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The Intentionality of the Mind and Millikan's Theory of Proper Function

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2005, (2), pp.93~113
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities

Youngjin Kiem 1

1경기대학교

ABSTRACT

The present paper discusses the ontic possibility of an unfamiliar and peculiar type of intentionality, with reference to Ruth Millikan's theory of proper functions and intentionality. It is quite remarkable that Millikan's theory just mentioned could imply that biological devices such as eyes, heart, and lung may have a certain primitive form of aboutness. Philosophers call aboutness of the sort external intentionality. This view of aboutness, by the way, clashes with the traditional understanding of intentionality in which it is maintained that only a whole person with consciousness and intellect possesses the real intentionality that cannot be reduced to any physico-biological properties or functions. In this paper the author pursues the matter of whether and in what way the idea of external intentionality can have theoretical relevance to building a general theory of intentionality. More precisely put: the author, in connection with Millikan's ideas of proper functions, attempts to clarify a central tenet of the recent externalistic view of intentionality, i.e. the thesis that some intentional states include actual objects outside the mind in a direct manner.

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