@article{ART003000700},
author={Sangsoo Lim},
title={Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts},
journal={Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies},
issn={1225-8539},
year={2023},
volume={30},
number={3},
pages={5-33},
doi={10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001}
TY - JOUR
AU - Sangsoo Lim
TI - Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts
JO - Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies
PY - 2023
VL - 30
IS - 3
PB - Institute of Global Affairs
SP - 5
EP - 33
SN - 1225-8539
AB - Recent events including rapid nuclear modernization of North Korea and China and increasing fear of nuclear escalation in Ukraine have led to renewed attention to nuclear politics in East Asia. In this context, this paper aims to address one of the most distinguished concepts in nuclear politics and its relevance to East Asia’s security environment: the stability-instability paradox. Specifically, this paper seeks to address the two following questions. Is the stability-instability paradox applicable to the inter-Korean security environment? If so, by what mechanism will the stability-instability paradox work in the region? Through theoretical analysis and a case study on the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, this paper yields two findings. First, while not yet fully applicable, the logic of the stability-instability paradox is increasingly becoming relevant in the inter-Korean security environment. Second, the stability-instability paradox in the region is likely to work through the mechanism of the ‘red-line model’, which entails relatively little danger of intentional nuclear escalation.
KW - Stability-Instability Paradox;Nuclear Weapons;North Korea;Nuclear Deterrence;Limited Conflicts
DO - 10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001
ER -
Sangsoo Lim. (2023). Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts. Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 30(3), 5-33.
Sangsoo Lim. 2023, "Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts", Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, vol.30, no.3 pp.5-33. Available from: doi:10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001
Sangsoo Lim "Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts" Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 30.3 pp.5-33 (2023) : 5.
Sangsoo Lim. Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts. 2023; 30(3), 5-33. Available from: doi:10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001
Sangsoo Lim. "Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts" Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 30, no.3 (2023) : 5-33.doi: 10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001
Sangsoo Lim. Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts. Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 30(3), 5-33. doi: 10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001
Sangsoo Lim. Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts. Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies. 2023; 30(3) 5-33. doi: 10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001
Sangsoo Lim. Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts. 2023; 30(3), 5-33. Available from: doi:10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001
Sangsoo Lim. "Stability-Instability Paradox and the Korean Peninsula: How Nuclear Deterrence Can Lead to Inter-Korean Limited Conflicts" Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies 30, no.3 (2023) : 5-33.doi: 10.18107/japs.2023.30.3.001