2024, Vol., No.50

Korean Review of French History 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 1.67

pISSN : 1229-702X
https://journal.kci.go.kr/krfh

France and Germany, which have common origin in the Carolingian Empire, have broken away from their nationalist viewpoint and set the starting point of their respective histories in the 10th century, that is, with the emergence of the Capetian and Ottonian dynasties. In contrast, while emphasizing the unity of the Carolingian Empire and the exchange and amicitia between the divided kingdoms, it was also emphasized that the substantive or cultural division of the two was only accomplished in the 12th century. However, the history of the two countries in the 9th and 10th centuries is characterized by a tendency to decentralize power and by dynamic interactions between numerous local forces, beyond the declarations or exchanges of specific dynasties. What should be noted is that in this process, especially from the end of the 9th century, the spheres for electing the kings of East and West Francia were formed differently. In this respect, the process of forming the historical and political identity of France and Deutschland needs to be reevaluated from an bottom-up perspective as a self-organization by complex local forces, rather than a top-down perspective of division and integration discussed at the dynastic level.

World War I was a test to assess the level of integration of Alsace-Lorrainers into the German nation-state. Although they largely supported the German war effort, their patriotism was sometimes mixed. While they certainly shared a sense of belonging to the German nation, they did not harbor intense hostility towards the French, who were designated as the “enemy” by the German authorities, making their mobilization less spontaneous. Cultivating a “war culture” among the Alsace-Lorrainers was challenging. However, they did not openly reject the war. The attitudes of the German authorities, considering them as “imperfect members of the national community” and treating them with suspicion, distanced them from the German national community. When the war ended with the victory of the Allies and French troops entered Alsace-Lorraine, the inhabitants greeted them enthusiastically, but it was more a reaction of relief to finally see the end of the war, to which they had never truly consented, than a desire to regain their French status.

The purpose of this article is to examine how France perceived and responded to West Germany’s Ostpolitik and to analyze the historical significance of France’s pursuit of European détente before and after the eastern policy. De Gaulle sought peace and prosperity in Europe from the perspective of Europeanism, rather than American Atlanticism; therefore, France emphasized improving relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries from the mid-1960s. The international context of European détente, along with the internal context of West Germany’s reunification efforts, led to the formation of Brandt’s Ostpolitik. France supported Ostpolitik, but was concerned about Germany’s growing influence in Europe. In order not to lose the initiative in the pursuit of European détente, France valued the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe France wanted to strengthen it’s international position in the process of building the foundations of European security through multilateral exchange and cooperation.