2025, Vol., No.159

The Review of Korean History 2024 KCI Impact Factor : 0.96

pISSN : 1225-133X
https://journal.kci.go.kr/hksh

This article explores how Okjeo and Ye responded to changes in the international order from the 2nd century BCE to the 3rd century CE. While earlier studies have portrayed them as passive groups under Wiman Joseon, the Han commanderies, and Goguryeo, this study emphasizes their agency as strategic actors. Using the Shiji, Hanshu, Hou Hanshu, and the Sanguozhi, it examines their choices amid the fall of Wiman Joseon, the establishment and restructuring of Han commanderies, the creation and abolition of the Eastern Commandery Protector, and Goguryeo’s growing pressure. The analysis shows that Okjeo pursued autonomy by relying on the samno (local elder) system, whereas Ye cooperated with Han commandery structures through the Bullei Marquis to secure privileges. These divergent strategies explain why Okjeo was incorporated into Goguryeo relatively early, while Ye preserved a degree of independence longer by balancing ties with both the Han and Goguryeo. The study thus reframes Okjeo and Ye not as passive peripheries but as active participants in East Asian interstate relations.

During the reign of Toghon Temür, the Shundi Emperor of the Yuan, the dynasty was repeatedly afflicted by floods and famines, while uprisings led by Han Chinese broke out with increasing frequency, throwing the empire into turmoil. In particular, the anti-Yuan resistance spearheaded by the so-called Red Turbans obstructed the north–south transport routes, thereby aggravating the Yuan’s internal economic distress. In order to suppress these anti-Yuan forces, the Grand Chancellor Toqto’a (脫脫), who had assumed overall command, requested military assistance from Goryeo. King Gongmin, whose political authority was still precarious in the early years of his reign, was in no position to reject the Yuan’s demand. In response, Goryeo dispatched over forty commanders and more than two thousand troops. These forces engaged Zhang Shicheng’s faction in battles at Gaoyou, Liuhe, and Huai’an. Arriving in Beijing in the eighth month of 1354, the Goryeo troops marched under Toqto’a’s command and fought against Zhang Shicheng’s forces at Gaoyou and Liuhe in the eleventh month. Even after Toqto’a’s downfall-brought about by shifts in Yuan court politics-the Goryeo army continued its campaigns under the leadership of Taybugha. From early 1355 onward, they engaged Zhang’s forces primarily in the region of Huai’an. Goryeo suffered considerable losses, including the deaths of six generals such as Yi Gwon and Choe Won. Ultimately, however, the suppression campaign collapsed due to Toqto’a’s dismissal and the declining morale of the expeditionary forces. Following Toqto’a’s removal, the Goryeo troops gradually returned home between the second and fifth months of 1355. The campaign against Zhang Shicheng nonetheless provided Goryeo with first-hand experience of the Yuan’s internal instability and its weakened military capacity. The intelligence gathered on the battlefield was conveyed to King Gongmin through the participating commanders, and this information played a formative role in the king’s reorientation of relations with the Yuan. Although the elimination of Gi Chŏl’s faction and the attack on the Eight Garrisons west of the Amnok River were only carried out in the fifth month of 1356, the incident in Jeonju involving the envoy Yesübüqa and the official Chŏng Ji-sang suggests that such plans had already been in motion as early as 1355. This indicates that Goryeo’s involvement in the suppression campaign had enabled a clearer assessment of the political situation. In this sense, Goryeo’s participation in the 1354 campaign against Zhang Shicheng holds historical significance, for it decisively influenced King Gongmin’s policy of establishing an independent political order free from Yuan domination.

Dorgon is a key term for understanding the relationship between Joseon and Qing and the history of East Asia from the Manchu invasion to the 7th year of Emperor Shunzhi’s reign. How did the Joseon people, who were directly involved, remember Dorgon? How did their memories change, and what were the main factors that caused these changes? This paper attempts to answer these questions. When the Joseon people who had experienced Dorgon disappeared, changes began to occur. The Joseon people, who had hoped for the decline of the Qing Dynasty, began to criticize the present state of the Qing Dynasty while at the same time beginning to view the past in a positive light. The glory of the Dorgon era, which had led the Enterting the Pass, began to fade little by little through the reigns of Shunzhi and Kangxi. As the Dorgon era was affirmed, Dorgon’s role in the context of Joseon-Qing relations was also revised. Dorgon transformed from a powerful figure who pressured Joseon from the front lines into a hero who blocked King Hyojong’s northern campaign. Once Qing rule over China stabilized, the Joseon people began to search for reasons. They began to see the figures of Zhou Gong and Zhuge Liang in Dorgon, who had assisted Shunzhi. Doragon began to be portrayed as a man of both ability and loyalty, and Emperor Qianlong’s measures to restore his reputation accelerated this perception. As Doragon’s reputation improved, his role in Joseon-Qing relations was also reevaluated. The image of him as a powerful figure who had oppressed Joseon was erased, and he was reborn as a hero of the era who had sought to marry into Joseon through legitimate courtship.