2021, Vol., No.119

A Study on the Transition from the United Nations Cemetery to the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea - Centered on the Period from 1955 to 1960 -

Lee Chungsun | 2021, (119) | pp.1~34 | number of Cited : 1

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Following the 70th anniversary of the Korean War outbreak in 2020, the year of 2021 marks the 70th anniversary of establishing the United Nations (UN) Cemetery in 1951. In light of these two significant milestones, this thesis examines the transition period　from the UN Cemetery to the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea (UNMCK), mainly focusing from 1955 to 1960. The study researches the historical process from the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 977(X) (Resolution 977(X)) in 1955 to the signing of the “Agreement with the United Nations and the Republic of Korea on the Establishment and Maintenance of the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea (Agreement)” in 1959. Also, the research scrutinizes the aspects of the transfer ceremony from the UN Command to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) of taking over the UNMCK in March 1960, which remain unexplored in the existing literature. Expanding its meaning as the UN's symbolic milieu, the decision-making process of contention, compromise, and cooperation among the UN allied nations during the Korean War demonstrates a collective response of common destiny in the period of Cold War. In this regard, Resolution 977(X) and the Agreement, which provide the cause for the burial ground of the fallen soldiers fought under the UN Command, can be understood as significant milestones in the history of both the Republic of Korea and the UN. Moreover, the study suggests that we should correct the misinformation regarding the management and signing of the UNMCK by analyzing the historical papers of the United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (UNA), UN materials, and newspaper articles. In particular, the UN archival documents, which are the first materials to be released, are expected to expand the scope of existing military research by filling the gap in academic discourse on the Korean War and the UN.

The Competition of Naval Power between U.S.-Japan in the Pacific Ocean during the Inter-War Period

Jung Gwang Ho | 2021, (119) | pp.35~79 | number of Cited : 0

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This article analyzes the competition of naval power between the U.S. and Japan before the outbreak of the Pacific War in the early 20th century. Japan, which emerged as a new maritime power in Asia in the early 20th century, began to seek hegemony in the Pacific region, whereas the United States, which sought to maintain the status quo in the Pacific region, recognized Japan's move as a challenge to the United States. The U.S.-Japan competition, which took place in the Pacific region, developed into a naval superiority competition, and eventually the Pacific War broke out in 1941. The naval power competition between the two countries raised the question of how to operate naval forces in Asia-Pacific, which developed into a maritime strategy competition between Japan's “interception-attrition strategy” and the U.S. war plan “Orange” ➜ war plan “Rainbow" against Japan. After the end of World War I, Japan became the first Asian maritime power and advanced to the South Pacific ocean. Japan joined the Washington regime in 1922, but considered the U.S. as the first virtual enemy and continued to build submarines, landing ships, and auxiliary ships which were exceptional maritime arsenals from the treaty. After terminating from the Treaty of Washington in 1936, Japan continued to strengthen its naval capabilities and developing a maritime strategy(interception-attrition strategy). Meanwhile, the U.S. began to recognize Japan as an official potential enemy in the 20th century, and developed an orange plan against Japan. The real perception of Japan's threat came as Japan's withdraw from Washington Treaty(1936). In 1938, the U.S. began building up its naval capabilities through the Vinson-Tramel Act to enhance its naval power, and responded to Japan's naval capabilities. The U.S. won over Japan in the maritime strategic level.

The Analysis on the Matter of Diverting Use of the Extraordinary War Expenditure by Japanese Army and Navy during the Second Sino-Japanese War - Focused on the Study originated from the Imperial Diet -

YUN HYEN MYENG | 2021, (119) | pp.81~113 | number of Cited : 3

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This article aims at focusing on the matter of diverting use of the Extraordinary War Expenditure by Japanese Army and Navy during the Second Sino-Japanese War and analyzing it. When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in July, 1937, the Japanese Government decided to run the Extraordinary War Expenditure for the war. Therefore, drafts for special accounting laws and expenses of the Extraordinary War Expenditure were submitted to the Imperial Diet in September in the same year. But the Diet members were concerned about the prolonged and extra use of the Extraordinary War Expenditure, because there were various problems caused by the dispatch of troops in Siberia resulting in the prolongation of the World War I in the past. However, the government said that the Extraordinary War Expenditure would be short-term means and they were used for the Second Sino-Japanese War only. Therefore, the members of the Imperial Diet raised the questions about the Extraordinary War Expenditure during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The government emphasized that the Extraordinary War Expenditure were justly used for the Second Sino-Japanse War. but the government's reply was not a fact. The Japanese Army and Navy diverted large amount of the Extraordinary War Expenditure for expansion of armament for the the Soviet Union and USA, respectively. It could be confirmed by internal documents from the Navy and the Ministry of Finance, and the testimonies by the parties concerned. In conclusion, the Japanese Government(especially, the Army and Navy) diverted large sum of the Extraordinary War Expenditure, which could not be used with any other purpose. Then, what is the noteworthy matters of diverting use of the Extraordinary War Expenditure by the Japanese Army and Navy? There are broadly two points as follows: First, it was the deterioration in control of military expenses by the Imperial Diet. Second, it was collaboration between the Ministry of Finance and the Army and Navy. Therefore, the matter of diverting use of the Extraordinary War Expenditure in the Japanese Army and Navy shows that How much did the Imperial Diet control military expenses and How was relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the military authorities.

Alfred Thayer Mahan's Theory on Naval Strategy and Change of the U.S. Naval Strategy in the Early 20th Century

Kim, Dong-eun | 2021, (119) | pp.115~163 | number of Cited : 2

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Mahan's Maritime Military Thought, based on geopolitical threat perception, greatly influenced America's maritime imperialization in the early 20th century. Through his maritime strategy, the 20th century could be a true "The century of America," and the U.S.,which became a global superpower after World War II, maintains the maritime-centered grand strategy that Mahan had insisted on. Therefore, in this study, I believe that the strategic origin of the U.S. Navy as of the 21st century was Mahan's thought, and we will first consider what his thought on naval strategy was. Then we will look at how Mahan's thought on naval strategy was implemented throughout each administration during the late 19th and early 20th centuries when the United States emerged as a super power. The goal of Mahan's thought on naval strategy was not limited to simply building high-quality large ships to build naval forces, and, as many people often misunderstand, he did not pursue unlimited decisive fleet battles. Mahan defined naval strategy as a key means of foreign policy. In the end, Mahan saw that the goal of the naval strategy was to play in a role in a "big stick" to carry out national foreign policies and protect and promote national interests. He judged that an offensive combat fleet centered on the capital ship was necessary to achieve the goal of this naval strategy, and sought to achieve "maritime superiority" through the concentration of the fleet. He also mentioned the importance of "securing forward naval bases" to help combat fleets operate smoothly overseas. The administrations of McKinley, Teddy Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson in the early 20th century, which were directly and indirectly influenced by Mahan's thought on naval strategy, established naval strategies in a similar context to the naval strategy that Mahan advocated.

The Characteristics of siege warfare by the time period of the Roman Republic

Bae Eun Suk | 2021, (119) | pp.165~200 | number of Cited : 1

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This study attempts to study the frequency of siege tactics and direct attacks in a total of 167 battles carried out by Roman army during the Republican period. Of the 13 battles in the 6th-5th centuries BC, none of the encirclement battles were conducted alone. Out of 10 battles, 5 battles were conducted by encirclement, the rest ones, 5 battles were in the form of direct attack immediately. There were a total of 17 battles that took place in the 4th century BC. Only 2 battles of them had built an encircling net. After establishing a siege, After establishing a siege network, it also entered the offensive battle. There was not a single battle that was just an encircling battle. Out of a total of 36 battles in the 3rd century BC, 8 battles used the encircling tactics. In the 2nd century BC, there were a total of 43 battles. Among them, 14 battles were carried out using the encircling tactics. There were only 2(4.7%) battles that built the encircling net. What stands out in siege wars of the 1st century BC is that the number of cases in which the siege network was established was 31(53.5%) out of 58 battles. Of these, 19(32.8%) battles formed only an encircling net, and 12(20.7%) battles attacked after establishing the siege network. Overall, however, aggressive tactics remained the same. After establishing the siege, the attack battles and the immediate attack battles amounted to 34(58.6%) battles. What is notable in the siege of the 1st century BC is that 31(53.5%) battles of the 58 battles were launched. Among them, 19(32.8%) battles were made a formation just for the encircling net, and 12(20.7%) battles were engaged in offensive battles after establishing siege networks. After establishing the siege network, 34(58.6%) battles were immediately launched. Analyzing a total of 167 battles fought by the Romans until the 6th-1st century BC, the Romans continued to favor aggressive tactics. Since the 3rd century BC, as siege equipment developed, more active siege wars were carried out. Siege warfare increased in the first century BC, but the overall rate was more offensive warfare. Therefore, in the battles of Numantia, Alesia, and Perusia, the sophistication of constructing the siege network by mobilizing a large number of troops and the technique of constructing the encircling net were advanced, but the encircling tactics was not a typical tactics of the Roman army.

The Triangle Relations among ROK, DPRK and Iran - Iran’s Hedging Strategy in the early stage of Iran-Iraq War(1980-1984) -

LEE HANHYUNG | 2021, (119) | pp.201~227 | number of Cited : 0

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[Book Review] Re-awareness of the meaning and role of the South Korea-U.S. alliance in modern Korean history.

Park Dong soon | 2021, (119) | pp.229~247 | number of Cited : 1

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military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

2021, Vol., No.119