본문 바로가기
  • Home
Basic Search

The Ownership Relations and Corporate Governance of the Wallenberg Companies in Sweden and the Way the Wallenberg Case Has Been Interpreted in South Korea

  • Journal of the Scandinavian Society of Korea
  • Abbr : JSSK
  • 2015, (16), pp.195-226
  • Publisher : The Scandinavian Society of Korea
  • Research Area : Social Science > Area Studies > North Europe(Scandinavian)

Shin Jeongwan 1

1성공회대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The Wallenberg family, the biggest capitalist family in Sweden has controlled many companies in industrial and financial sectors for five generations. And it has had controlling power much stronger than its stock portion. In a sense, it seems that the family has maintained the ownership relations and corporate governance similar to those of the Korean Chaebols. Paying attention to this, some Korean researchers and Korean mass media used the case of the Wallenberg family for maintaining that the Korean society should respect the Chaebol system and support the succession of management right of Chaebol companies to third generation of Chaebol families. But there are not only similarities but also differences between the Wallenberg family and the Korean Chaebol families. What made possible for the Wallenberg family to have controlling power much stronger than its stock portion were the dual class shares and the pyramid-like ownership relations. The latter means that the public utility foundations established by the family members own the investment company, Investor AB, and Investor AB in turn as a holding company owns many companies. Moreover, the excellent management capability and practice of noblesse oblige of the family, and the bank-centered Swedish financial system were also important factors. And the Wallenberg family has exercised controlling power under the conditions quite different from those of the Korean Chaebols, high level independence of the family companies, transparence of management, workers’ participation in management for example. And there were political conditions including the hegemony of the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the existence of very strong trade unions, which made it possible to check the possibility of misuse of the power of big capitalist families. Thus, it seems more desirable that the case of the Wallenberg family be ‘consumed’ in Korea for understanding what kind of conditions should be satisfied for allowing the Chaebol families to exercise controlling power much stronger than their stock portions, rather than for arguing for protecting the management right of Chaebol families and supporting the succession of management right to third generation of Chaebol families.

Statistics

  • 1,473 Viewed
  • 208 Downloaded

Tools

Issue List

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

Basic Search Advanced Search