본문 바로가기
  • Home

The Problems of the Objective Interpretation of Attributes in Spinoza

  • The Korean Journal of Chiristian Social Ethics
  • Abbr : 기사윤
  • 2004, 8(), pp.147-184
  • Publisher : The Society Of Korean Christian Social Ethics
  • Research Area : Humanities > Christian Theology

박삼열 1

1관동대학교

Candidate

ABSTRACT

In this essay I argue that there is a more subtle and complex view of love implicit in the Ethics. A third type of love. which may be characterized as "self-determined," serves to mediate between the extremes of what Spinoza calls the "common sort of love" and the intellectual love of God. Before this more subtle view of love as potentially self-determined can be developed we will need to examine Spinoza's views on the nature of the emotions. Specifically, it will be crucial to show that the distinction between active and passive emotions, and hence between active and passive types of love, is indeed tenable. For this distinction to be possible, it will need to be shown that Spinoza's conceptual framework can allow for the possibility of at least limited human freedom. Based on Spinoza's view of the emotions, we will be able to sketch a taxonomy of love in the Ethics, contrasting self-determined love with both the common sort of love and the intellectual love of God.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.