concrete reality. This thesis first examines the context and meaning of the overthrow and renewal of phenomenology required as part of a critique of classical phenomenology, and then discusses the phenomenology of life suggested by Henry.

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