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A Study on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Deployment Race at Europe during the last period of Cold War(1970s-1980s) and Its Implications for Korea's National Security

Kim Jae Yeop 1

1한남대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

During the 1970s-1980s, the late period of the Cold War, Europe had witnessed a deployment race of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), represented by SS-20 ballistic missile of Soviet Union and Gryphon ground-launched cruise missile, Pershing-Ⅱ ballistic missile of the United States (U.S), while politico-military tension was heightening in the region. The conflict was set out as the situation of Western Europe weakened credibility of U.S nuclear umbrella for the region due to the nuclear parity between U.S and Soviet Union, followed by the deployment of SS-20 which could put Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet Union's unilateral military superiority. Dual-Track Decision of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy U.S INF at Western Europe contributed to not only restore regional nuclear force balance against Soviet Union, but also offered a leverage, in terms of both diplomatic and military aspects, at nuclear arms control negotiation with Soviet Union, which had ultimately concluded in the dismantlement of INF from both U.S and Soviet Union. As concerns on the growing nuclear armament capabilities of North Korea are disputable agenda among public opinion in Republic of Korea (ROK), the voice of demanding ROK's nuclear armament by indigenous nuclear program and re-deployment of U.S short-range nuclear weapons has been gaining a widespread support. It is noteworthy that supporters of ROK's nuclear armament, especially the idea of U.S short-range nuclear weapons re-deployment, is putting up the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s to justify their claims. Despite a superficial resemblance, however, the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s shows many differences from current security environment of the Korean Peninsular. As a result, it will be a huge fallacy to justify ROK's nuclear armament, including U.S short-range nuclear weapons re-deployment, by putting up the case of INF deployment race at Europe during the 1970s-1980s. As long as U.S maintains both capabilities and willingness for keeping nuclear umbrella commitment, ROK should not give up efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular, supported by enhanced defense capabilities and diplomatic cooperation with the international community.

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