2016, Vol., No.101

A Study on the letters by Seonjo(宣祖), Lee Deokhyeong(李德馨), and Lee Sunsin(李舜臣) contained in [Jiaqing(嘉慶)] Zhang'an Wangshi zongpu(章安王氏宗譜)

Park Hyun Kyu | 2016, (101) | pp.1~40 | number of Cited : 0

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I have studied the contents of 8 letters that Wang Shiqi(王士琦) received from Seonjo, Lee Deokhyeong, and Lee Sunsin in this paper. The letters are included in [Jiaqing] Zhang'an Wangshi zongpu which was compiled again during the period of Jiaqing's reign in the Qing dynasty. Wang Shiqi was assigned Korea in August in 1598(the 31st year of Seonjo's reign) as a Ming government official of participation in government and soon after went to Jeonra Province to manage the troops of Liu Ting(劉綎) and Chen Lin(陳璘) through supervising Waegyo(倭橋) battle in Suncheon(順天) and the naval battle at Noryang(露粱海戰). He returned his country with Ming main troops in April next year. By this time, he took the letters received from Joseon figures. [Jiaqing] Zhang'an Wangshi zongpu was a genealogy of Wangs of Zhang'an(the north of Jiaojiang, Taizhou台州). The 7 letters out of 8 letters contained in the book have high value of historical records in that the letters can not be found in domestic documents. The contents of 8 letters which were received from the king and officials of Joseon demonstrated mainly Waegyo battle in Suncheon and the naval battle at Noryang which were occurred respectively in October and November 1598(the 31st year of Seonjo's reign) as the backgrounds. Lee Deokhyeong in his letter earnestly requested Wang Shiqi to let Ming troops come forward actively in the Waegyo battle in Suncheon. Wang Shiqi devised a method that the allied naval forces of Joseon and Ming attack first Namhae as the troops made little progress in the Waegyo battle in Suncheon. By this time, Lee Sunsin and Lee Deokhyeong replied with their opinions that the plan of attacking first Namhae(南海) was not good method. Soon after Lee Deokhyeong sent a letter to Wang Shiqi to convey his satisfaction as he was greatly inspired by the news that Japanese troops began to be exterminated in the naval battle at Noryang. Seonjo also sent a letter to Wang Shiqi to appreciate his service in the victory of the naval battle at Noryang.

A Study on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Deployment Race at Europe during the last period of Cold War(1970s-1980s) and Its Implications for Korea's National Security

Kim Jae Yeop | 2016, (101) | pp.41~78 | number of Cited : 3

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During the 1970s-1980s, the late period of the Cold War, Europe had witnessed a deployment race of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), represented by SS-20 ballistic missile of Soviet Union and Gryphon ground-launched cruise missile, Pershing-Ⅱ ballistic missile of the United States (U.S), while politico-military tension was heightening in the region. The conflict was set out as the situation of Western Europe weakened credibility of U.S nuclear umbrella for the region due to the nuclear parity between U.S and Soviet Union, followed by the deployment of SS-20 which could put Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet Union's unilateral military superiority. Dual-Track Decision of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy U.S INF at Western Europe contributed to not only restore regional nuclear force balance against Soviet Union, but also offered a leverage, in terms of both diplomatic and military aspects, at nuclear arms control negotiation with Soviet Union, which had ultimately concluded in the dismantlement of INF from both U.S and Soviet Union. As concerns on the growing nuclear armament capabilities of North Korea are disputable agenda among public opinion in Republic of Korea (ROK), the voice of demanding ROK's nuclear armament by indigenous nuclear program and re-deployment of U.S short-range nuclear weapons has been gaining a widespread support. It is noteworthy that supporters of ROK's nuclear armament, especially the idea of U.S short-range nuclear weapons re-deployment, is putting up the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s to justify their claims. Despite a superficial resemblance, however, the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s shows many differences from current security environment of the Korean Peninsular. As a result, it will be a huge fallacy to justify ROK's nuclear armament, including U.S short-range nuclear weapons re-deployment, by putting up the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s. As long as U.S maintains both capabilities and willingness for keeping nuclear umbrella commitment, ROK should not give up efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular, supported by enhanced defense capabilities and diplomatic cooperation with the international community.

A Study on the Factors on the successful Peace-keeping Operations of The Korea UN Peace Keeping Units in Lebanon, "Dong-Myung Unit

Yang Cheol-Ho | 2016, (101) | pp.79~126 | number of Cited : 4

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The Study on the combat of Kae‐song Rail Station by Kae‐song Railroad Police Unit during the Korean War

Byun,Hye-Seok | 2016, (101) | pp.127~176 | number of Cited : 4

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The combat of Kae‐song Station by Kae‐song Railroad Police Unit was the first combat conducted by national police in order to defend Kae‐song Station of Gyeon‐gui Line to the point of death and it was also the last combat before Kae‐song was taken by North Korean army, while the 12th Regiment of the Korean armed force was dispersed and evacuated from the area because of the surprise attack at the dawn of June 25, 1950. Kae‐song Railroad Police Unit of national police was one of 13 local railroad police units which were subordinate organizations of the railroad police's main force which directly belonged to the Public Order Bureau in the Ministry of Home Affairs at the time of the Korean War and it was the special police organization in charge of the security mission of the railroad station and its facilities of the Kae‐song district in the Northwestern part of the 38th parallel. It was the first railroad police organization made by the military governor, Lieutenant general John R. Hodge on Jan 25, 1946 during the American military government period in Korea on the purpose of protecting and maintaining railway security and its facilities after the liberation of Korea. It had managed as an independent government office like a local National Police Agency for 7 years until October 15, 1953 when it was disbanded. Kae‐song Railroad Police Unit was an irregular forces and special police organization, but the fifty policemen collected by emergency call in order to defend Kae‐song Station fought with poor weapons such as carbine rifles and 99-type rifles against the 15th regiment of the 6th infantry division of North Korea's regular army which had powerful weapons such as T-34 tanks. They were ready to die and fought desperately according to the plan of their commander without being dispersed and evacuated. The policemen of the Railroad Police Unit were isolated in air‐raid shelter, but they came out of the air‐raid shelter in order to defend the civilians of Kae‐song and carried out attack toward the North Korean army to the last minute. Although they failed to secure the Kae‐song Station which they had planned to defend to the death, the result of their delaying and defensive action over one hour contributed to the assembling Korean troops at the defense line of Im‐jin River for the defense of the capital city of Seoul. It is natural and right thing that their spirit of sacrifice, the will power for defending nation, and the honor of national police be well appreciated. However, we cannot find any empirical studies on the combat of Kae‐song Station fought by Kae‐song Railroad Police Unit now, although it has passed almost 60 years since the combat occurred. And especially the names of the policemen except the commander inspector Gam, Bong‐ryong who were killed at the combat haven't been discovered. Besides, the fact that on the day of the outbreak of war the North Korean army which attacked the Kae‐song Station got inside Song‐ak mountain of Kae‐song and invaded Kae‐song city is well recorded in the police combat manual called as『Teuksujeonryeosaryeojip』(特殊戰例事例輯) written in 1951. Although the fact that the North Korean army didn't invade the Kae‐song Station with riding trains is clearly confirmed through『Hangukgyotongdongrangi』(韓國交通動亂記) published by the Ministry of Transportation in 1953, the unverified fact about the details of the fall of Kae‐song city is being quoted, so the courage and sacrifice of the Kae‐song Railroad Police Unit is being discolored. This study cross-validated the documents and testimonies related with the combat of Kae‐song Station and it also cleared up the fact that ‘the opinion of the North Korean army's take riding of Gyeong‐ui Line' was misinformed due to utilizing conflicting testimonies. Thus, it shedded new light on the recovery of Kae‐song Railroad Police Unit's honor and the historical meaning of the combat of Kae‐seong Station. It confirmed that the elapsed time of the combat in『Teuksujeonryeosary eojip』which had recorded the combat of Kaesong Station for the first time was recorded by using summer time which was implemented in Korea at that time. So, it reconfirmed the time of attack by the North Korean army and the time of fall of Kae‐song city. Besides, it discovered not only the list of the police men but also the list of those killed in combat. It was after 66 years that the list of 45 men killed was discovered.

The Research on the Overseas relocation plan of Korean Government led by the US in the Korean War

Sangho Lee | 2016, (101) | pp.177~202 | number of Cited : 3

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The Study on the process of the establishment of unarmed fighting skill(拳法) from the cultural aspects as military martial art in the late of Joseon dynasty

Choi hyeong guk | 2016, (101) | pp.203~234 | number of Cited : 2

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This thesis is to examine the implementation process of unarmed fighting skill(拳法) and its change of training in the late of Joseon dynasty with cultural and historical point of view. It may be summarized as follows. Firstly, diffused unarmed fighting skill to military camp in the late of Joseon dynasty was come into widely use as 'Bo(譜)' format which was made by connecting Chinese unarmed fighting skill. This format had become a background unlike unarmed fighting skills’ training method of the time and used for unarmed fighting skill test and evaluation for Joseon’s soldiers. Secondly, the most important reason why Joseon soldiers learnt unarmed fighting skill was to use other weapons smoothly and set the common standard for body training. For instance, the height of punch from unarmed fighting skill was divided into 3 levels (上平, 中平, 下平) and the fact was confirmed that this method was used for spear fighting skill as well. Especially, weapons such as 'Nang-sun(狼筅)' or 'Dang-pa(鐺鈀)' were required with basic strength and flexibility of physical body because of its length and weight and unarmed fighting skill was most effective way to train soldiers for making fitted body to do martial art. Thirdly, It had improved from the form of 'Bo(譜)' to face to face battle form and body movements also became realistic. The usage of unarmed fighting skill had enlarged with not only simple blow skill but also newly added 'Jujitsu' skill to attack enemy in close distance. Last, the most distinctive point for settlement process of unarmed fighting skill in late Joseon dynasty was that this skill was spread focusing on soldiers. It was Joseon’s typical process unlike China or Japan to settle and spread martial art skill. Joseon’s unarmed fighting skill had settled through this way and stably trained as a subject for national military service examination.

The Research on the Procurement of Military Materials and the Effects of Military logistics trade immediately after the Imjin Waeran

YunYeoseok | 2016, (101) | pp.235~272 | number of Cited : 6

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Josun endeavored to procure the military materiel in many ways during the period of Imjin Waeran, but there was a limit to do so for itself, for the lack of financial resources, techniques, and raw materials. To find the solution, plenty of military supplies were imported to Josun from China, Ming, not simply in a way of support of stuffs, but in a way of funding in order to purchase the military materiel through trade. The rapidly changing Northeast Asian situation played a role as one of the factors rising necessity of the military materiel procurement after the Imjin Waeran. Josun tried to maintain the reward policy and to enforce the Wolgwagungibeop(月課軍器法) which the government assigned the production of arms to each local authorities in order to procure the military supplies not only from trade, but also through the production domestically. As a result, the arms came to be commodified and then the arms market was formed consequently. Most of all, the resumed trade with Japan made it easier to bring matchlocks and other law materials in Josun so that it led to the increase in the production of arms along with the growth of military markets. The procurement of these supplies which conducted by the Chosun dynasty in the Imjin Waeran had been developed in a large scale. Since then it had influenced the activities of private boats, the strengthened currency function of silver, and the expansion of private trades. Here were the very vigorous activities of private boats in the process of the transportation for provisions in the markets and shipping business which had been formed from the early Josun Dynasty. Especially, a great quantity of provisions were transported around the Han river, it influenced the activities of private boats that largely were owned by the merchants in Gyeong-gang(京江) area. Also, the currency of Silver as a payment method for the military trade was increased in value considerably as well. Silver was to be circulated, though so limited, among the common people. Finally the established market for military trade was the channel of foreign trade. What the Josun government had been promoting the military trade became a foundation for the active participation of merchants in the foreign trade.

The Study on the basis of the ‘Four Naval Battles of the World’

Seok Yeong Dal | 2016, (101) | pp.273~302 | number of Cited : 2

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The Study on Characteristics of the Military Law[軍法] observed by the Hun’ryeon Dogam(訓鍊都監) office and the Futures of Executions by Decapitation(梟示刑) in the second half of Joseon period’s

Sim Jae-woo | 2016, (101) | pp.303~332 | number of Cited : 8

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What I examined in this article are the contents and nature of the Military Law observed and implemented by the Hun’ryeon Dogam office, in order to have a better understanding of how the office itself, which was the most characteristic Joseon military installation established in the second half of the Joseon dynasty period, having been operated. And to do that, this article attempted a more detailed look into Hun’guk Deung’rok, which was a compilation of operational documents generated by this office but for some reasons was not previously analyzed that much carefully. Also, certain relevant cases are presented here in this article. The general structure of the Joseon period Military Law reveals that the most prominent forms of punishment were either by decapitating one’s head and hanging it up(梟示刑), or flogging(棍杖刑). It was especially so in the latter half period, as dictated by military regulations. In the dynasty’s early half, the flogging stick(棍杖) was yet to be devised, and decapitation was not followed by hanging the person’s severed head up. But after the 1590s’ war with the Japanese, new practices were employed, hence the practice of ‘hanging the decapitated head,’ or ‘flogging a person.’ Examined next are military regulations observed inside Hun’ryeon Dogam, through punishments meant for deserters and rules used for capital execution. In case of deserters, first time offender was simply flogged, but multiple offenses were punished by decapitation, followed by the practice of hanging the head up, so we can see desertion was never tolerated. Instruction that were to be kept in mind, in case of using the flogging stick, was also carefully drafted so that the officers would refrain from using excessive force in implementing the flogging practice. To be examined lastly were the actual examples of decapitating someone and hanging the severed head up. Cases could be categorized into three groups: punishment of a soldier or officer who murdered a colleague or breached military discipline, punishment of a deserter, and punishment of the riot leaders who staged an insurrection in the Mushin/戊申 year. Murdering a colleague or staging an insurrection were met with the most deadliest punishments. On the other hand, during the reigns of kings Sukjong or Yeongjo, when the war was long past and peace was being maintained, deserters were treated with mild punishments comparatively other than decapitation with their heads to be hung up. In other words, they were flogged instead. We can see that the authorities were trying to implement law, not so strictly to the letter but rather flexibly according to circumstances.

The Study and analysis on the management and change for 'Eoyeongcheong' from the Financial perspective between the 17th century and the first half of the 18th century

song-ki-jung | 2016, (101) | pp.333~364 | number of Cited : 5

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Eoyeongcheong was one of the five military components, which carried out special duties such as king’s guard, royal guard of king’s honored going at a royal tomb, and defense of a castle of the royal town, etc. Up to now, the existing researches have put their focus on interpretation of Eoyeongcheong management in the midst of political changes, or have a focused look at the management method of Eoyeongcheong. However, the existing researches have partially commented on the financial problem which was a core of a military camp. Hereupon, this paper is intending to put its focus on the financial matter of Eoyeongcheong. The finance of Eoyeongcheong initially relied on Hojo(as one of the six ministries which was called 'Yukjo', it was in charge of household survey & control, tribute and taxes, food, goods, and economy.). However, with the size of military camps becoming bigger, the burden of Hojo was increasing. Accordingly, during the ruling of King Hyojong, the finance of Eoyeongcheong was secured as it was equipped with annual size level of military camps. Such a management situation of Eoyeongcheong was arranged by Eoyeongcheong gusikrye(a book about the foundation history of Eoyeongcheong, and Eoyeongcheong-related various regulations and present conditions, etc.). According to these materials, revenues of Eoyeongcheong were divided into the ones from Boin(an economic supporter affiliated with regular military service), and the ones from Dunjeon(land appropriated for military provisions). In addition, the expenditures of Eoyeongcheong were executed on the use of wages for Hyanggun(local military soldiers)and officers and upward level, and rewards for meritorious persons. Afterwards, the finance of Eoyeongcheong became sufficient on the strength of the increase in the number of Boin, and reduction in local military soldiers who were dispatched to Seoul by the work shift system, etc. Consequently, the government expended the fiance of Eoyeongcheong for another financial use, and reduced the financial resources through public labor assessment as well as took measures to seek substantiality of the military forces.

The research on the military positions, "Jiyu" and "Haengsu" in the Goryeo Dynasty

kim nak jin | 2016, (101) | pp.365~396 | number of Cited : 6

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The study on the employment of cavalry troops by Wang Geon, the Founder of Goryeo Dynasty

Kim, Myeongjin | 2016, (101) | pp.397~428 | number of Cited : 5

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military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

2016, Vol., No.101