2017, Vol., No.102

Russian Women Partaking in the Military field during World War I: Individual Women Soldiers and the First Women’s Battalion of Death

최지은 | 2017, (102) | pp.1~36 | number of Cited : 2

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This article focuses on Russian women soldiers during World War I in terms of total war and the Russian February Revolution. The War took on a new aspect in 1914 as a result of two paradigm shifts: the emergence of the modern state and technological development. All the belligerent suffered setbacks stemming from this new conflict. For Russia, one of hardships was the deficiency of workers, many of whom had been drafted into the army. Inevitably, an increasing number of Russian women were employed in various sectors of industry. The expanding role of Russian women was not limited to industry, however. The participation of individual women in the military had already increased under the conditions of total war, but the military activity of Russian women entered a new phase after the February Revolution. Though the first all-female combat unit was established under the propaganda slogans of liberation and equality, it is more appropriate to locate its origins in the situation faced by the Provisional Government and the Russian army. The First Russian Women’s Battalion of Death was one of several measures that the Provisional Government took to carry out the June Offensive, which it hoped would reverse its military and political losses. The world saw the first female combat unit on May of 1917. In addition to its combat role, the battalion had the propagandistic mission of shaming male soldiers who were refusing to perform their duty. Though women soldiers seemed like a cost-effective way to wage war, all the battalion’s efforts were in vain when it confronted with reluctant mass soldiers. The military leadership of the Provisional Government cast doubt on the value of all-female combat units. Thus, the women’s battalion was destined to be disband even before Red October whether it would have proved women could be useful in combat.

The Study for the United States Air Force’s Dyna-Soar Project approved by the Eisenhower Administration that pursued the peaceful use policy of Space

신경은 , UM JUNGSIK | 2017, (102) | pp.37~62 | number of Cited : 0

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A Study on North Korea’s Propaganda Office during the period of the Korean War - Focusing on the Structure of Operations and the System for Business -

Kim Sangbum | 2017, (102) | pp.63~114 | number of Cited : 3

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The Formation of the North Korea-China’s Military Cooperative relationships and the Border of ‘Revolution’after the Liberation - Focusing on North Korea’s Assistance to the Chinese Civil War and the Establishment of the Army -

Kim, Seon-ho | 2017, (102) | pp.115~150 | number of Cited : 10

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Surrounding Great Power’s Policies on the ‘Independent issue of Corea' with Relation to the Sino-Japanese War

Seok Huajeong | 2017, (102) | pp.151~186 | number of Cited : 5

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The study focuses on the 'independent issue of Corea and the international relations under the situations of the Sino-Japanese War. During the War, 'the independence of Corea', regardless of sovereignty and territorial integrity as an independent nation, was under the restrictions of the structure of strategic interest for the Great Powers including Japan and China. Japan's exclusive ambition over the Korean Peninsula, which pretended to be 'independence of Corea', consistently revealed during the war period. China, on the other hand, wanted to prevent the Korean Peninsula from the falling into the hands of the Japanese as a whole, leaning on the intervention of the Powers. The ambiguous attitudes of China between 'independence of Corea' and suzerainty were one of the major factors in prolonging the war and delaying the peace negotiations. Of the Powers with concerns in East Asia, the United States hoped to use Japan to terminate China's suzerainty over Corea, open the door to Chinese trade and investment and weaken the influence of Britain and Russia in East Asia. Britain and Russia also checked each other because the partner country might try to expand its power alone in the Korean Peninsula. British Lord Kimberley's 'common intervention' by the powers was a way to prevent Russian monopoly on the Korean Peninsula, and to avoid 'armed intervention'. His proposals of 'joint occupation of Corea' and 'separate Protection' by China and Japan came from a large frame to control Russia, but as a result, it became a guideline to Japan to open the war. Since the beginning of October in 1894, when the war spread to mainland China, Kimberley's proposal, ‘independence of Corea guaranteed by the Powers’, was intended to exclude any power's monopolies on the Korean peninsula including victorious Japan. Russia also hoped to prevent the subjugation of Corea by any power and adopt a wait-and-see policy at least until the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway. But as soon as Japan's crucial victory threatened the 'independence of Corea and of China', Russia will be involved actively the issue through the Triple Intervention in April 1895.

The Governing Liaodong(遼東經略) of Ming and the relations between Joseon and Ming in the Hong-wu, the Founder of Ming, period

KyeoungLok Kim | 2017, (102) | pp.187~226 | number of Cited : 10

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The Ming Dynasty is the history of Chinese lasted by Han established unified dynasty, in its founding to destruction in more than 200 years, the edge of the Liaodong army has always being a special group to defend the borders of the existence. During the political rapid changes period when Yuan(元) was replace by Ming(明), the Liadong(遼東) was transformed from the Yuan world order(元中心國際秩序) to the Ming world order(明中心國際秩序). In this process, various political forces on the Liadong showed strong differentiation of the centrifugal forces of the individual forces rather than the gathering of the forces centered on North-Yuan(北元). In the end of Yuan era, Emperor Hong-wu(洪武帝), who had solved the problems of the times and pursued a central centralized system of emperors, failed to concentrate on the Liadong despite its strategic importance due to various issues at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty. The Liadong was dominated by Liao-yang Branch Secretariats(遼陽行省) during the Yuan Dynasty, but in reality it was a region where various forces such as Mongolia(蒙古), Jurchen(女眞), Khitan(契丹), Goryo(高麗) and Han(漢族) were present. In particular, the proximity to Goryo and the large number of Goryo dynasties emigrated from the Liadong were closely related to Goryo. This close relationship was also the cause of Koryo's relationship with Yuan Dynasty during the period of replacing Yuan with Ming. Emperor Hong-wu, who established certain achievements of the Yuan Dynasty and the ruling system of the emperor internally, promoted the full-scale governing Liadong from the 20th year of Hong-wu. He suppressed the Yuan Dynasty and continued to pursue a policy of conciliation against the Jurchen living in the east of the Liadong. However, the fundamental limitation of the governing Liadong was that rule of military government center of Liadong Regional Military Commission(遼東都司) was deceitful, such as conciliating the Jurchen and awarding office. This was not direct control, but indirect control, which made it impossible to secure the stability of government. The reason for the limited governance centered on the Liadong Regional Military Commission of emperor Hong-wu originated from the international recognition of emperor Hong-wu. In the meantime, he took a jurisdiction over the Liadong and the Jurchen and pushed for a coercive policy of diplomatic pressure on Joseon by causing a conflict with newly established Joseon.

Yoo Kum-Pil whose posthumous name was Chungjeolgong, Great Commander of the Koryo Dynasty

Shin, Seongjae | 2017, (102) | pp.227~258 | number of Cited : 3

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This article has examined the life and military activities of Yoo Kum-pil, Koryo dynasty's great general who fulfilled the highest achievements in the process of unification of the Later Three Kingdoms. In this paper, major focus was laid on his tactics and the qualities as a commander based on Yoo’s military operations in warfare. Yoo Kum-pil was from Pyeongju region, being a descendant of Paekangjin power clan. His ancestors originally were native to Kochang area, but moved to Pyeongsan locality when Paekangjin military post was established in late 8th century. Yoo family then prospered with the new clan base. When 'Gungye', who was the leader of older Koguryo region, expanded its power onto Paeseo zone, Yoo Kum-pil swore allegiance to Gungye regime and started his career there. However, it was only after Wang Kun founded Koryo that Yoo’s real reputation began to be known. Yoo Kum-pil took part in numerous battles and triumphed over everytime. His military operations between 918, when Koryo was founded, and 936, the year of the unification, could be divided into 5 phases. Yoo’s martial prowess reached its greatest height during the battles of Jomul fortress, Kochang, Oonju, and Ilicheon. Moreover, Yoo also was given credit for the naval retaking of Naju and participating in Gyeonhweon’s escape to Koryo. Yoo Kum-pil’s invincibility lied in his ability to organize his troops into strong cavalry(勁騎), which excelled in mobility, superior armament, mighty breakthrough power, and flexible use of tactics. Such talents were well displayed in individual as well as group combats. During the times when Koryo was just established, Koryo men were the majority in the cavalry. However, the influx of northern people outside of the border increased as the unification war intensified. They soon formed the biggest group of Koryo horsemen. Yoo Kum-pil assumed the highest command of this troop, as well as commanders of the main body going to Koryo generals. However, foreign officers were in charge of minor unit forces. Along with outstanding cavalry performance, Yoo Kum-pil’s personal military genius could also be attributed to his victorious career. In the biographies section of History of Koryo, documents show Yoo being a ‘general strategy(將略)’, earning respect from his men. The book of military strategy that Yoo studied to enhance his capabilities was Six Secret Teachings(六韜). He treasured and practiced the virtues of bravery(勇), intelligence(智), benevolence(仁), trust(信), and loyalty(忠) from this treatise. Yoo clearly applied the teachings of this book to his major military activities. Since he was the highest commander of the army, Yoo’s men also learned of his taught qualities, which in turn had significant effects in many aspects. Yoo’s generals and soldiers eagerly followed their general in terms of realizing six virtues as well. Thus, much endeavors of Yoo Kum-pil and his army personnel ultimately worked as a driving force for Koryo to unify the Three Kingdoms.

A Recent Chinese Academic Research on the War History of Goguryo

Jung Dong-Min | 2017, (102) | pp.259~294 | number of Cited : 5

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This article tries to identify trend of research of Chinese academics related to the war history of Goguryo by introducing achievements of Chinese academics in the war history of Goguryo after 2007 when Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was completed, reviewing its perception on Goguryo, and reviewing and analyzing new or noticeable opinions in Chinese academics. The perception of Chinese academics on Goguryo, which is was a local government of China, that an ethnic minority established was shown intact in Goguryo war history related researches after 2007 when the project of Dongbuk-Gongjung was finished. Chinese academics addressed that Goguryo was controlled by Hyundo-gun because of military inferiority since it was first founded and thus relation of ‘Shinsok (臣屬)’ was maintained. While explaining Goguryo’s occupation of Liaodong area in the early 5century as replacement of local government officials from Chinese dynasty by Goguryo as a local government administrator who rendered liege service and homage to Bei-Wei and received an appointment title, it addresses that Goguryo was a local government of China from Han to the Period of North and South Dynasties according to 臣屬體制論 and 朝貢冊封論. Such perception continues in researches on war history between Goguryo and Sui and Tang Dynasties. They tried to find the cause of war from implementation of the Chinese world order such as Fan-shu(蕃屬) system theory and installation system theory and strongly addressed that Goguryo was a local government of central Chinese Dynasty. The same trend is shown in military related researches. They did not show military competencies of Goguryo but highlighted its military inferiority to Chinese Dynasty. Through this, they emphasized that Goguryo was a local government controlled by Central Chinese Dynasty. When reviewing military related researches in Goguryo war history, it is found that they tried to expand research directions with various themes. However, they could not escape from flat summary simply enumerating historical facts when they explained war performance process. To break this, it is needed to actively use archaeological excavation achievements in addition to new historical records. If we can combine existing literal records and archaeological materials organically, it will help us to understand unit organization, weapon system and defense system as well as battle performance processes more concretely. On the other hand there are some perception difference between Korean academics and Chinese academics such as Imnailbonbu theory. To overcome such perception gap, active academic exchanges between Korean academics and Chinese academics are required.

(서평)한국전쟁에서의 맥아더와 그의 장군들 - Stephen R. Taaffe, 『한국전쟁에서의 맥아더와 그의 장군들』, University Press of Kansas, 2016년 -

Harold E. Raugh, Jr | 2017, (102) | pp.295~298 | number of Cited : 0

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(서평)냉전과 건군의 거대한 뿌리- 박동찬, 『주한미군사고문단 KMAG』(한양대 출판부, 2016) -

Kim, Seon-ho | 2017, (102) | pp.299~312 | number of Cited : 0

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(서평)6․25戰爭에서 마오쩌둥의 역할 재조명- 데이빗 쑤이(David Tsui) 한국국제전략연구소 譯, 『中國의 6․25戰爭參戰』(서울: 다와, 2011) -

Choi, Yooncheol | 2017, (102) | pp.313~332 | number of Cited : 0

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2017, Vol., No.102