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Habitus of Personal I in Husserl -In View of Aristoteles and Kant-

  • PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE
  • 2019, (31), pp.117~149
  • DOI : 10.33639/ptc.2019..31.006
  • Publisher : Research Institute for East-West Thought
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
  • Received : October 18, 2019
  • Accepted : November 29, 2019
  • Published : November 30, 2019

Cho,Kwan-Sung 1

1경인교육대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

In this paper I intend to elucidate the concept of habitus (Habitualität in German, habituality in English) that can be said to be regarded by Husserl not as one of the important thematic concepts but as a meaningful operative concept above all by drawing on some living examples expressed not in Husserl’s jargons but in terms of ordinary language. By setting forth the twofold existing modes of habitualities that express themselves not only in the individual life forms or life styles (Lebensstil des Individuums) but also in the social life forms or life styles (Lebensstil der Gemeinschaft) I attempt to bring out the social and historical character of personal I as the concrete unity of mind and body and as the growing and maturing carrier of various habitualities especially in view of the phenomenological value theory and ethics that Husserl has in mind, and that I have been striving to systematize. Even though Husserl does not make a sufficiently explicit and fully abundant moral norm-oriented phenomenological analysis and description of habituality of personal I, his phenomenological matter-oriented genetic analysis and description of habituality can be judged to have multi-faceted potential implications for virtue-based moral philosophy and ethics as well as for education in general and for moral education in particular. In this article I put emphasis on the following theses: ① Aristoteles, Kant and Husserl move in their philosophical thematization of habituality in the interface between weak innatism and weak empiricism making the so called Nature-Nurture Controversy meaningless, and they do not go into dealing with the problem of habituality beyond their philosophy-grounded perspective. ② Both their philosophical treatment of habituality and Husserl’s genesis-oriented thematization of habituality are to be made more fruitful, persuasive and convincing by making use of such empirical sciences as biology, neurosciences, psychology, sociology, political science, cultural anthropology etc.

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