KJCKorea
Journal Central

Salt is a key resource controlled by the state. Although literature on the salt industry during the Joseon Dynasty and Japanese colonial period has accumulated over time, the history of salt after liberation in 1945 has rarely been studied. Researchers have found that the division of the Korean Peninsular led to a salt shortage and that, as a solution, privately owned salterns were built along the west and south coast during the United States Army Military Government (USAMGIK) period. The construction of privately owned salterns is only a part of the story; it is necessary to examine the situation of government-owned salterns, the USAMGIK stance on salt distribution, and other aspects for a comprehensive understanding of the salt industry after liberation. This study investigates the USAMGIK salt policy from 1945 to 1948, analyzing statistics and reports produced by the USAMGIK at the time and by the Korean Salt Industry Union Association in 1957. The USAMGIK fundamentally maintained the Monopoly Bureau of the Japanese Government-General of Korea and seized control over the salterns previously owned by the Government-General of Korea and Japanese companies. The USAMGIK also resumed the production of government-owned salterns, acquired salt from abroad through aid, and prioritized distribution of salt to Korean households. In this gradual recovery process of the South Korean salt industry, Gunja Saltern and Sorae Saltern played a prominent role, especially since South Korea lost Yeonbaek Saltern to North Korea during the Korean War. Gunja Saltern and Sorae Saltern were crucial sources that provided a large and stable supply of salt in the late 1940s and early to mid-1950s.

This paper examines the Shiheung Crystalline Graphite Mine, located in Gunja-myeon, Shiheung, through its project of exploration, reconstruction planning, and implementation under the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) mining technical assistance program in the post-Korean War period. With substantial graphite reserves and a strategic geographical location, the mine was a significant addition to regional and national economic development. UNKRA’s 1950s development plan aimed to modernize the mine through new plant construction, equipment procurement, technical assistance. However, the project encountered delays due to insufficient funding, mismanagement of aid supplies, and unsuccessful foreign contracting, exposing broader inefficiencies of South Korea’s aid system at the time. While industrial production began only after UNKRA’s dissolution in June 1958, the agency’s efforts revitalized the mining sector, a bedrock of South Korea’s export economy in the 1950s. UNKRA technical assistance facilitated the introduction of ‘modern’ American systems of underground resource management through technology transfer and marked an important turning point in the revitalizing and modernizating of the Korean mining industry through continuous production expansion into the 1960s.

This article critically examines the environmental pollution and improvement process caused by the development of Sihwa Lake and Sihwa District, and seeks the possibility of coexistence between humans and non-human beings. In 1977, Banwol Special Zone was designated as part of the policy of population dispersion in the metropolitan area, and in the 1980s, as industrial complexes were expanded and reclaimed farmland development was promoted, Sihwa District development began in earnest. This development was an expression of “high modernism” that advocated “national land reform”, and it was also an intention of the Chun Doo-hwan regime to make up for the poor performance of domestic construction companies due to the slump in the Middle East construction market. Large-scale reclamation led to the relocation of residents and job changes, and the destruction of the tidal flat ecosystem. In 1994, when the Sihwa Seawall was completed, Gunja Bay was transformed into “artificial nature” Sihwa Lake. However, due to the discharge of wastewater from the Banwol Industrial Complex and the inflow of domestic sewage, Sihwa Lake became a “lake of death.” As ecological disasters occurred and the shoddy construction process and the irresponsibility of government agencies such as the Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-water) were revealed, residents and environmental groups actively criticized and resisted the government. Since then, water quality has improved and the ecosystem has been restored in the 2000s through seawater circulation, improvement of sewage treatment facilities, and operation of tidal power plant. However, ongoing developments such as Sihwa MTV, Songsan Green City, and Daesong Complex are revealing limitations in maintaining the sustainable Sihwa Lake ecosystem. The Sihwa Lake case warns that ecological disasters can occur if indiscriminate development continues. As an alternative for coexistence of humans and non-human beings, it is necessary to consider granting legal personality to specific ecosystems such as Sihwa Lake.