This study examines the Wonsan Landing Operation conducted by the Soviet Pacific Fleet in August 1945 from the perspective of military operational history. Previous studies have mainly discussed the Soviet advance into northern Korea in the contexts of liberation, occupation, Soviet-American relations, and the formation of the North Korean regime. By contrast, the sequence and manner in which the Soviet Pacific Fleet occupied the northern Korean east-coast ports of Unggi, Rajin, Chongjin, and Wonsan have not been sufficiently examined.
This article reconstructs the preparation of the Wonsan Landing Operation, the fleet’s entry into Yonghung Bay, the landing at Wonsan Port, the delay in Japanese surrender, the disarmament process, the seizure of the airfield, and the processing of Japanese prisoners. It draws primarily on Tsirulnikov’s report, Kabanov’s memoirs, and Gelfond’s account of Soviet naval operations, while comparing them with Japanese Monograph No. 155 and Morita Yoshio’s account.
The Wonsan Landing Operation was not a high-intensity combat landing like the Chongjin Landing Operation.
Japanese forces did not directly resist the landing at the pier, but they did not immediately comply with surrender and disarmament demands. The Soviet naval landing force pressured the Japanese command and gradually controlled the port, ships, key urban facilities, the airfield, and movement toward the railway. Therefore, the Wonsan Landing Operation was not a simple unopposed landing or a peaceful reception of surrender. It was an operation to seize the port, enforce surrender, and disarm Japanese forces amid the military uncertainty that remained after Japan’s surrender. Although its combat intensity was low, the Wonsan Landing Operation developed into a military control operation in the aftermath of Japan’s surrender.