2018, Vol., No.106

The Capture of the ROKS I-2 : the Forgotten Engagement and its Crew

Jeong, Won-woong | 2018, (106) | pp.1~35 | number of Cited : 0

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The Incident of USS Pueblo and North Korea's Policy Choices based on ‘the Empirical Analysis with Prospect Theory’

Kim Chang Kyu | 2018, (106) | pp.37~81 | number of Cited : 1

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This study is the analysis based on Prospect Theory for the North Korea's mechanism of policy choices on the USS Pueblo Incident happened in 1968. The Kim's reference points at the time of the USS Pueblo incident are externally to protect North Korea's sovereignty, to strengthen the alliance with the U.S.S.R. and China in addition to maintaining the autonomy for national security, internally to consolidate the Kim's autocratic power and to reinforce the revolutional power against the South Korea The USS Pueblo incident can be divided into two stages. The first stage is to seize of the USS Pueblo and the first response stage of the U.S.A. and North Korea. (from Jan. 16 to Feb. 1) At this stage, Kim estimated that the U.S.A. would not drive the situations to war because of her domestic and international political difficulties. In early January 1968, North Korea faced the difficult political situations due to her contradictory relationships with U.S.S.R. and China, the increase of consciousness to be encircled because of the establishment of the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and Japan, and the failure of the raid on Blue House by the North Korea's guerrillas. In these situations, the information collection of the USS Pueblo on North Korea was a threat against North Korea's security and a violation of North Korea's sovereignty, and it was also a challenge against Kim. So Kim perceived the situations were in loss-domain on the basis of his 4 reference points and chose the risk-taking collision policy to seize of the USS Pueblo and to deny negotiation. The second stage is the negotiations between the U.S.A. and North Korea. (from Feb. 2 to Dec. 23). As all efforts were failed, the leadership of the U.S.A. could not help stopping the armed demonstration and sitting down on the table for the individual negotiations with North Korea. As the negotiations had been going on, the U.S.A. had somewhat conceded '3A'(Admit, Apologize, Assure) and North Korea could get the result to be admitted the North Korea's sovereignty by the U.S.A. Kim had got the result to strengthen the alliance with the U.S.S.R. and to acquire her additional economical and military support, to improve the relationship with China, to enhance his internal & external prestige, to support the North Vietnam indirectly and to succeed in resulting in conflict between Korea and the U.S.A. These situations almost satisfied Kim's 4 reference points. So Kim perceived the situations as gain-domain and decided to choose the risk-avoiding selection to conclude the negotiations. This study shows the effectiveness of Prospect Theory. It will be the short cut to grasp the reference points of North Korea's leadership and the mechanism of policy choice and to cut or change its links in order to prevent and oppose the continuing North Korea's provocation effectively. This study expects to contribute to this.

The Implementation of‘Active Defense' Military Strategy in the Conduct of War of China: Focused on Cases of Military Conflicts with Its Neighboring Powers

Kim Jae Yeop | 2018, (106) | pp.83~126 | number of Cited : 5

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The Reformation for National Defensive Field of the Republic of Korea and Lessons Learned of 818 Plan

Misook Lee | 2018, (106) | pp.127~170 | number of Cited : 4

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The Local Language Education of Korean Force's during the Vietnam War

Lee Sin Jae | 2018, (106) | pp.171~205 | number of Cited : 1

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An Analysis of Strategic Success Factors during the Operation‘Chromite’

Dae-sung Kim | 2018, (106) | pp.207~252 | number of Cited : 1

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In the present study, we derived the success factors of the Operation Chromite through the military strategic analysis focusing on the maneuver and attrition strategies. The maneuver strategy is to neutralize the military power of the enemy through destroying its will to conduct war. In regards to the execution methods, the first is to avoid strong points and attack weaknesses; the second is to achieve superiority in maneuver tempo; the third is the sequential military operation and mission-oriented command. On the other hand, the purpose of the attrition strategy is to exhaust the military capability of the enemy in order to destroy its will to conduct war. In regards to its execution methods, the first is the accumulated destruction; the second is the achieving of destruction tempo; the third is centralized control. The analysis on the military operation of the North Korean army and UN forces in the Operation Chromite reveals that even though the North Korean army pursued the attrition strategy seeking for continuous attack from the front of Nakdong River perimeter(defense line) of UN forces, it failed at continuous and systematic combat due to the insufficient troops. As it not Only failed at withdrawing its front but at concentrating its troops and firepower effectively even after the landing of UN forces in Incheon, the North Korean army couldn't penetrate the Nakdong River defense line of UN forces nor properly defend its Seoul occupation. On the other hand, the UN forces, by seeking the maneuver strategy through the Operation Chromite, a major bypass maneuver to Incheon, instead of the counterattack in Nakdong River defense line where the main forces of North Korean army was concentrated, avoided the strengths of the enemy and attacked its weakness. Also, the UN forces, through the counterattack in Nakdong River defense line completely defeated the North Korean army by achieving the advantage of maneuver tempo through a combination of the bypass maneuver and deep penetration. In conclusion, while the North Korean army wasn't able to successfully run the attrition strategy it pursued, UN Forces perfectly performed its planned maneuver strategy which led the Incheon Landing Operation to victory.

The status and Operational Realities of Naval forces in Chungcheong in the early 18th century

song-ki-jung | 2018, (106) | pp.253~288 | number of Cited : 8

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Military and Diplomatic meaning of Byeokjegwan(碧蹄館) in the Joseon period

KyeoungLok Kim | 2018, (106) | pp.289~327 | number of Cited : 8

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The Byeokjegwan(碧蹄館) was a diplomatic space where played a key role in the diplomatic activities with China of the Joseon, and was a place of King's reign(王政) and good governance(善政). Also, It was a military space that brought the turning point of the war situation during the Imjin War(壬辰戰爭). With this historical meaning, although the Byeokjegwan has received much attention from the times, however it is difficult to find the shape of the present Byeokjegwan. In general, the Byeokjegwan has a function as a Kaeksa(客舍) rather than a mistake that recognizes the house as the posthouse(驛站). This is due to a lack of understanding about the posthouse system and Kaeksa system. The posthouse is a traffic and communication facilities established to promptly report and understand the military ambitions of war, including national defense. On the contrary, the Kaeksa was lodging of the envoy of the king, and the king's politics was a space for local society. Joseon established a Kaeksa as a key space for the nationwide implementation of King's reign. The Kaeksa was a space where the royal ruler symbolized the kingship, and the local governor performed important ceremonies such as the kingship, and performed a banquet in the expression of the good governance to serve the people. In addition, it is an enforcing space for selecting local talent, and it is a space where the central government and the local society are connected. The guest house, which was the core of the king's local politics, overlapped with the posthouse system, but most of them were separated from the posthouse system. In other words, the Byeokjegwan is a key domestic and foreign political and diplomatic space. In previous studies, the term "Byeokjegwan battle(碧蹄館戰鬪)" was used, which should be reviewed academically. Even though there was no actual battle in Byeokjegwan, it was started to be used after being emphasized by Japan. In this paper, I use the term "Byeokje battle(碧蹄戰鬪)", which requires more rigorous research in the future. The Byeokje battle was a meaningful battle that changed the war situation in the Imjin War. The Joseon - Ming alliance(朝明聯合軍) defeated the Byeokje battles in Byeokje. The defeated Ming soldiers so that they lost their will to fight and were committed to truce negotiations. Joseon opposed the cease-fire talks between the Ming and Japan, claiming full withdrawal of Japanese troops. In other words, the Byeokje battle was a battle that greatly changed the war situation between Joseon, Ming and Japan.

A Study on the Installation of Horse Ranch in Suwon Dohobu in the Early period of Joseon

Yi Hong Du | 2018, (106) | pp.329~359 | number of Cited : 1

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When Ming dynasty claimed the sovereignty of Tamra to take over Jeju Ranch, Taejong regarded it as a military crisis and transferred 2,000 stallions of Jeju Ranch to Jindo and Ganghwado. And he had a horse ranch installed on the coast and islands of the mainland. Sejong inherited Taejong's intention of installing mainland horse ranches and installed horse ranches in Hongwon peninsula of Namyang bay and in several islands. Suwon Dohobu's horse ranch installation consists of three parts. The first one is the background of horse ranch installation. Here we consider why the early Joseon was more active in horse ranch installation than Goryeo dynasty. Goryeo dynasty also needed cavalries to cope with the northern province like the early Joseon, but, Yeojin tributed Daldan horses to the early Goryeo, so the installation of horse ranches was not urgent. On the other hand, in the Yuan dynasty interference period, Mongol horses were brought to Goryeo to install horse ranches on coasts and islands all over the country, but most of the horse ranches were abolished in the late Goryeo by seizing fodders and war horses. The second one is Suwon Dohobu's Hongwon cape, Yangya cape, and Pungdo ranches. Hongwon cape ranch was installed as a cattle ranch to grow cattle in the 13th year of Sejong, but was abolished 10 years later. However, Saboksi installed Wegu (外廐) there and grazed Naeguma horses. Yangya cape and Pungdo ranch were national level of horse ranches. For the matter of managing these two ranches, Suwon Dohobu of Gyesugwan and Namyangdohobu that was under the jurisdiction of Suwon Dohobu were confronted. The third one is the horse ranch installation of Namyangdohobu under the jurisdiction of the Suwon Dohobu. Namyangdohobu was subordinated to Suwon Dohobu is based on the historical data, “Dohobu is one, Namyang” for Suwon Dohobu's jurisdiction in “Sejong Sillok” Jiriji. There were 10 horse ranches belonging to Namyangdohobu, but Seongjong moved Deokjeokdo, Sayado ranch to Incheon Dohobu, Soholdo ranch to Ansan‐gun, and Pungdo ranch to Suwon Dohobu in the 17th year of Seongjong. And Yeongjongpo Manho, under the command of Namyangdohobu Gwado Sugun Cheomjeoljesa, a camp chief of military camp, also served as a ranch supervisor for six horse ranches. Chojiryang Manho also served as ranch supervisor for Soholdo and Ijakdo ranch under the direction of Seongjong.

Securing Boju of Koryo Dynasty and Its Meaning

Kim, Seon-ah | 2018, (106) | pp.361~391 | number of Cited : 2

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Boju was located in the lower part of the Amnokgang, and was a key point to be used as a transportation route to the mainland of China and the excavation area as well as the Korean Peninsula and the Liaodong area. Boju, which had been dispatched by a large number of provincial armies, occupied an important position in the Koryo period, which was constantly contested with China. Since the Boju area is located at the border gateway, it was not only politically and militarily important, but also a place where it could take advantage of brokerage trade through economic exchange. The intention of establishing a chapter in the Boju area came from the intent of taking economic gain as a means of checking the concerns that resumed the relationship with Song. However, Koryo was intended to prevent the expansion of the Liao forces in the east of the Amnokgang. Boju was the first target of attack when there was an external invasion and could be used as a channel for the invading army at the moment. Koryo was trying to prevent anything that could become a sprout of the conflict with Liao. The time when Koryo was able to assert its sovereignty over the Boju area was the replacement of Liao and Jin. Koryo was able to acquire the Boju area, which is a strategic economic and military center, through diplomatic methods. Jin demanded Pledge. Koryo accepted this and obtained Boju. Koryo, even after restoring Boju from Jin, dispatched Bundo army, Doryung, Jungnangjang and Nangjang to the area. It was because it was an important area that became the gateway between the two countries. In particular, Byeongmasa allowed Yanggyae to defend and installed bundo at the same time. It was a dual system. They were able to form their own forces. In particular, Han Shun and Da Ji, who were the officers of the provincial government, rebelled against the ruling of the central government. In this period, local officials flattered the militant regime and deprived the people, or opposed the central government. After securing the Boju, they deployed military forces to effectively rule the region. but rather they formed their own forces.

A New and Systematic Perspective on History of South Korea's Defence Policy

Yong-Sup Han | 2018, (106) | pp.393~405 | number of Cited : 1

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Ming Dynasty History from the perspective of the Great Wall and the Frontier Fortification

KyeoungLok Kim | 2018, (106) | pp.407~420 | number of Cited : 0

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2018, Vol., No.106