본문 바로가기
  • Home

Enactivism, Emergence, and Downward Causation

Rhee, Youngeui 1

1강원대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to save the notion of downward causation in the face of the supervenience argument from a point of enactivism as a theory of mind. In section 2, I examine the causations held in Descartes' substance dualism and discuss the theoretical background in which the contemporary notion of downward causation has been introduced in relation to the notion of emergence. In section 3, I examine the impossibility of downward causation through the supervenience argument of Jaegwon Kim, a reductive physicalism. The supervenience argument consists of a first argument that only recognizes the supervenience relation in inter-level and a second argument that asserts the identical relation in inter-level as well as the mental causation intra-level. I examine the problems that the supervenience argument raises against enactivism. In section 4, as the preliminary stage, I discuss the hardcore of enactivism such as embodied action, autopoiesis, and principle of reciprocity and, based on them, the causations held in enactivism. In the discussion, the downward causation is not one but three types, and the path of downward causation is also three. I contend that downward causation belongs to the middle type, and that if the alleged reduction in the supervenience argument is replaced by a reciprocal causation, then enactivism can derive the notion of downward causation from the argument. In addition to the theoretical justification for the downward causation above, I discuss the case of epileptic seizure proposed by Varella et al. as an empirical justification and point out that it is a case for the middle type.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

This paper was written with support from the National Research Foundation of Korea.