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A Law and Economic Analysis of Private Takings

  • Korea Real Estate Review
  • 2013, 23(3), pp.7-33
  • Publisher : korea real estate research institute
  • Research Area : Social Science > Law > Law of Special Parts > Law of Real Estate

KIM, IL-JOONG 1 Sungkyu Park 2

1성균관대학교
2(재)한국부동산연구원

Accredited

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the comparative inefficiency of private takings. For this goal, we first examine the existing takings-related laws and survey major qualifications for private takings (i.e., participation restrictions or other preconditions). We then outline the legal and economic literature regarding private takings and offer the main argument that private takings can cause varying types of inefficiency such as cancellations, changes and delays of public projects by private-sector’s opportunism (i.e., adverse selection or moral hazard). The hypothesis is derived that eminent domain in combination with the private objective of profit maximization and the incompleteness of public monitoring against private-sector’s opportunism can be abused seriously. We subsequently show a possibility of private taking’s inefficiency by investigating the entire cases of constructing industrial complexes which took place almost for the past decade. Althought we rely on a simple methodology using average statistics, it turns out that supplying industrial complexes by private takings is not a superior means compared with public takings. This result implies that an effort to ensure private taking’s efficiency is needed.

Citation status

* References for papers published after 2023 are currently being built.

This paper was written with support from the National Research Foundation of Korea.