This study exposes the problems of Koreaʹs young generation. By exploring the history of young generations and university culture, the author also aims to examine the evolving discourse on young generation in Korea.
Todayʹs youth in Korea experiences economic hardship, due to employment anxieties, as well as despair about future. According to a survey, when asked for a word one associates with youth, most frequent answers were ‘employment’ and ‘unemployment’; emotions that young people experienced most often in the past month were powerlessness, numbness, and despair.
On the other hand, change in university entrance rates in Korea calls for a new perspective on the issue of young generation. From 33.2% in 1990, the rates peaked in 2008 at 83.8%. As of 2015, as many as 70.8% of young people in Korea still enter university.
The university culture of the 1960s was one of passion, excitement, chaos and escapism. The high feelings of the 19 April Revolution in 1960 were soon crushed by the 16 May Coup in the following year; the dreams of a new age were shattered. And yet, the development of mass media such as TV, radio, cinema and magazine showed a university culture more proactive than any other era.
The 1970s then blossomed ‘youth culture.’ Although an influx of Western culture created new dynamism, repressive state regime imposed various censorship and controls on the individual and the cultural. Keywords which characterize the youth culture of the 1970s include ‘beer,’ ‘jeans,’ and ‘guitar.’ The 1980s was a decade of student movement. Universities most boldly manifested their social position during this period, and as a result the 1980s marked a time when university culture had most distinctive identity. Thus the 1970s saw university culture blossoming from within the context of developing youth culture at large, whereas the 1980s established university culture as a representative form of general youth culture.
During the 1990s, with the rise of pop band Seotaeji and Boys, university culture moved its focus from ideology to culture. Along with globalization discourse and changes in education policy, youth culture also changed.
After the so‐called IMF crisis in 1997, a wave of neo‐liberalism redefined the Korean society with the values of riches and success. For the young generation, however, this was a period of rising tuition fees, pressure to build specification and youth unemployment.
Various generation labels have been coined throughout this history: 386 generation: New Generation or X‐generation: N‐generation or Y‐generation (millennials) to name a few. Recently, the expression ‘surplus generation’ has found currency. (The ironically‐termed dalgwan (philosophical) generation, a translation of satori generation in Japan, is also used.) These generational classifications are based on birth cohort as well as economic, social and cultural shifts. They act to make the values of youth culture weak or subservient.
Korean youth have not found their voice in the Korean society. They exist, but their existence remains unseen: they are invisible. What is now required to revive Korean youth goes beyond cooperatives, social enterprises and youth grants; they need desires and creativity. A policy approach is called for in addressing various issues of youth generation, such as housing, jobs, entertainment and their place in society.