2017, Vol., No.105

The Implication of War conducted by USA on the Changes of ROK-US Alliance

Jang Kwangyeol | 2017, (105) | pp.1~44 | number of Cited : 1

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In the case of asymmetric alliance like that of ROK-US, naturally, the side having more power has the initiative, taking lead to have advantage over the weak partner. And it is possibly normal phenomenon that the weak power does not have main role for the alliance and makes a concession to strong power’s demand. But when strong power gets involve in any war, the status become different, that is, the pattern of alliance is altered. In results of this study, the weak partners’s demands has more powerful influence on strong power’s in wartime compared to peacetime. That means the weak power’s influence to the changes of alliance reinforce on the strong power’s in wartime. It is because the alliance policy of the weak power become more active and bigger concentration and confidence for negotiation in strong power’s in wartime. In order to prove this phenomenon, I paid attention to three things in this study. The first is ‘Two Level Game theory’ which is that "How international and domestic level political functions make negotiation processing and products of alliance." The second is ‘Asymmetrical Negotiation Theory’. I trace the how weak power overcome the gap of total national abilities with strong power thorough the negotiation during the strong power’s in war and peace time. The next is the result of this study. Weak side has more initiative for the negotiation in strong power’s in wartime. Because the strong power has to concentrate his attention on the war, and weak power has more alternatives than strong power’s on peacetime. Moreover I checked the strong nation has expended ‘win-set’ for the negotiation by domestic political pressure and international situation, but weak power has small ‘win-set’ during the strong power’s wartime. There for during the strong power’s wartime, the bilateral asymmetrical alliance changed to weak power’s favor. But in peacetime, strong power leads the alliance with his total national abilities. In the last analysis, if weak power want to have initiative in asymmetrical alliance with strong nation, The nation has to have attention to strong nation’s wartime and quasi-state of war. And in strong power’s peacetime, weak power make small win-set through hearing public opinion and diversity of strategy and tactics for negotiation with strong power.

A Study on the Battle of White Horse Hill, 1952 : Analysis on the 9th ROK Division's Improved Capabilities of combat execution

Jongnam Na | 2017, (105) | pp.45~94 | number of Cited : 4

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This paper deals with the 9th ROK Division's historic victory against the Chinese forces at the Battle of White Horse Hill, October 1952. Although there have been many, official and/or academic, researches on this battle, mostly, they have focused on some vague factors such as mental power as key factors of the victory. This paper, however, tries to suggest fresh point of views on this battle by analyzing several first-handed data of the battle such as number of troops, casualties, times and durations of engagements, number of consumed ammunition, and etc. While suggesting the concept of ways of fighting and combat effectiveness as a analyzing frame, This paper seeks to find out how the 9th ROK Division was able to repulse the Chinese troops for more than 12 times during the 10-days long fierce and bloody battle. In order to review the detailed backgrounds of the 9th Division, this paper follow the history of this unit since May 1951 when it was collapsed seriously by the Chinese forces. After the defeat, the 9th Division was the first ROK unit that entered the Field Training Command(FTC) in August 1951 in order to reorganize and rehabilitate under the guidance of US Forces in Korean and KMAG. During 8 weeks of a well-organized training at the FTC, officers and soldiers of this division learned modern combat skills by harmonizing firepower and mobility of forces together. Also, since this unit came back to the front line in November 1951, The commanders of this unit never stopped to train their soldiers and troops by using FTC training models while increasing its combat effectiveness. When the Battle of White Horse Hill started in early October 1952 finally, the 9th ROK Division overwhelmed the Chinese forces by not allowing for the enemy to capture Hill 395. Although the Chinese troops captured the top seven times briefly during 10 days of the battle, the 9th ROK Division never stopped to repulse the enemy from the top with superior combat power based on more numbers of troops, strong firepower, and effective leadership skills. By analysing several key data on the Battle of White Horse Hill, this paper sheds light on the 9th ROK Division's developed way of fighting and superior combat effectiveness as the main factors of its final victory against the Chinese forces.

The analysis of Kim Ilsung’s Strategy during Korean War : The Tendency of Turning Strategy into Tactics

Kim Tae Hyun | 2017, (105) | pp.95~150 | number of Cited : 3

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The Purpose of this article is to analyze the dynamics of ‘Strategy of Tactics’, based on a case study of Kim Ilsung’s strategy during Korean War, especially the period from June to September 1950. The strategy of tactics can explain why Kim Ilsung as a supreme war commander of north Korean Army conducted the Korean War like a battle rather than war without any consideration or calculation on the possible ‘friction of war’(conceptualized by Carl von Clausewitz). This research argues that a discord or a mismatch in the level of war defined in the ‘strategy - operational art - tactics’ hierarchical system facilitated the military adventurism and rigidity of strategy, which ultimately contributed to expand a crack and friction between ideal war(merely war planning) and real war(conduct of war). This basic conceptual framework defined as ‘tacticization of strategy’ illustrates a phenomenon that a lower level of war strategy(tactics) dominates the logic of higher level of strategy, possibly compared with a paradoxical situation such as ‘the tail wags the dog’. This article argues that Kim Ilsung’s tactics-oriented way of thinking, misinterpreting the whole war as a battle or combat rather than as a ‘war itself’, was an critical factor which motivated him an adventuristic initiation of war, and caused an unexpected friction and catastrophic mistakes and failure in the conduct of the initial offensive phase of Korean War from June to September 1950. This explanatory concept of ‘tacticization of strategy’ or ‘strategy of tactics’ can explain why Kim Ilsung miscalculated the war prospect based on a wishful thinking such as a blitzkrieg-victory illusion. This was a decisive mistake he made during war decision making process, which forced him not to assess and decide in a strategic sense during conduct of war as well. He overestimated the impact of blitzkrieg. He believed once north Korean army occupied south Korean Capital within a short period, the south Korean government would collapse and then he could rule all the territory in the southern part of Korean Peninsula. This illusion of blitzkrieg before and during war made his war as a simple combat or battle at a tactical level. As long as he regarded his war as a ‘mere combat, there was no reason to take into account the frictions of war for him. He never doubted the victory of his army. Kim Ilsung’s misunderstanding of war, defined as a tacticization of strategy in this article, resulted in a fatal catastrophe for him.

The ROK Government's Counter Strategy to the US at the Beginning stage of the 1968 Pueblo Incident: Focused on the Fear of Abandonment

Joonseok Yang | 2017, (105) | pp.151~188 | number of Cited : 7

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From “August Storm” to “Desert Storm”: The U.S. Army’s Research and Adoption of the Soviet Theory of Operational Art in the Cold War Era

HANSU LYU | 2017, (105) | pp.189~226 | number of Cited : 3

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The purpose of this article is to examine the influence exerted by the American military scholars on the adoption by the U.S. Army of the theory of operational art which had been developed in the Soviet Union. We could see that the Russian military theorist Alexander Svechin introduced the innovative concept of operational art in 1920s. The Soviet army was quick to adopt operational art as its official military theory, whereas the U.S. army ignored it for a long time. The latter’s denial of the operational art can be explained by the fact that there was no the massive standing army which could be a basis of operational art and the lack of the experiences of managing the massive army in USA during the peace time. Moreover, the massive conventional forces have been replaced by nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The defeat in the Vietnam War, the massive build-up of the Soviet conventional forces, and the result of the Middle East War in 1973 compelled the U.S. army to think it necessary to adopt an intermediate concept between strategy and tactic, however. Under such circumstances, some American specialists in the Soviet army such as David Glantz and Jacob Kipp began to argue that the U.S. army should not hesitate to adopt the operational-level art which was the part and parcel of the Soviet military theories. Their endeavor prompted the United States Army Command and General Staff College to use the Soviet military literature as textbooks in the School of Advanced Military Studies. At last, the concept of operational art was officially stipulated in the 1986 FM-100/5. Those competent U.S. staff officers who learned the operational-level art by studying the Soviet military theories proceeded to make the efficient plans for the U.S. army’s military campaigns in the Gulf War in 1991. In a nutshell, some excellent Western specialists scrutinized the military theories of the Soviet Army in the Cold War era and contributed to the adoption by the U.S. Army of the operational art developed by the Soviet military theorists. As a result the USA won the Gulf War in 1991.

US-Soviets Military Cooperation regarding the Soviet Union’s participation in Counter-Japanese War during World War II - Focused on the role of 'Lend-lease Act' and 'Project Hula' -

Heonyong Sim | 2017, (105) | pp.227~256 | number of Cited : 5

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Unlike the generalization of US-Soviets conflicts during the period of the Cold War, they have maintained the mutually cooperative relationships during the period of World War II. Especially, during the Second World War, the US and the Soviets developed mutual cooperation efforts against the common enemy fascist Germany and Japanese militarism. The partnership between the US and the Soviets began in earnest when the US Lend-lease Act was extended to the Soviets after the Germany invasion of Poland and Czech Republic in September 1939. In June 1941, when Germany attacked Soviet Union and in December 1941, Japan attacked US respectively, the partnership of US-Soviets has been more strengthened. This article intends to explore the relationship of US-Soviets cooperation during the World War II in context of the participation of Soviet army in anti-Japanese War and the 'Lend-lease Act'. The United States has called for the Soviets to participate in the war against Japan during a series of wartime talks. Compensation for war participation of Soviet Union was military support and in the recovery of territory and the expansion of influence that had been lost. This article analyzed in relation to the historical facts how the exchange of views between the leaders of two countries and the changes in military strategy of the two countries had been developed due to changes in the war situation. this area has not been highlighted in domestic academic circles. In particular, I have been interested in the military cooperation between US-Soviets, which was deepened during the preparation of the list of additional logistical support requested by the Soviet Union after their decision to participate in the war against Japan. The 5th Moscow protocol, named as Milepost program, not only provided military supplies and equipment, but also extended training Soviets soldiers to operate advanced weapons, equipment, and warships. This secret cooperation project, called 'project Hula’, demonstrates the extent to which military cooperation between the two countries against the common enemy has reached. However, in the Cold War era, which was established immediately after World WarⅡ, the military cooperation of US-Soviet was no longer developed and the project which had been carried out was also secretly buried.

The Design of the Allies’ Military Strategies and the Post-War Structure at the Cairo Conference of 1943

Yoon, Young Hwi | 2017, (105) | pp.257~286 | number of Cited : 2

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For many Asian countries including Korea, the Cairo Conference has significant implications. At the Conference, leaders of the allied nations pledged to accede the occupied territory from Japan to China and grant the independence of Korea ‘in due course’. The Cairo Declaration was reconfirmed at the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and accepted by the Japanese after the war. The previous studies have mainly focused on ‘the Declaration' itself or its effects on the destiny of the East Asian countries. However, the allies’ motivations for holding the conference, which underlay much of the Declaration, have not been a frequent theme of research. Many researchers have engaged in ‘circular logic’; that is, they have emphasized the Declaration, assuming the Cairo Conference was held to discuss the destiny of several areas in East Asia. The ‘Foreign Relations of the United States' documents concerning the process of Conference’s preparation offer a more comprehensive interpretation of its historical meaning, which the Declaration cannot fully demonstrate by itself. Firstly, heads of nations at Cairo in 1943 needed to establish a new international order in East Asia. There was a disagreement over the Chinese role in the post-war structure between the two Western leaders and Stalin. The meaning of a passage in the Declaration, stating ‘all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese…shall be restored’, could be fully understood by considering the three leaders' political intentions. The passage was prepared after the three allies reconciled their ideas over this international political issue. Moreover, due importance should be given to the military strategic aspects of the Cairo Conference. In late 1943, the allied forces were laying plans for the recapture of Burma, while they had diverse opinions about the day on which an operation commenced and the extent of British military intervention on the Burmese front. They also showed different views over the Soviets' participation in future military operations against Japanese imperialism. Thus, the passage ‘The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air expressed the greatest common factor among the three allied forces rather than a rhetorical comment. In this sense, through a thorough investigation of the three great powers' motivations in terms of international–political and military purposes at the Conference, the historical meaning of the Declaration can be explained more comprehensively.

The Hidden Side and distinct characteristics of the Slogan for 'Counter America and Assist N. Korea Movements in the area of Shanghai in China - A Border Line between 'Resistance to America' and 'Assistance to N. Korea'-

Kim, Tae-yoon | 2017, (105) | pp.287~316 | number of Cited : 0

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After the Second World War, China had to undergo another war of Chinese Civil war in 1945 amid the atmosphere of the Cold War. For this reason, from 1945 to 1950 when the Korean War began, China was in an ideological and economic instability, and it needed a major event to change the atmosphere of China. Amid this situation, the Korean War began. For the Chinese Communist Party, participating in an ideological war that was taking place outside the mainland China was to help a brother nation from the internationalist point of view and it was an opportunity to resolve a chaotic atmosphere in China. Eventually, the Korean War became a means by which China could resolve the turmoil by means of the "mass mobilization using the revival of the wartime economic system". Mao Zedong, who had already overcome many difficulties by means of the mobilization of the people from the past, started the domestic mass mobilization campaign under the external slogan of 'Counter America and Assist N. Korea'. First of all, in order to eliminate the ideology of the Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party of the liberalist camp, it renovated the consciousness through the current affairs propaganda campaign and encouraged the awakened crowds to voluntarily participate in the mass mobilization movement and the patriotic commitment campaign. As a result, the 'Resist America and Assist N. Korea Movement was a mobilization movement that gave North Korea the assistance both physically and mentally, but, in terms of actual benefits and losses, the current affairs propaganda was a means to solidify the ideological foundation of the Chinese Communist Party. In the name of 'Resist America and Assist N. Korea Movement', China carried out a 'thorough ideological education for the general mass of a newly independent country and such initiative by the Chinese Communist Party is evaluated to have been successful. The same was true of the mass mobilization movement. The weapons contribution movement and the patriotic commitment campaign through the mass mobilization led to the strengthening of the military forces of the Chinese People's Army. Furthermore, the saving campaign and the production increase campaign based on patriotism under the wartime economic system also sent their economic power soaring. A state-to-state relationship proceeds in consideration of the mutual economic issues. On the surface, the relationship between China and North Korea has been known to be a blood alliance dating back to the time of the Japanese colonial rule. However, it cannot be said that China carried out the "Resist America and Assist N. Korea Movement" and sent the Chinese Voluntary Army to North Korea simply in order to protect the communist camp for the benefit of the proletarian internationalism. China also tried to help North Korea by going out of its way to organize the 'Resist America and Assist N. Korea Movement in order to sort out its domestic turbulent conditions and to solve the economic problems. At the same time, the Koreans in the Yanbian area, who thought of North Korea as their "motherland" and wanted to participate in the North Korean War, supported the Chinese People's Volunteer Army out of their patriotism, but these people in an ethnic minority in China did so because they wanted to be duly recognized as Chinese citizens.

A Study on 'Seonso', which means the place for building warships, within the Jurisdiction of JeollaJwasuyeong in the Joseon Era

Song Eun Il | 2017, (105) | pp.317~360 | number of Cited : 12

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The seonso in naval post within the jurisdiction of JeollaJwasuyeong were mostly established when or before each navel post was set up. That is, they were mostly established between the reign of King Taejo and King Jungjong. The installation and origin of Eup Seonso were deeply connected to the changing military defense system of Joseon during the former half of its history. The Jingwan system, which had been the basis of national defense system since 1457년(third year of King Sejo's rule), was replaced with the new system of Jeseungbangryak around Eulmyowaebyeon(tenth year of King Myeongjong's rule), which brought considerable changes to the maritime defense system. The naval forces grouped together only the naval posts along the coast and organized them into Jingwan under the old Jingwan system, connecting them to no administrative districts. Under the system of Jeseungbangyrak, however, they built the naval forces in the Eups along the coast and even near Jujin as well as the naval posts and put them under the jurisdiction of naval forces Jeoldosa. As a result, Eupsugun was created in each Eup, and Seonso were established at places where the Eupsugun could be stationed and warships could be built and moored. Most of naval post Seonso were located right in front of the south gates of naval posts with two exceptions: Bangdapjin and Yeodojin Seonso lied outside the south and north gates, respectively, thus holding a unique position. Eup Seonsos were scattered around the region with Suncheonbu Seonso in Shingi-dong of current Yeosu City, Jangheungbu Seonso in Haechang-ri, Anryang-myeon of current Jangheung-kun, Boseonggun Seonso in Seonso Village, Obong-ri, Deukryang-myeon of current Boseong-kun, Nakamgun Seonso in Jinseok Village, Jangyang-ri, Beolgyo-eup of current Boseong-kun, Heungyanghyeon Seonso in Deokheung-ri, Dohwa-myeon of current Goheung-kun, and Gwangjanghyeon Seonso in Jinwol-ri, Jinwol-myeon of current Gwangyang-kun. Each Seonso was located in a point of strategic importance not exposed to the distant sea or outside. As for the operation of Seonseo, the supreme commander of naval post was in charge of naval post Seonso with his subordinates including Uhu, Gyosu, and Gamjojeonseonchulnapgungwan taking the field responsibilities. Under their supervision, a good number of people were active at the Seonsos. Eup Seonsos were taken care of by the captain that was followed by Bangseonjang, Gipaegwan, Podogwan, Hundo, Gungigamgwan, Seonchanggamgwan, Sabu, Hwapojang, Posu, Tagong, Sagong, Musang, Yosu, Jeongsu, and Neungrogun. Not all of them were regular employees since only the essential members including Bangseonjang, Gipaegwan, Podogwan, and Hundo as well as the captain were regular employees. Eup Seonso where those members were active were under the jurisdiction of concerned Eups, which means that their operation was in principle the right and duty of Eup heads. Each Eup took care of a lot of work and covered all the aspects of operation with the exception of military affairs, which were under the authority of Jeolla Jwasusa of Jeolla Jwasuyeong rather than the Eup heads. There were many public facilities including Seonchang, Jujeupgo, and Sugungi at each of those naval post Seonsos and Eup Seonso that were operated in those ways.

The Awareness of Territory and Border Dispute of the Early Stage of Goryeo Dynasty

AnSik Shin | 2017, (105) | pp.361~388 | number of Cited : 7

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The Demarcation of Goryeo territory was largely determined with dynastical awareness of northern territory which had been steadily formed since foundation of nation, and the central interest was based on the Yalu river. The point that Yalu coast was included in northern territorial awareness had a regular difference in respect of ideological and actual significance of domination. The way of realizing this was actualized through the institutional strategy of Yanggae(兩界) along with the concrete domination through construction of fortress. Northern territorial awareness during the early Goryeo can be said to have been conceptualized with Maheoltan(馬歇灘) and Seokseong(石城) of Yalu coast, mentioned in ChoiSeungro’s Simuchaek. It can be controversial whether Maheoltan was located, however concrete mention of Yalu river implies that the concept of Yalu river was regularly operated in the center of dynastical northern territorial awareness since foundation of Goryeo. The point when Yalu coast was entered in the actual domination of Goryeo was due to the 1st invasion of Khitan during Seongjong’s reign 12th year and the result of reconciliation conference between SeoHee and SoSonnyeong, the admiral of Khitan. It is determined that Ganghwa conference between Seo Hee and So Sonnyeong did not made a clear conclusion of demarcating border between the two countries, however a compromise to acknowledge domination of the two countries was made by dividing into Gangdong(江東) and Gangseo(江西) based on Yalu river. The point that Goryeo acquired in the process of reconciliation with Khitan during the 12th year of Seongjong’s reign was above all regularization of advance into Yalu riverside. This not only realized identity of dynastical northern territorial awareness, but also secured stable regional base of border demarcation externally. This also was the basis to overcome two invasions of Khitan during Hyunjong’s reign, which contributed to firmness of norther region of Goryeo by constructing ‘Goryeojangseong’ during the reign of Deokjong. On the other hand, the significance of reconciliation conference during the 12th year of Seongjong’s reign was generally named as acquisition of ‘Gangdong 6-ju’. However, the point when ‘Gangdong 6-ju’ became the focus of attention was during Hyunjong. Also, the intention of Goryeo's royal court in the process of reconciliation conference implied the securement of justification of driving out the tribe of Yeojin between Goryeo and Khitan. Of course, it is not clear the scope of drive out of the tribe of Yeojin, realization of this was an important issue of northern stabilization of Goryeo. Accordingly, the researcher considers it is necessary to emphasize the significance of border demarcation through advance into Yalu riverside next to drive out of Yeojin, rather than symbolizing the output of reconciliation conference between Goryeo and Khitan as ‘Gangdong 6-ju’.

A Systematic Understanding of Korean-Rusian Military Relations - Sim, Heon-yong, 『Soviet's Military Policy on the Korean Peninsula(1917~1948)』(Institute for Military History, MND, 2016)

Kee Kwang Seo | 2017, (105) | pp.389~400 | number of Cited : 0

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Causes and History of Wars in the perspective of Darwinism - Azar Gat. 『War in Human Civilization』(Oxford University Press, 2006)-

Choi, Young-Jin | 2017, (105) | pp.401~411 | number of Cited : 0

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2017, Vol., No.105