2016, Vol., No.121

Possibilities for Historical Criticism Through History Films

Hana Lee | 2016, (121) | pp.7~40 | number of Cited : 11

This paper introduces historical films as a touchpoint of viewing historiophoty through two perspectives and discusses the role historians should play for them. The two perspectives on viewing historiophoty are none other than the perspectives of popularizing of history and that of producing historical contents, i.e. popular culturalization of history, which run parallel to each other and meet in the category of historical films. Thus, the confusing terms surrounding historical films, i.e. emplotment of history, faction, history film, etc., have been redefined and the requisites and category of movies that can be designated as history films established. Between the theses that history films must enlighten and awaken the masses and that of popular culturalization of history as consuming history as entertainment, history films can become an intellectual space for sharing these concerns. Thus, they can be taken as a touchpoint for conversation, shortening the existing gap of the method of emphasizing historical facts and interpretation and viewing historiophoty as a method of easily conveying history to the masses as well as being a method of consuming history as subject matter and resource of analysis and entertainment. This is because history films can fulfill both of these functions. The masses do not simply learn historical knowledge, but when the primary goal of history education and popularization of history is raising their abilities to think historically, historians must take a proactive attitude toward history films as a form of historical criticism. Historical criticism here does not mean that historians should stand in a superior role as enlightened intellectuals over producers of popular culture, but furnish stimulation and opportunities for viewers to actively participate in current problems through history films. Moreover, when history education still can be used as a tool of political repression of ideas, history films can be an effective bypass of providing alternative historical interpretations to the masses. As a site where history and the masses meet, today’s historians should actively participate in this area as history films can raise historical criticism by nurturing historical thinking and critical consciousness.

The Position of Park Jong-hwa and Kim Dong-ni, “the Descendants of anti-trusteeship(bantak: 反託) movement” and Right-wing literary field in Korea

Kong Im Soon | 2016, (121) | pp.41~79 | number of Cited : 13

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The first serious slip of the pen(pilhwa: 筆禍) event occurred immediately after 5·16 Military Coup. It’s target was the Bak Gye-ju’s novel “Yeosu(旅愁)” that serialized in the Dong-A Ilbo. The scene in question was support of trusteeship(chantak: 贊託) and the review of patriot figure represented Rhee Syng-man. But issues raised by the Bak gye-ju due to revolutionary mood in the April 19 sank beneath the surface again being dealt a severe blow by May 16th Military Regime. This case showed an internal injury that has been deeply rooted in Korea. It was trusteeship(takchi: 託治) and patriotic debates in 1946 that had been sweeping collective passions and movement, this paper seeks to reveal that self-identification of right-wing literary field in Korea has been made in the middle of trusteeship(takchi: 託治) and patriotic debates in 1946. From this perspective, this paper proposes the concept of “the descendants of anti-trusteeship movement” aided to “the descendants of March First Movement” of Jung Byung-joon. “The descendants of anti-trusteeship movement” is a term that should be noted in particular with regard to the origin of right-wing literary field in Korea. Because “the descendants of anti-trusteeship movement” beyond the “the descendants of March First Movement” began to reconstruct language and logic in literary circles in opposition to left-wing literary field in Korea. The Meaning of Park Jong-hwa’s ‘Nation’ discourse and Kim Dong-ni’s ‘pure’ discourse were also moving in this context. While this paper is trying to study that Kim Dong-ni, a true “the descendants of anti-trusteeship movement”, was continually rewriting his ‘pure’ discourse in addition to lead Park Jong-hwa’s ‘Nation’ discourse, also reexamines reflectively that the history of right-wing literary field in Korea has been still living through literature system and the media and current education system with the desire of history of literature and composing canon.

The Status and Prospect of Digitization of Historical Resources

Junbeom Ryu | 2016, (121) | pp.81~113 | number of Cited : 5

Goryeo Gwangjong’s(光宗) Political Reform and the Construction of Iron Flagpole of Yongdusa(龍頭寺) in Cheongju

kim nak jin | 2016, (121) | pp.117~160 | number of Cited : 2

The construction of Iron Flagpole of Yongdusa(龍頭寺) reflects the hojok’(豪族local gentry)s decreasing influences on the local communities in Cheongju. Cheongju was closely related to Gungye(弓裔) before his accession. Gungye built a solid foundation as forcible displacements of Cheongju’s 1000households when he moved the capital to Cheorwon. The powerful of Cheongju were so badly disunited when Wang Geon(王建) was crowned king. They were divided into Loyalists to Wang Geon and the opposing part(Loyalists to Gungye). Also the local gentry of Cheongju had different interests depending on where they live. This conditions made it difficult for the cohesion of the hojok in Cheongju. Also central government strengthened it’s control over hojok’s power and it led to lessen their influence on local residents. This lasted until the reign of Gwangjong. Gwangjong executed a sweeping purge to major hojok. For that, Gwangjong picked men of great presence as the King’s guards(侍衛軍). They formed the military basis of strengthening of royal authority. These guards used to belong to the hojok privately. Especially they had a duty of escorting the king, the officers were also involved. Because of this, some of the hojok presumed to be chosen as King’s guards. From early on, Cheongju played a key role in the military support of Gungye. So selecting King’s guards in Cheongju split local societies and reduced the major hojok’s power. Yongdusa in Cheongju was estimated to be a temple of Cheontae Order. Because of Gwangjong’s(光宗) support to Beopsangjong, Gyojong was in a position of advantage over the other Buddhist sects. So Yongdusa decayed and lost its position as an ideological foundation to local people. The Kim clan of Cheongju, including Dangdaedeung(堂大等local headman) Kim Yejong, Kim Huiil, Kim Su, Kim Seokhui, Kim Gwangyeom, bear the cost as a part of its efforts to build the Iron Flagpole of Yongdusa. Such a large-scale project came amid a mounting sense of crisis about their power. According to the records of the Iron Flagpole of Yongdusa, the hojok of Cheongju (The Kim clan as the central figure, The Son clan, The Gyeong clan, The Han clan) wanted to build the flagpole to show solidarity for their dominating force. The hojok of Cheongju already lost their power and influence. From the records of flagpole, we could notice the list of contributors with many well-known names and the titles of the office for both predecessors and incumbents. It was not the totality of the hojok in Cheongju. Some of them did not actively participate in the construction of Iron Flagpole of Yongdusa. This means that hojok’s influence is on the ebb. Therefore the construction of Iron Flagpole of Yongdusa was actively promoted as a means of solidifying the hojok’s power.

A Study on the Modifications of Official Uniforms of Government Officials in the early Goryeo Dynasty

KIM BO KWANG | 2016, (121) | pp.161~199 | number of Cited : 9

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This study aims to investigate the modification of official uniforms of government officials by looking at changes in the system of official uniforms of government officials between the 11th year of King Gwangjong’s reign (960) and the year of King Uijong’s reign (before and after Year 1160). As there are the cases of government officials wearing official belts and official attires in purple, celadon green and velvet during the years of King Taejo’s reign, it is assumed that government officials of the Goryeo court wore them from the beginning of the Goryeo Dynasty. However, it is difficult to know how exactly it was implemented since the dynasty was still in chaos with the remaining legacies of the Silla Dynasty. But it seems that in the 11th year of King Gwangjong’s reign, the system of official uniforms was established after adopting the system of the Later Zhou Dynasty and rearranging it in a certain way. Four colors of official uniforms such as purple, velvet, red and celadon green were introduced and worn by government officials according to their ranks in office such as Gwan-gye or titles such as Jungdan-gyeong, Dohang-gyeong and Sojubu. However, as the government structure was overhauled during the reign of King Seongjong, changes were made to the existing public offices and positions. Moreover, under the revised system of official uniforms of government officials during the reign of King Hyeongjong, three colors of official uniforms, namely purple, red and green remained while the velvet color was removed. Therefore, it is assumed that during the new bureaucratic system of King Seongjong, not only did the official uniforms of low-ranking government officials change but also the court attire system of three colors, namely purple, red and green was revised. In the Goryeo Dynasty after the reign of King Munjong, the importance of ancestral rites was emphasized while the social order and recovery were promoted, and during the reign of King Uijong they became codified. The records of differentiating the official uniforms of three colors to indicate government officials above level 4, level 6 and level 9 were found in a story accounted by Xu Jing who visited Goryeo during the reign of King Injong. Though Xu Jing understood such structure of the system as a copy of the system in the Song China, it reflected the political system of the Tang Dynasty customized by the Song.

The Status of Goryeo Kings in the Mongol Subjugation period through the jurisdiction matters

Lee, Myung-mi | 2016, (121) | pp.201~234 | number of Cited : 10

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After the restoration of King Wonjong in 1269, Darughachis got to stay in Goryeo, and the Mongolian forces also stationed in Goryeo to suppress the Revolt of Sambyeolcho, and to persuade and prepare for an expedition to Japan. Since then, there were cases in which Darughachis and officers of royal forces exercised judicial power mainly in relation to the military. The officers of royal forces exercised judicial power on their own when the military command system was clear, and Darughachis would exercise judicial power over daily matters. What is worth noting in the handling process of judicial matters during the period was “Japmun(雜問)”, in which Darughachis, officers of royal forces, and Goryeo kings or officials dealt with judicial issues together. Both Darughachis and officers of royal forces were part of the Mongolian force and followed the orders from the emperor including suppressing the Revolt of Sambyeolcho and persuading and conquering Japan. In the implementation process, however, there were differences between them: while the officers of royal forces focused on the “military” in their activities, Darughachis made responses to specific matters even covering the stabilization of common people in Goryeo. Since the Revolt of Sambyeolcho was an uprising against the king of Goryeo, as well, the forces of Goryeo were also active with suppressing it. Darughachis and officers of royal forces were, however, in different positions regarding the persuasion of and expedition to Japan. When there were issues requiring judicial settlement in the process of carrying out common military duties in that situation, they seem to have coordinated and reflected their mutual interests through the system of “Japmun.” When they failed to coordinate their mutual interests in the Japmun process, the individuals that took personal part in it had to go and see the emperor in the royal court and adjust differences in their positions. The King Chungryeol’s personal attending the emperor in 1278 can be understood in that context, which was requested to control further trouble after the conflicts between the two parties, which held an important status within the Mongolian national system and were supposed to play critical roles in the expedition to Japan more directly, grew external through the false accusation of Kim Bang-gyeong. The situation that Goryeo kings had to attend the Mongolian royal court to personally report the results of joint interrogation with the Mongolian officials in matters related to the Mongol empire and further to defend their treatment of internal affairs of Goryeo when someone raised an issue with it at the emperor’s court shows the changed status of Goryeo kings. In that process, the imperial power of Mongolia functioned as an arbitrator and final decision-maker to settle such disputes.

Military organization and troops management of 雙樹山城 in late Joseon period

Moon, Kwnang-Kyun | 2016, (121) | pp.235~269 | number of Cited : 4

Gongju was geographical key position surrounded by Charyeong Mountain Range and Geumgang river. However, Gongju of early Joseon period was not focused as military key position although defense facility of border area of the North and the coast of the South. But, geographical and socio-economic condition of Gongju was focused during the Japanese invasion of Korea, mountain fortress was established and then, it became defense mountain fortress, the base of Chungcheong-do. This thesis concentrated on the investigation of actual status of military organization and mountain fortress management of Ssangsu mountain fortress in late Joseon period from a military angle. Gong mountain fortress abolished in early Joseon period was established in the 36th year of Seonjo(1603). In the year, government transferred gamyeong in Gong mountain fortress and audit-centered administrative system and military system were unified. In the process, auditor 柳根 extensively established Gong mountain fortress which was the base defense facility during the Japanese invasion of Korea. The position of Gong mountain fortress was enhanced while its name was changed to Ssangsu mountain fortress rightly after the utilization of refuge place of Injo during the rebellion of 李适. And, in the 24th year of Injo(1646), it was reestablished due to the rebellion of 安益信. Ssangsu mountain fortress became gwanbang of Chungcheong-do from military function after 100 years of the establishment, the 29th year of Sookjong(1703). In the period, regional defense system was much strengthened with appearance of 海防論as foreign situation was unstable. In the situation, 3,000 sokogun soldiers under Chungcheong military were arranged in Ssangsu mountain fortress and based on the military strength, military organization of Ssangsu mountain fortress was prepared based on Soko law. In addition, for the director of the military strength, 巡營中軍 who was dangsang of jeong3pum was nominated. Through the process to secure military strength of Chungcheong gamyoung in the 17th century, about 8,000 people were arranged to Ssangsu mountain fortress. But, while foreign situation was stable after the 18th century, government arranged military soldiers to the center and from them, collected some financial sources. In addition, most of the soldiers belonged to the regional military institution were becoming 納布軍化. In the stream of military policy, most of the military strength of Ssangsu mountain fortress became nappogunhwa.

The Anti-Japanese Activity in Kapsan Area, Southern Hamkyung Province in late 1920s～early 1930s.

Cho Woo Chan | 2016, (121) | pp.271~312 | number of Cited : 7

Reorganization of the Korea Democratic Party and unified movement of Right-Wing political party in the early half of the 1946

Yoon Duk Young | 2016, (121) | pp.313~356 | number of Cited : 5

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The aim of this study is as follow. After the assassination of Song Chin-woo, who led the early Korea Democratic Party(KDP) as a senior secretary, KDP has been down over the process of reorganization and any distraction to the chief secretary Kim Song Soo system, how did the KDP respond specifically to a series of political process in early 1946, what are the limits of KDP revealed in the process, how to respond Korea Independence Party(KIP) in the center of the unified movement of Right-Wing, Was that the point went through a process of distraction around him KDP how the reorganization. After the death of Song Chin-woo, infighting broke out around the political power of the KDP. Won Seihoon was the center of the controversy, he has been temporary secretary and representative figures of progressive nationalist forces of Right-wing Socialists forces as a subcultures of the KDP. As the dispute within the party was ending as the chief secretary Kim Songsu. Early political process in a series of 1946, Rhee Syngman was brilliantly revived while performing a leadership role with the support of the United States Army Military Government in Korea(USAMGIK). The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea led forces have tried their own political integration on the basis of high movement of against Trusteeship, and eventually fails. Phase was the most powerful right-wing parties KDP was rapidly shrinking. The first American-Soviet Joint Commission nearing and be visible establish a provisional government issues, unified movement of Right-Wing were deployed around the KIIP. KIP claimed the absorption and integration of the three political parties KDP, Nationalist Party, New Korea Nationalist Party. KDP was however in favor of the party name and platform for policy, but opposition was integrated absorption and was contrary to the claims of senior executives of the KIP. Opposition was not just a limited number of reader forces and conservatives within the KDP and It was also similar to non-reader forces and progressive forces. Kim Songsu has exposed the limitations of leadership in the unified movement of Right-Wing process.

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2016, Vol., No.121