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The ROK’s Military Strategy and Force Enhancement Planning Against North Korean Nuclear Threats Around the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis

  • military history
  • 2026, (140), pp.559~600
  • Publisher : Military History Institute, MND
  • Research Area : Humanities > History
  • Received : June 29, 2026
  • Accepted : September 9, 2026
  • Published : September 15, 2026

문수빈 1,  Roh Young-Koo 1

1국방대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This study examines the ROK defense authorities’ perception of North Korea’s nuclear threat and their military strategy and force planning around the first North Korean nuclear crisis (late 1980s–mid-1990s). Cross-examining official defense publications, policy reports, and memoirs, it highlights the ROK military’s proactive responses, which have received limited attention in diplomatic histories. Amid concerns over possible U.S. troop reductions, the defense authorities pursued self-reliant defense by developing a deterrence-by-denial paradigm that combined active defense with multilayered missile defense. Through “limited defense sufficiency,” this strategy sought to reduce the likelihood of a successful North Korean attack, limit its military effects, and manage escalation risks. Despite institutional and technological constraints, the ROK military also pursued future strategic capabilities in surveillance and reconnaissance, missiles, missile defense, and nuclear-powered submarines. These efforts are historically significant as they provided an intellectual and conceptual foundation for today’s independent ROK “Three-Axis System.”

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