2023, Vol., No.128

The War between Silla and Goguryeo in the 460s to 480s and the Expansion into the Gangwon Yeongseo Region

Koh Chang Min | 2023, (128) | pp.1~52 | number of Cited : 0

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Between 460 and 480, the focus was on analyzing the battles in the Yeongseo and East Coast regions of Gangwon Province for Goguryeo and Silla. While various research results have emerged about the wars of that time, there were issues such as the lack of clarity regarding the positioning of the Jeongseon-Samcheok connection or the locations of Gwahyeon and Hosanseong, which appeared in the war of 489. Examining the areas of Jeongseon, Samcheok, and Gangneung, it was argued based on geographical and historical analysis of the Goryeo and Joseon eras that movement from Gangneung to Jeongseon was smoother than from Samcheok to Jeongseon. It was found that the movement from Gangneung to Jeongseon was smoother than from Samcheok to Jeongseon. Silla attempted to expand along the Namhangang River towards Jeongseon and Yeongwol. The route taken by Goguryeo in the 481 attack on Silla was along the coast. Goguryeo's defeat weakened its control in Gangwon Province. Based on historical and archaeological evidence, Hongcheon was estimated to be the location of Hosanseong attacked by Goguryeo in 489. Considering the the discovery of late 5th-century Silla pottery in Hyeongseong and the possibility of Moroseong being identified as Pyeongchang Morohyeon, it was argued. As Goguryeo's influence in the Gangwon Province region weakened due to the war of 481, Silla attempted to expand towards the Daegwallyeong Iseo area. Goguryeo attacked and occupied Gwahyeon and Hosanseong to address potential control issues along the Chuncheon-Hongcheon-Wonju route due to Silla's expansion. However, the challenging terrain and transportation hindered Silla's long-term expansion. Silla's attempts to expand into the Yeongseo region from the northeastern region of the Namhangang River indicate changes in control and the political situation in Gangwon Province from the late 5th century. These findings raise considerations for Silla's future expansion in the region.

The Military Characteristics of Spear Martialarts and Spear Martialarts of 『Muyedobotongji』􋺸in the Joseon Dynasty

Choi hyeong guk | 2023, (128) | pp.53~94 | number of Cited : 0

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The Factors Affecting the Joseon Navy's Winning Maritime Battles during the Imjin War -Focusing on the Improvements of the Navy Due to the Experiences of Fighting with Japanese Pirates Troops in the Early Years of the Dynasty-

Park joo mee | 2023, (128) | pp.95~140 | number of Cited : 2

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Having experienced numerous attacks by Japanese pirates from the early years of the dynasty, Joseon viewed that 'Japanese pirates troops were strong on water, but weak on land'. However, when the Imjin War, Japanese invasions of Korea (1952~8), took place, the Joseon Navy managed to win battles continuously from the beginning of the war, while the Joseon Army was defeated on land. Accordingly, there have been many researches examining why its navy could continue to win battles. However, as those researches have tended to focus on specific aspects of the battles, they have some limits in comprehensively understanding it. Accordingly, this study comprehensively analyzed direct impacts of the attacks of Japanese pirates troops on the Joseon Navy. That is, using principles of maritime strategy of Julian S. Corbett, this study proved that the experiences of fighting with Japanese pirates troops in the early years of the Joseon dynasty helped the Joseon Navy win the maritime battles during the massive invasions of Japan Japanese invasions in the late 16th century called Imjin War. To achieve the research purposes, this study applied the historical social science methodology of Max Weber. This study did not aim to discover new facts, but to prove that the excellency of the Joseon Navy in the Imjin War was the results of experiences of fighting Japanese pirates and troops in previous years. To achieve the research aim, this study comprehensively analyzed research findings which had been done in different areas. This study found out that fighting experiences with Japanese pirates troops in the early years of the dynasty helped Joseon to strengthen its naval power to secure the command of the sea. Of course, Joseon did not consistently pursue such a maritime strategy in the early years of the dynasty. But, dealing with Japanese forces in Sampo Waeran, Saryangjin Waebyeon, Eulmyo Waebyeon, and Sonjukdo Waebyeon, etc., Joseon could clearly figure out shortages and defects of its maritime war capacities, and improve its naval structure, warships and weapons over time. As a result, the Joseon Navy could show its strong aspects during the Imjin War. It is expected that this study will contribute to understanding of the causal relationship between Japanese attacks in the early years of Joseon and supremacy of the Joseon Navy during the Imjin War and understanding of history from the consilient perspective.

War and Weather - Japanese Military Strengths and Weather observation in the Russo-Japanese War -

kim yun mi | 2023, (128) | pp.141~174 | number of Cited : 0

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Bezobrazov's Far East Policy and Russo-Japanese Negotiations before the Russo-Japanese War

Lee, Hang-Jun | 2023, (128) | pp.175~216 | number of Cited : 0

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Bezobrazov formed shareholders of Yalu River Forestry Company centered on people who served in the Guards Corps or related to the imperial family to defend the interests of the imperial family, and he promoted Russia's Far East policy through the imperial family with the patronage of Nicholas II. while gaining political influence. Tsar Nicholas II also actively supported Bezobrazov to strengthen the autocracy. Bezobrazov supported the tyranny of the emperor and the governorship of the borders as the basic political system. Bezobrazov thought that an emperor-centered autocracy was the most suitable political system for Russia. Ultimately, Bezobrazov supported the long-term plan for Russia to occupy Manchuria and make Korea a protectorate. Bezobrazov believed that Russia should build up its military presence in the Far East and then protect individual Russian companies with foreign participation. By the way, Bezobrazov argued that no company could actively operate in the Far East if the management system of the Ministry of Finance remained as it is today. Bezobrazov criticized Russia's bureaucracy and tried to carry out the Far East policy of the imperial family by directly negotiating with the finance minister, the military minister, and the foreign minister. As a result, Bezobrazov directly intervened in the establishment of the Far East Government-General, drafted the Special Committee for the Far East organizational structure and the Far East's economic plan, and even prepared a plan for the formation of a plenipotentiary committee in Manchuria. However, at the last minute of the Russo-Japanese negotiations, Bezovzazov proposed a plan to maintain Korea's independence without Russia militarily occupying Manchuria in order to realize the 'Russian-Japanese alliance'. This was different from the basic policy of Bezovzazov's Far East policy, which was 'the occupation of Manchuria and the protectorate of Korea'. He intended to realize their own interests by establishing a 'stock company' while Russia occupied an economic advantage in Manchuria and Japan in Korea. In late December 1903 and early January 1904, Bezobrazov conveyed his idea to Kurino, the Japanese minister to Russia, to promote the actual 'Russian-Japanese alliance', and he suggested Russia's adherence to Manchurian interests and concessions on the Korean issue. Bezobrazov accurately grasped the intentions of the political opposition in order to seize political leadership in Russia, but he failed to grasp the decision-making process of Japan's most important enemy, Korea and Manchuria policy, especially the Japanese military's preparations for the Russo-Japanese War. He was preoccupied with internal enemies and neglected to grasp information about external enemies. As a result, Russia suffered a series of defeats against Japan in the early days of the Russo-Japanese War.

Changes in war strategy and the establishment of a logistical support system in the early years of the Korean War

Sangho Lee | 2023, (128) | pp.217~248 | number of Cited : 0

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A Role of Staff Officers in the Korean War Armistice Conference

Kim, Jeong Hun | 2023, (128) | pp.249~298 | number of Cited : 0

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This study analyzes the importance of the Meeting of Staff Officers from November 1951 to April 1952 during the Armistice Conference. This study analyzed the role of the Staff Officers Meeting and the achievements of the Staff Officers Meeting in the process of the Armistice Conference focusing on the third agenda. Existing research has only shown fragmentary results that the meeting of staff officers has helped conclude the armistice agreement. In addition, Existing research focus only on the decision process of the leadership in which the armistice agreement is concluded, or on the establishment of the second agenda military demarcation line and consultation on the fourth agenda prisoner. Discussions on the maritime area that were not resolved in the second agenda were also held in the third agenda. Moreover, when the issue of prisoners, the fourth agenda, was not solved, it was discussed in conjunction with the issue related to the third agenda. Discussions on the third agenda are important but have not been noticed. Especially, the Staff Officers Meeting played an important role in resolving the issues arising from the Third Agenda, but it did not draw attention. Of course, Stalin's death was the biggest reason for the resolution, but without the role of the Staff Officers Meeting, it would have taken longer for the armistice to be concluded even after Stalin's death or the completeness of the agreement would have been reduced. Therefore, in order to solve these problems, this study focuses on what the issues of the third agenda, what each other claimed, what they wanted, and how they solved the problem, focusing on the minutes of the armistice talks. As a result, the items that were at issue in the third agenda discussion were classified and the consensus area for each item was derived. And through constant meetings of UN and Communist delegations, it was found that the meeting of staff officers played an important role in the conclusion of the armistice agreement.

The Korean War and its Impact on NATO Expansion, Focusing on Greece and Turkey

Jeong, Ki-Hyuk | 2023, (128) | pp.299~334 | number of Cited : 0

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Defense Policy Agenda Setting Process in Korea : Types, Characteristics, and Policy Implications - Focusing on the postponement and reenactment of the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control, the deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, and the Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement -

Choi. Young-Chan , Kim, Kyung-Jin | 2023, (128) | pp.335~400 | number of Cited : 0

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The purpose of this paper is to identify how the major defense policy agendas of previous governments are set, spread, and entered, and analyze the types and characteristics based on this. The results of the study are summarized as follows. First of all, Korea's major defense policy agenda was analyzed as a more diverse and democratic model in which problems were raised by citizens or private groups outside the government and turned into policy agendas actively resolved by the government. When deciding on a policy to postpone the Transfer Wartime Operational Control, it was analyzed as a mobilization model to secure public support after the government's agenda, and an inside access model that omitted the process of Transfer Wartime Operational Control, THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula, and signing a Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement. The characteristics of Korea's defense policy agenda setting process can be presented as follows. First, South Korea's defense policy decision was made within the framework of North Korea's provocations and threats and the U.S. defense policy. Second, the government's opinions were reflected in the initiative, and most of the agenda setting process was led by the government. Third, the government tended to decide on the policy contents they prepared or spread the contents to groups essential for implementation and set policy agendas. Fourth, there was a lack of public understanding and persuasion efforts for defense policy decisions from the process of setting policy agendas. Finally, logical consistency and continuity were not maintained in the process of setting policy agendas. Based on this, the policy implications that can be presented can be presented as follows. First, efforts should be made to enhance the negotiating ability with the U.S. from setting the defense policy agenda. Second, in the process of setting a policy agenda, it is necessary to review the bottom-up agenda rather than top-down. Third, the process of setting the defense policy agenda needs to be carried out with various policy actors, and clear guide-lines for how to set the content and scope should be set in consideration of the national interests. Fourth, consistency and continuity must be maintained from the stage of setting the defense policy agenda. Fifth, active use of think tanks is required. Finally, unlike in the past, various efforts should be accompanied to gain public support from the stage of establishing the defense policy agenda so that public consensus and support can be formed.

Operation and construction of Israeli air force against military threats from neighboring countries

Kwan Haeng Cho , Sungpyo Hong | 2023, (128) | pp.401~450 | number of Cited : 0

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[Book reviews] Military connections left behind by those erased in war

KEUM Bowoon | 2023, (128) | pp.451~464 | number of Cited : 0

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[Observation Review] After attending the first Military History Forum in 2023

장성환 | 2023, (128) | pp.465~476 | number of Cited : 0

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KJCKorea
Journal Central

military history 2022 KCI Impact Factor : 0.87

2023, Vol., No.128