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Four-Dimensional Particularism as Psychophysical Nominalism

Tohyung Paik 1

1숭실대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

Nonreductive physicalism has been accepted as a main stream on the mind-body problem for a while. In recent philosophy of mind, however, the problem of mental causation, which is never a new problem, is raised anew as a hot issue, since a serious ontological problem of nonreductive physicalism is brought up. According to it, in nonreductive physicalism as property dualism, the mental are only epiphenomena, because it cannot have any causal power. So the mental have no ontologically meaningful status, but are just dependent on the physical. If this criticism is right, the well-known advantage of nonreductive physicalism should be fictitious, and the discussions on the mind-body problem will come back to the start point. That is our situation. I think that the problem of mental causation relates deeply with the problem of properties as universals. And my point is that Davidsonian token-event identity theory as a form of psychophysical nominalism can survive and be a promising option for the mind-body problem. In this article, I will propose Four-Dimensional Particularism as psychophysical nominalism applying Davidsonian token-event identity theory and Leibnizian monads.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.