2026, Vol., No.139

military history 2024 KCI Impact Factor : 1.07

pISSN : 1598-317X / eISSN : 2713-8992
https://journal.kci.go.kr/imhc

This article reexamines the Hanseong Campaign of 475 CE not as a simple surprise siege, but as a planned military operation in which Goguryeo integrated prior intelligence, force mobilization, encirclement, fire attack, and logistical support. Previous scholarship has focused primarily on the diplomatic background of Hanseong’s fall and the broader international context, leaving the actual course of the campaign and its military character relatively underexamined. To address this gap, the study cross-reads textual sources with archaeological and scientific evidence concerning Baekje’s defensive network in the Hanseong period, paleotopography, traces of fire, transportation routes, and supply conditions. The analysis suggests that Goguryeo’s southward advance was not an abrupt, improvised assault, but a planned campaign that combined intelligence gathering, troop mobilization, logistical preparation, encirclement of the capital area, and fire attack. In this respect, the Hanseong Campaign points to an operational level mediating between strategic objectives and tactical action rather than to a single battle in the narrow sense. By drawing on concepts from modern military studies in a limited and cautious manner, this article clarifies one aspect of Goguryeo’s conduct of war under King Jangsu. This reappraisal revises prevailing interpretations of the Hanseong Campaign and highlights the planning, complexity, and continuity of Goguryeo’s warfare under King Jangsu.

This article examines the establishment and operation of Ch’ongwiyŏng (總衛營) in 1846 under King Hŏnjong, as well as its abolition and subsequent reversion to Ch’ongyungch’ŏng (摠戎廳), in order to reconsider the reorganization of capital defense and royal guard systems in early nineteenth-century Chosŏn. Ch’ongwiyŏng was not simply a newly created royal guard camp, but a reorganized military institution built upon the institutional foundation of Ch’ongyungch’ŏng, which had long linked the defense of the capital and its outer perimeter through its bases at Yŏnyungdae and Pukhansansŏng. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Chosŏn faced mounting constraints, including fiscal exhaustion, weakening military capacity, factionalized politics, and the growing threat posed by the appearance of foreign vessels. Under these conditions, Ch’ongyungch’ŏng had already expanded its functions from outer defensive operations to duties closely related to royal protection, including escorting royal processions, maintaining forward encampments, and participating in urban defense. The establishment of Ch’ongwiyŏng thus institutionalized and strengthened this accumulated operational experience. By absorbing troops and resources from other central military garrisons, Ch’ongwiyŏng concentrated on palace guard service, royal escort, and related protective duties, while reinforcing the substance of royal protection through training and organizational reconfiguration. Although short-lived, it marked the institutional crystallization of Ch’ongyungch’ŏng’s functional transformation and a significant phase in the reorganization of late Chosŏn capital defense.

This study reconstructs the vision and development of a ROK-led security alliance initiative based on APACL and analyzes its failure through two factors: the US strategic dilemma and Syngman Rhee’s anti-communist and anti-Japanese threat perceptions. The failure of the ROK-led defense alliance stemmed from structural constraints arising from the US dilemma toward the ROK: Although the United States regarded the ROK as an “indispensable anchor” in its anti-communist strategy and island defense line in Asia, it simultaneously feared the risks of escalation and loss of control associated with Rhee’s independent actions. Consequently, Washington did not support the formation of a ROK-led anti-communist organization, and the ROK’s exclusion from SEATO further reinforced Rhee’s pursuit of an autonomous security initiative such as APACL. At the same time, Rhee’s anti-communist stance coexisted with strong anti-Japanese sentiment, leading him to reject any regional defense arrangement that included Japan. This limited the institutional expansion of his security vision. Consequently, the interaction between US control concerns and Rhee’s threat perception generated structural tension, resulting in the failure of APACL’s institutionalization. Despite this outcome, the APACL initiative represents an early case in which a weaker ally sought to expand autonomy and exert diplomatic leverage within a US-centered alliance order.