2018, Vol., No.109

Investigation and contents for Ulleungdo of Russian military transport ship Yakut in 1903

KIM, YOUNG-SOO | 2018, (109) | pp.1~32 | number of Cited : 1

PDF

A Study on the Characteristics of Military Policy and Military Operations The Marshal Headquarters in The Great Han Empire Prior to the Russo-Japanese War

MoonJunho | 2018, (109) | pp.33~80 | number of Cited : 5

PDF

Since its establishment, The Marshal Headquarters that directed the military affairs had to respond to the realized foreign threats. Because both Russia and Japan that wanted to occupy the impact on the Korean Peninsula continued arms race. Meanwhile, the turmoil in the border areas became frequent in accordance with the spread of the Boxer Rebellion(義和團事件), and as the eight countries allied forces became visualized, The Great Han Empire regularized ‘the military superiority police’ through the revision of 「Marshal Headquarters’ system」 and the expansion of armaments. The Great Han Empire hereby became to set government centering on the military operations institutionally. Due to the outbreak of war to suppress the boxers, the large-scale invasion of the Qing bandit(淸匪) and the overall problems followed by the influx of refugees. On this, Marshal Headquarters reinforced the military guard troops extensively in the border areas and realized ‘the linear defense’ which was arranged circumspectly by troops. Through this, the Qing bandit, that is a mediatory factor, was able to be repelled and the intervention of foreign forces blocked. Meanwhile, internal turmoil had to be suppressed and the power of the central government had to be shown abroad since Russia and Japan were navigating the intervention cause in various ways. Therefore, local appeasement was made in the form of the stationed troops on the key points and putting the military troops on the area where the situation took place. In this regard, the foreign protection, which could be extended to foreign affairs, was an important issue. In addition to this, Marshal Headquarters tried to achieve stability in the region where the troop was dispatched through the military inspection and made an effort to establish fundamental principles and improve morale of the military such as the realization of institutional care for the fallen soldiers.

A Study on the Counter-Insurgency Failure Factors of the U.S. Army in the View of Orientalism : Focused on Iraq War Case

Park Byeung Chan | 2018, (109) | pp.81~114 | number of Cited : 2

PDF

The United States has not systematically organized and developed experiences and lessons of failure since the failure of the counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War more than three decades ago. Since then, the United States has been confronted with a new war that was unexpected, though on May 1, 2003, when President Bush declared that "major battles in Iraq were over", the war seemed to be a successful ending. The response of the US military responding to the insurgent's insurgency was still limited to the conventional way of conducting combat, so it was once again a failure. Thus, this study will analyze the factors that led to the failure of the United States to revive the counterinsurgency from the perspective of 'Othernization' of Orientalism. The United States looked at Iraq with distorted views created by it's 'Othernization' of Iraq and Iraq people. In the end, it was separated from indigenous inhabitants and approach from the viewpoint that it could not bring back the support of residents. Based on the four battle cases that took place during the Iraq war for analysis, we will compare the four failure factors to see what factors have failed or succeeded in the battle. As the comparative factors, the first, 'Execution of the operation centered on the sweeping', the second, 'The operation without consideration of the civilian damage', the third, ‘Execution of the US military independent operation’, and the fourth, ‘Execution of the large conventional military operation’. As a result of analysis of the factors of failure of the US Army's counterinsurgency, the factors that can be generalized as common cause of the counterinsurgency failure in Iraq are the ‘execution of the operation centered on the sweeping’ and ‘the operation without considering the civilian damage.’ On the other hand, considering that the 'large-scale conventional military operation' was a failure factor of the first Falluja battle and joint strike operation, considering that it was a successful operation even though it was applied in the second Falluja battle, ‘large-scale conventional military operation' did not become a necessary factor for the failure of the counterinsurgency.

An Analysis on the Critical Success Factors of the US Maritime Quarantine in the Cuban Missile Crisis

LEE PYO KYU , byungha, Kyun | 2018, (109) | pp.115~162 | number of Cited : 0

PDF

On the contemporary era, the unclassified secret sources, the documents and materials of interviews with those who participated or worked in association with the Cuban Missile Crisis let us know the activities of the Soviet Submarines, and the processes and effects of the US maritime quarantine operation. Thus, now it is possible to synthetically analyze it from the viewpoints of naval component operations. Consequently, the purpose of this article is, on the basis of the results of the analysis, to draw the critical success factors of the US maritime quarantine operation in the Cuban Missile Crisis. For this, I employ the literature review approach on the bases of the governmental unclassified secret sources, the memoirs, the related thesis/articles and multimedia data. According to results of the research, the critical success factors were not only the active diplomacy technic for the coercive approach on Mikita Khrushchew, the Soviet Leader, by providing carrot and stick at the same time using nuclear and conventional powers, but also the detailed operational directives deterring a real conflict with the Soviet Foxtrot submarines backed by the Cuban troops, deployed limited missile strength and land based the Soviet army in Cuba in advance. They were the critical factors of de-escalating the nuclear crisis and of saving the world as well as the US from the danger of breaking out a nuclear war. The additional factors were the infeasibility of employing the nuclear strategies of the mutual massive retaliations, the US setting regarding the purpose and performing procedures of the maritime quarantine and the Soviet understanding on them, unremitting coercive activities and capability revelation, and lastly keeping the posture for perfect verification against the Soviet nuclear/conventional materials(sources) deployed in Cuba. All of these were proved by the logical bases. The practical lesson of the US maritime quarantine in the Cuban Missile Crisis is that the military lessons of the past operation will not be the directives for a future war. In order to succeed in a future war, it is essential to develop a new strategy reflecting not only the lessons of the past military operations, but also diverse contemporary political and strategic environmental factors.

An Unbalanced account of the Second 'World' War: A Critic on A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II

이상현 | 2018, (109) | pp.163~204 | number of Cited : 0

PDF

Gerhard Weinberg's A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II was translated into Korean in 2016. The book was a brave attempt to make a wholistic narrative of the Second World War focused on Hitler's racial foreign policy and the Holocaust. Weinberg wrote it throughout the 1980s and published the first edition in 1994. However, the author did not change his approach and analysis even until 2005 when the new edition was published; thus continues his theme of 1980's historical approaches and diplomatic history. This book is now finally introduced in Korea with almost 20 years old perspective. The biggest strength of this work is that it illustrated a 'big picture' of the war with a focus on the contingency of battles, theatres, strategies and diplomacies, especially in terms of the global intention of Hitler. It distinguishes Weinberg from many other historians who have failed to provide the overall flow of the Second World War by over-emphasizing stories of 'Great Men' and famous battles. His classical perspective as a displomatic historian allows his readers the great benefit to look at the war 'from the above'. Despite his clear centre of gravity, however, Weinberg still has some drawbacks. The Hitler-centric approach inevitably makes the narrative to be Europe centric, especially Germany. Weinberg's Holocaust is not well located in the general context of the world conflict, and the opposite scholars, who vigorously criticise the classic approach on the German history, are simply neglected. The new edition was published on 2005, yet cultural and social histories were almost not considered, while air power was not dealt with as seriously as naval power, and the Home Front was simplified as peoples' will. Therefore, although this book is one of the most recent publications on the general history of the Second World War, it needs to be supported by other more recent studies.

The Establishment and Activities of Patriotic Supporter Association in North Korea

Moon Mi-ra | 2018, (109) | pp.205~244 | number of Cited : 6

PDF

Attempts to strengthen the military power of Joseon before Byeongja Horan(丙子胡亂) and its limitations: Centered on securing troops and supplying military provisions during the early days of King Injo's reign.

Tae-koo HUH | 2018, (109) | pp.245~280 | number of Cited : 4

PDF

The Status and Activities of Gyeongsang Left Navy during the Imjin War

Jangmyeong Je | 2018, (109) | pp.281~320 | number of Cited : 6

PDF

The perception that the Joseon Navy played a crucial part in overcoming the national crisis during the Imjin War is dominant. The naval forces in three provinces (Gyeongsando, Jeollado, and Chungcheongdo) forbade the Japanese army to advance from the sea, which greatly contributed to leading the war in favor of Joseon. However, the Gyeongsang Left Navy which was established and operated in the eastern part of Gyeongsang province with Busan at the center, was not able to function properly as it occupied by the Japanese forces from the beginning of the war. This study investigates the military activities of the Gyeongsang Left Navy during the Imjin War. It is verified that the Gyeongsang Left Navy existed and carried out its duty clearly. Therefore, it is necessary to explore and examine the activities of the Gyeongsang Left Navy in order to review the naval history during the Imjin War. A total of fourteen naval troops were in operation, including two Gwans (administrative land districts), and twelve Poes (naval forces administrative districts) in the Gyeongsang Left Navy right before the Imjin War. However, it was impossible to prevent the large-scale Japanese troops from invading Busan in the sea because the naval camps were dispersed widely around Busan. In the early phase of the war, therefore, the battles were mainly fought on the land. The commander of Gyeongsang Left Navy also participated in land battles, including Siege of Busan in which the general Jeong Bal fought hard, and Siege of Dadaepo in which Yun Heung-sin died in the last ditch for Joseon. Then, the Gyeongsang Left Navy strengthened its offensive against the Japanese forces which remained in that area by the time the peace negotiation began. At this time, Kim Taeheo, the governor of Ulsan won a victory both in land battles and sea battles. In the meantime, Lee Suil, the commander of Gyeongsang Left Navy seized four enemy ships. During the period of the peace negotiation, the Joseon court sought for the measures such as the construction of panokseon (board roofed ship) to improve the combat power of the Gyeongsang Left Navy. However, the combat of the Gyeongsang Left Navy was only effective in a guerrilla warfare, and it was not able to overcome its numerical deficit against a large enemy. This situation was the same even during Jeongyoojaeran, the second invasion. When Jeongyoojaeran broke out in January 1597, Gijang Hyeongam and the governor of Ulsan were not able to keep off the enemy and did nothing but reported the invasion of the enemy. However, during the first Siege of Ulsan, the Gyeongsang Left Navy was able to contribute some extent. Lee Unryong, the commander of Gyeongsang Left Navy, supervised the transportation of the provisions for Ming forces through the East Sea and actually exerted great influence in the battle with a small force. The Joseon court commanded the naval camps in the Gyeongsang Left Navy to move toward Busan. So the troops were intensively disposed in Busan. In short, the Gyeongsang Left Navy carried out military activities in its own way although it was almost in the state of collapse in the early phase of the Imjin War. It could be considered that the Gyeongsang Left Navy did its utmost under the circumstances of that time even if the contribution was small compared to other regional navy.

The Location recognition of Anshi Castle and Review of the rumor of Tang Taizong eye injury in the Goryeo Dynasty

kim Cheolwoong | 2018, (109) | pp.321~352 | number of Cited : 2

PDF

The Battle of Anshi Castle has been talked about by many as an event that represents Korean history. Therefore, This paper reviewed two problems about Anshi Castle, the perception of the Goryeo period about the position of Anshi Castle and the rumor of the eye injury of Tang Taizong. The Battle of Anshi Castle is recorded in Chinese documents such as ZhenGuanzhengyao(􋺷貞觀政要􋺸), Tongdian(􋺷通典􋺸) and ZizhiTongjian(􋺷資治通鑑􋺸). In the ZhenGuanzhengyao, the Ansi Castle was said to be in the Liaodong. In the Tongdian, there is Anshi on the south side of Daliaoshui(大遼水). By doing so, the people of Goryeo would have recognized that Anshi Castle was in the eastern part of Liaohe(遼河). In the late Goryeo period Lee saek, Jeong mongju, and Lee sungin traveled through the Liaodong region to reminisce about the Battle of Anshi Castle. They understood that Anshi Castle was in Gaizhou(蓋州) of Liaodong region. Liaoshi and Jinshi compiled from the Yuan Dynasty, Yuanshi compiled from the Ming Dynasty recorded that Anshi Castle was in Gaizhou. However Anshi Castle, which was recognized as in the Liaodong until the Goryeo Dynasty, was officially recorded as Yonggang-Hyun by the ShinjungDonggukRyujiSeunglam. As a result this later led to confusion in Anshi Castle's location. On the other hand, the rumor of the eye injury of Tang Taizong is handed down as a representative memory of the battle of Anshi Castle. However, many librarians have recorded that Taizong leaved Liaodong and suffered from a boil after arriving in Dingzhou. Therefore, the rumor of the eye injury of Taizong is a misinterpretation of the fact that Taizong's disease. In the relationship between Goryeo and Mongol·Yuan, the battle of Anshi Castle was reinterpreted as a historical case of emphasizing the strength and independence of Goryeo. In response Lee saek, Jeong mongju, and Lee sungin pay attention the Battle of Anshi Castle as a historical event. This came from a historical recognition that Goryeo succeeded Goguryeo.

Supply and Demand System of iron equipment in Roman army

Bae Eun Suk | 2018, (109) | pp.353~386 | number of Cited : 1

PDF

Celestial Empire’s view about the Sino-North Korean relations of Mao era

Dongwon Lee | 2018, (109) | pp.387~396 | number of Cited : 1

PDF

Colonel Young Oak Kim’s Message to Korea’s Future Heros

이무형 | 2018, (109) | pp.397~408 | number of Cited : 0

PDF

KJCKorea
Journal Central

military history 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.94

2018, Vol., No.109