KJCKorea
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The allegory of the charioteer, the white horse, and the black horse in the Phaedrus has traditionally been regarded as representing the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive parts of the soul in the Republic. This tradition originates with ancient Platonists, who interpreted Plato fundamentally within a framework that contrasted reason and desire. The identification of the charioteer and the two horses with the three parts of the soul also arose from this interpretive framework. However, if we pay attention to the specific details presented in the text, there are more discrepancies than similarities between the tripartite theory of the soul and the allegory of the charioteer and the two horses. Moreover, there are quite a few indicators suggesting that Plato did not intend to identify the two. In order to understand what Plato intended to express with the allegory of the charioteer and the two horses, we should note that this allegory appears in Socrates’ second speech, which is a “palinode” that corrects his first speech. The first speech actually presents a direct contrast between reason and desire, and the allegory of the charioteer and the two horses is meant to replace that contrast. Both reason and desire are capable of producing either proper or improper motivations: the white horse represents the disposition of aidōs, which produces proper motivations, while the black horse represents the disposition of hubris, which produces improper motivations.

Plato’s Phaedrus engages a wide range of philosophical themes with a rich and complex way. In particular, Socrates’ second speech, namely palinode, is one of the most philosophically distinctive parts. It addresses not only eros and divine madness but also the human and divine soul, body, and recollection, which seem unrelated with eros and divine madness. For this reason, the palinode constitutes the most interpretively challenging part of Phaedrus. In this paper, I elucidate that themes seemingly tangential to eros, such as soul, recollection, embodiment, and becoming godlike, are in fact integral to demonstrating the central thesis of the palinode. In this way, I also contend that the mythical explanation of soul and recollection in palinode is necessary for revealing eros as the process of self-discipline, through which the human being as the unity of soul and body becomes godlike. In other words, I aims to reveal that recollection is not an isolated endeavor of a solitary agent but is actualized within the relationship of erotic attachment between the lover’s soul and the beloved’s soul.

In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates delivers the so-called first speech and the second speech. The first speech is a blame of the lover, while the second one is a praise of him, so that the two speeches appear to stand in opposition. Immediately after the first speech, Socrates states that he has committed an act of impiety against Eros and, as a purification, delivers the second speech. At the close of the second speech, Socrates concludes his speech with a vow to Eros, asking for forgiveness for his earlier speech. This paper raises the following question: Was Socrates’ first speech, then, a wrong that should never have been made, because it constituted a blasphemy against Eros? As previous scholarship has pointed out, it seems evident both that Socrates repents of the impiety of his first speech and offers the second as an act of atonement, and that the first speech seems to have a certain role in the overall design of his discourse. However, Socrates’ repudiation of the first speech and the suggestions put forward by scholars that both speeches are indispensable for him appear to be in tension with one another. Why should we say that the first speech was necessary for Socrates, while he himself retracts its condemnation of Eros? My suggestion—that the first speech constitutes a blasphemy that Socrates should commit—aims to resolve this tension. Moreover, previous studies tend to emphasize that the mythical stories in Socrates’ speeches exemplify one of the requirements of a good orator, as Socrates himself describes. While I find this general view probable, I suggest further that reading the first speech as a wrongdoing that Socrates must commit harmonizes well with the very criteria of good speech-making that Socrates states.