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On the Possibility of Duties to Oneself - ‘Release Objection’ in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

  • Journal of Humanities, Seoul National University
  • 2025, 82(4), pp.209~236
  • DOI : 10.17326/jhsnu.82.4.202511.209
  • Publisher : Institute of Humanities, Seoul National University
  • Research Area : Humanities > Other Humanities
  • Received : October 13, 2025
  • Accepted : November 11, 2025
  • Published : November 30, 2025

Kang, Eun-a 1

1서울과학기술대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the possibility of the concept of duty to oneself, focusing on the “release objection.” First, it clarifies that the debate on duties to oneself is limited to non-derivative moral duties. It then argues that the release objection—which claims that the concept of duties to oneself is self-contradictory—fails as a refutation of the possibility of such duties, because its key premise, namely that the self cannot bind itself, is not justified. However, the paper points out that the release objection raises a deeper problem for Kant’s account of the possibility of duty. Kant’s strategy of securing a place for duties to oneself by distinguishing between the self as the imposer of duty and the self as the subject of duty incurs the burden of clarifying the status of the former as well as the burden of explaining the theoretical tension with the doctrine of autonomy. Ultimately, by examining the problems raised by the release objection within Kant’s account of the possibility of duty, this paper aims to show that the concept of duty to oneself does not fall into a logical contradiction, but rather it calls for a more fundamental reflection on the very conditions under which duties are possible.

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