2014, Vol., No.17

PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.5

pISSN : 1975-1621 / eISSN : 2092-0873
https://journal.kci.go.kr/insewtdgu

Why am I at all and not rather nothing? The question, if not aimed at exposing the physical cause of causal necessity, requires a philosophical explication of the reason why I should exist at all, as opposed to not existing. How could this fundamental philosophical question be raised from the philosophical viewpoint, if the human being is already given even before his or her own decision to exist? If I am free, I should be able to be through my own free decision. In order for me to be able to freely determine whether or not I am, however, an ontological contradiction would be inevitable in such a way that I should be there before I exist. On the contrary, if I am not able to make a decision about my existence, there would be another contradiction; I, through the will that is not my own, come into being as a free being, without being able to be free to determine for myself. Thus to ask why I am at all and not rather nothing, is to ask whether such fundamental freedom would be possible to the human being. This paper tries, from the question above, to consider basic moments and the possibility of human freedom termed as ‘self-caused’, and thereby also, to ask and answer the fundamental question of metaphysics as to why there is something at all and not rather nothing.

Disinterestedness in Kant’s critical philosophy is served as the qualitative moment that functions as a starting point for the judgement of taste. This moment is an aesthetical attitude of the cognitive subject that is not interested in whether the aesthetical object really is. And through having the attitude the subject can be aware of itself as one and united being of its nature and freedom. The moment of disinterestedness functions as to justify the subjective-universal claim of the aesthetical judgement in the moment of quantity, the foundation of purposiveness concept in the moment of relation, and the functional basis of sensus communis in the moment of mode. And moreover the moment of quality makes it possible both the judgement of sublimity and the indirect interest that produces genius artwork. In this way the moment of disinterestedness penetrates the aesthetical in general as well as the subjective universality. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that disinterestedness is a key concept to understand the aesthetical in general in Kant’s critical philosophy and to ascertain the meaning of art and it’s appreciation.

This paper aims to explicate the similarities between Schelling's identity philosophy and analytic psychology of C. G. Jung. Schelling's philosophy is similar to Jung's psychology in terms of 'wholeness', 'contradictoriness', 'transcendence', 'manifestation'. I examine the likeness of those two theories and try to provide a clinical application of Schelling's philosophy. First, concerning 'wholeness', I compare Schelling’s idea of absolute identity to Jung’s idea of wholeness. Both of them are meant to overcome the dualism. Second, about ‘contradictoriness’, I take it that both Schelling and Jung regard it as the essence of the world and spirit. Schelling's notion of absolute reason and Jung’s notion of self have that character in a similar manner. Third, concerning 'transcendence', I compare Schelling's intellectual intuition with Jung's emergence of archetype image. Schelling demands intellectual intuition to make the subject produce the object. Jung suggests archetype image in dream and active meditation. Finally, Schelling’s manifestation of the absolute in arts is comparable to that of collective unconsciousness of Jung. In conclusion, I suggest a clinical applicability of Schelling's philosophy based on the similarities with analytic psychology of Jung.