KJCKorea
Journal Central

This study aims to investigate the performative and practical meaning of “truth” in the Story of the Three Bodyguards (1 Esdras 3:1–5:6) through an integrated rhetorical analysis. While traditional scholarship has often fragmented the text into "Greek" and "Jewish" layers or reduced the praise of truth to mere political propaganda, this article seeks to demonstrate how the concept of truth functions as the core persuasive driver for the historical resumption of the Jerusalem Temple reconstruction. To achieve this, the study adopts a holistic rhetorical strategy, reading the five speeches not as isolated fragments but as a coherent persuasive sequence. It traces the transition from epideictic contest to deliberative petition and employs an intertextual method to uncover how Hellenistic rhetorical forms consistently appropriate Hebrew scriptural language (from Isaiah, Jeremiah, Genesis, and Proverbs) as persuasive resources. The research first critiques existing editorial hypotheses by highlighting the narrative’s rhetorical continuity. It demonstrates that the first three speeches—on wine, the king, and women—utilize scriptural motifs to expose the inherent distortions in human judgment. Based on this, the study redefines Zerubbabel’s speech on truth not as another competing force, but as the normative criterion aligned with divine justice. The analysis culminates in Zerubbabel’s final appeal, where truth is transformed into a performative demand for the king to fulfill his prior vow, thereby linking speech and judgment to concrete historical action. The study concludes that the Story of the Three Bodyguards is a sophisticated performative discourse rather than a mere court tale. By redefining truth as the alignment of speech, judgment, and action, this research enhances the theological and ethical understanding of Septuagint literature. Ultimately, it offers a critical insight into political ethics, suggesting that the legitimacy of authority is fundamentally measured by its commitment to fulfilling spoken promises—a “performance” of truth that initiates communal restoration.

This paper seeks to address and correct the inaccurate and often confusing translations of the Hebrew tree name hadas in various Korean Bible versions. To achieve this goal, the study first compares the existing translations of hadas across different Bible versions (Korean, English, and German) and then conducts an in-depth analysis of all biblical passages where the tree is mentioned. Since the hadas tree is a non-native species and unfamiliar to the Korean context, this paper proposes adopting a transliterated form of the Hebrew name in the Korean text. Furthermore, we emphasize the necessity of providing supplementary explanatory notes to clarify that the scientific name of this tree is Myrtus communis, and that it is universally known as ‘myrtle’ in English and ‘myrte’ in German. It is also essential to unequivocally state that the various traditional Korean names used previously for hadas are scientifically inaccurate mistranslations. This research aims to highlight more effectively the tree’s nature as a profound symbol of hope and restoration amid the hardships and despair of the exile period. Moreover, connecting the Hebrew name of Esther (Hadassah) to the tree's characteristics allows the intersecting metaphor of marriage between the bride and groom to be brought to prominence. Ultimately, this proposal for the accurate Korean nomenclature of hadas will contribute to a more precise and in-depth understanding of the biblical text.

Pharaoh’s hardness can raise theological problems not only for the relationship between human free will and divine sovereignty but also for the question of responsibility. Consequently, studies on this topic have long proceeded in a contentious manner. This paper, working from that problem-awareness, offers new insights by structurally analyzing the lexemes related to Pharaoh’s “hardness” and their syntactic constructions. The inclusio structure of qāšâ (קשׁה) shows that while God made Pharaoh’s heart strong (חזק/ḥāzaq) and heavy (כבד/kābēd), he did not make it hard (קשׁה/qāšâ); rather, Pharaoh himself hardened (קשׁה/qāšâ) his own heart. Pharaoh’s officials are also presented as a case indicating that, whether a person hardens one’s own heart or God hardens it, one’s “heart” and “actions” remain matters one can choose and determine. Moreover, the conditional clauses God presents to Pharaoh, taken together with the case of the officials, show that even when God exerts influence upon the human heart, human free will and the capacity to choose are not infringed. On this basis, the paper concludes that Pharaoh’s hardness results from the simultaneous operation of divine sovereignty and human free will, yet the ultimate responsibility for his hardness and the resulting plagues lies with Pharaoh himself. In this process, by identifying the inclusio structure of qāšâ (קשׁה) within the plague narrative, this study has shown that qāšâ (קשׁה) plays a highly significant role in the attribution of responsibility for hardening. It has also newly demonstrated that Pharaoh’s officials stand in contrast to Pharaoh at two levels —“heart” and “action”— thereby showing that they function to further underscore Pharaoh’s responsibility. These findings appear to lend additional persuasive force to positions that more strongly emphasize Pharaoh’s accountability in the debate over his hardness.