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Ownership of Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Risk-Taking Behavior: Disciplinary Effect of Competitive Threat in Product Markets

  • Journal of Insurance and Finance
  • 2015, 26(3), pp.95-139
  • Publisher : Korea Insurance Research Institute
  • Research Area : Social Science > Business Management

LEE JI HYE 1 Hee Sub Byun ORD ID 2

1고려대학교
2한림대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates how the competitive threat affects the relation between the ownership of controlling shareholders and corporate risk-taking behavior. Empirically, we confirm that the ownership of controlling shareholders has significantly negative effect on the level of corporate risk-taking. This result means that controlling shareholders change corporate risk-taking behavior based on their incentive structure from stock ownership. However, this relationship is not observed in more competitive product markets, while it appears in less competitive product markets. Thus, competitive threat can be considered as an external control mechanism to discipline the incentive of controlling shareholders, who want to pursue the private benefits. Meanwhile, the disciplinary effect of competitive threat is mainly observed in firms with weak internal corporate governance. This result implies that the weakness of internal control mechanisms is significantly complemented by product market competition.

Citation status

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