2018, Vol., No.28

PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.5

pISSN : 1975-1621 / eISSN : 2092-0873
https://journal.kci.go.kr/insewtdgu

This article discusses how Marx explained the capitalist society with regard to distributive justice. First, a reconstruction of the Tucker-Wood thesis, the proposition that capitalist exploitation is just, will be examined. According to the functional explanation of the concept of justice adopted by Marx, insofar as the capitalist distribution structure is adequate to the capitalist mode of production, that structure cannot be considered unjust. Second, the thesis of Husami, which is incompatible with the Tucker-Wood thesis and contends that Marx evaluates the capitalist exploitation as unjust, will be analyzed. According to Husami, if Marx’s own principles of justice, namely ‘distribution according to labor contribution’ and ‘distribution according to needs’, are applied to the capitalist mode of production, it follows that capitalism is an unjust system. This article indirectly advocates the Tucker-Wood thesis by showing that Husami’s two principles derived from Marx’s “Critique of the Gotha Programme” cannot be considered normative principles of justice. In addition, this article shows that the defense of the Tucker-Wood thesis implies a critique of the assumption that the ‘circumstances of justice’ are permanent conditions of human life. Marx’s critique of capitalism cannot be understood as a normative critique which appeals to moral criterions. It is rather a historical materialistic criticism calling for historical transformation of social conditions itself that requires a certain norm as justice.

This study aims to analyze the changes of Wittgenstein’s viewpoint on the understanding of the term ‘wonder’, and it wants to give an overview of Wittgenstein’s dynamic stream of thoughts on the meaning of language and behavior. In the logical thinking of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s wonder draws a boundary between the limitations of language and the world, and leads us to the ultimate goal of his philosophy through 'silence' about unspeakable mysteries. The wonder here means a contemplative ‘wonder as a mode of silence.’ However, Wittgenstein describes the wonders of the existence of the world by analogy with an 'Excellent Experience' in his writing "A Lecture on Ethics" and reveals the opportunity to gain linguistic access to mystical things provided that we look at the world as a miracle. The term 'wonder' here refers to 'wonder as a mode of communication'. It denotes an understanding of the ethical things which are subject to silence in relation to human life, history, and culture, and it is translated into an anthropological thinking of the language. This shift of the viewpoint on ‘wonder’ shows the originality and continuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in that it constitutes the beginning of a new tradition of encountering foreign cultures while acknowledging the old tradition of our cultural heritage. Ultimately the merit of this study would be to reveal a path of meaningful thinking which arises from the path to the liberation of the spirit of Wittgenstein. He, as a human being, initiated it by constantly seeking communication with the world through the establishment of a series of successive relationships leading to the concepts ‘wonder’, ‘silence’, ‘speaking’ and ‘doing.’

This article examines the criterion provision of the empirical consciousness in the Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. According to Hegel, consciousness always relates itself to an object, and at the same time, consciousness also distinguishes the object from itself to establish it outside this relation. Furthermore, consciousness becomes aware of itself as knowing the object, and therefore, compares its knowledge with the object which is set outside this relation. In other words, consciousness while experiencing itself takes ‘in itself(Ansich)’ of the object which it establishes outside this relation as its criterion for measuring its objective knowledge. Now, the Ansich of the object, which consciousness takes as its criterion, is a shape of the object itself which by experience comes to be known always in a new form of essence. If its knowledge at each stage does not correspond to this criterion, consciousness alters its knowledge, the object of this knowledge, and its criterion until the last stage. The description of this process as a progress of forms of consciousness from the viewpoint of philosopher makes up the Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology of Spirit represents the movement of the science of experience of consciousness as it builds itself from below up to the scientific spirit(Geist). It also constitutes a phenomenology of the scientific spirit which recalls from above its training and educating stages(Bildungsstufen) in the multilayered structure of the moments that make up the truth.