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Analysis of Deregistration Attacks in 5G Standalone Non-Public Network

  • Journal of The Korea Society of Computer and Information
  • Abbr : JKSCI
  • 2021, 26(9), pp.81-88
  • DOI : 10.9708/jksci.2021.26.09.081
  • Publisher : The Korean Society Of Computer And Information
  • Research Area : Engineering > Computer Science
  • Received : August 24, 2021
  • Accepted : September 16, 2021
  • Published : September 30, 2021

Keewon Kim 1 Kyungmin Park 2 Tae-Keun Park 3

1목포해양대학교
2한국전자통신연구원
3단국대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we analyze the possibility of deregistration attack in 5G SNPN (Standalone Non-Public Network) based on 3GPP standard document. In the deregistraion attack, the attacker pretends to be a UE that is normally registered with AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function) and attempts to establish a spoofed RRC (Radio Resource Control) connection, causing AMF to deregister the existing UE. The existing deregistration attack attempts a spoofed RRC connection to the AMF in which the UE is registered. In addition, this paper analyzes whether deregistration attack is possible even when an attacker attempts to establish a spoofed RRC connection to a new AMF that is different from the registered AMF. When the 5G mobile communication network system is implemented by faithfully complying with the 3GPP standard, it is determined that a deregistration attack of a UE is impossible.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2022 are currently being built.

This paper was written with support from the National Research Foundation of Korea.