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Sheng Shicai’s Anti-Japanese Strategy and the Consolidation of Power in Xinjiang (1935–1941)

  • Journal of Manchurian Studies
  • Abbr : 만주연구
  • 2026, (41), pp.99~133
  • Publisher : The Manchurian Studies Association
  • Research Area : Social Science > Area Studies > East Asia > China
  • Received : March 20, 2026
  • Accepted : April 27, 2026
  • Published : April 30, 2026

LEESEONHUI 1

1전남대학교 역사문화연구센터

Accredited

ABSTRACT

During the Second Sino-Japanese War, although Xinjianghad no direct contact with the front lines, it functioned as an anti-Japanese rear base wherelarge-scale fundraising and propaganda campaigns were actively carried out. Prior studies have interpreted these activities as the result of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ideological work, Sino-Soviet cooperation, or the formation of a Chinese national consciousness. However, this period coincided with Sheng Shicai’s rule. Upon seizing military power in 1933, Sheng positioned anti-imperialism—particularly anti-Japanese resistance—as the core of his governance, rendering anti- Japanese mobilization in Xinjiang inseparable from his strategy of consolidating rule. This article focuseson the period from 1935 to 1941 and argues that anti- Japanese mobilization in Xinjiang was not driven by external forces but was planned and implementedby Sheng Shicai as part of his strategy to consolidate power. Sheng established the Xinjiang People’s Anti-Imperialist Associationand personally served as its chairman. The Association’s organizational structure effectively transformedthe provincial administrative system into a mobilization apparatus. Furthermore, the influx of CCP members into Xinjiang was also planned and controlled in accordance with Sheng’s governingneeds. AlthoughCCP members were appointed to practical roles in education, finance, and media, policy-making authority remained with Sheng in his capacity as the Association’s chairman. This top-down control extended to anti-Japanese fundraising, where the provincial government issued directives through the Associationdown to local branches, while Sheng personally approved the scope and methods. Additionally, Sheng sought to advance Xinjiang’s provincial interests through negotiations with both the Soviet Union and the Nationalist Government, independently proposing participation in an aircraft manufacturing plant and the establishment of an avi-ation school without authorization from the central government. That Sheng’s anti-Japanese mobilization was a product of governing strategy rather than ideological conviction is also evident in . In September 1938, during a visit to Moscow, Sheng held direct talks with Stalin and expressed his intention to join the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while requesting that this remain strictly confidential. This contradictory behavior—openly signaling loyalty to the Soviet Union while tightly controlling its visibility—demonstratesthat Sheng’s pro-Soviet and anti-Japanese stance was less an expression of ideological affinity than a calculated political maneuver aimed at securing the position of the Xinjiang provincial regime within the structure of interstate negotiations.

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