@article{ART001822460},
author={KyungHee Lee},
title={The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism},
journal={Philosophical Investigation},
issn={1598-7213},
year={2013},
volume={34},
pages={145-167},
doi={10.33156/philos.2013.34..005}
TY - JOUR
AU - KyungHee Lee
TI - The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism
JO - Philosophical Investigation
PY - 2013
VL - 34
IS - null
PB - Institute of philosophy in Chung-Ang Univ.
SP - 145
EP - 167
SN - 1598-7213
AB - In Descartes, it is his theory of ‘automates’ that causes the controversy on animal’s sentience. He called animal’s body a better ordered machine made by God, comparing with ‘automaton’ made by man in Discourse on the Method. After that, this is generally known as the beginning of the theory of ‘automates’ combined with ‘bête’ and ‘machine’ together. This passage doesn’t have any such meaning that animal alone is the automaton. He is willing to explain not only animal body but also human body equally from his mechanical point of view. He made an attempt to interpret animal’s movements altogether through the mechanical principle. As Cottingham said, it is difficult to conclude that Descartes’s animal lacks sentience from that he calls animal ‘machine’ or ‘automaton’.
Descartes’s point doesn’t consist in the negation of animal’s sentience but in the establishment of the mechanic world-view. Therefore the interpretation that Descartes consistently deny animal’s sentience from first to last is too excessive. He is on neutral ground.
KW - Descartes;animal;automates;Bêtes-machine;feeling;Cartesianism;mechanical point of view
DO - 10.33156/philos.2013.34..005
ER -
KyungHee Lee. (2013). The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism. Philosophical Investigation, 34, 145-167.
KyungHee Lee. 2013, "The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism", Philosophical Investigation, vol.34, pp.145-167. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2013.34..005
KyungHee Lee "The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism" Philosophical Investigation 34 pp.145-167 (2013) : 145.
KyungHee Lee. The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism. 2013; 34 145-167. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2013.34..005
KyungHee Lee. "The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism" Philosophical Investigation 34(2013) : 145-167.doi: 10.33156/philos.2013.34..005
KyungHee Lee. The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism. Philosophical Investigation, 34, 145-167. doi: 10.33156/philos.2013.34..005
KyungHee Lee. The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism. Philosophical Investigation. 2013; 34 145-167. doi: 10.33156/philos.2013.34..005
KyungHee Lee. The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism. 2013; 34 145-167. Available from: doi:10.33156/philos.2013.34..005
KyungHee Lee. "The Problem of Automaton and Feeling in Descartes’s theory of Animals-Crossing the Border of ‘Bêtes-machine’ in Cartesianism" Philosophical Investigation 34(2013) : 145-167.doi: 10.33156/philos.2013.34..005