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On the Principle of Financial Democracy and the Constitutional Control -Focusing on the Flexibility of the Finance Law and the Control of the Settlement of Accounts-

  • Public Land Law Review
  • Abbr : KPLLR
  • 2008, 41(), pp.497-520
  • Publisher : Korean Public Land Law Association
  • Research Area : Social Science > Law

장선희 1

1대구카톨릭대학교

Accredited

ABSTRACT

Our Constitution proclaims the parliament-centric financial democracy as its basic principle of the finance. As provided by the Clause 54 and the following clauses and by the Clause 59 and other laws and regulations of finance, the principal subjects on the national finance are to be kept under the control of the parliament, in other words, they come into effect through the resolution of the Parliament. This principle is derived from the doctrine of the democratic sovereignty of our Constitution, and it's an unavoidable interpretative conclusion from the supremacy of the parliament in the system of the indirect democracy. From a practical point of view the financial authority of the parliament endowed by the Constitution has effect, different from the legislative authority, not only on the abstract and general subjects, but also on the individual and concrete ones. From a period-related point of view it can, different from the legislative authority empowered with the prior control, intervene in the administrative activities simultaneously, and accuse the administrative departments of responsibility retroactively. This reinforcement of the financial authority could be understood as a concretization of the constitutional demand for democracy and legalism based on the parliamentary supremacy into the financial democracy and the financial legalism. The executive is, as mentioned above, under an obligation to act based on the financial democracy and legalism, but it also should be flexible enough to cope with the changing financial circumstances. That why there are a series of institutional devices to ensure the flexibility of the financial laws. This flexibility includes the discretionary authority of the executive to a certain extent and the political influence from outside. The flexibility of the executive in regards of the financial administration can cause a setback of the financial democracy. For all the importance, our jurisprudence lacks a serious discourse on that subject from the financial reform through the establishment of the financial law to these days. In this treatise the legislative system of the budget and accounts that is established to promote the flexibility will be looked into form a perspective of financial democracy, focusing on its untrodden parts. The control over the finance based on the principle of the parliamentary resolution is multifarious and extensive corresponding to the nature and content of the finance. By reason of that, this treatise will be restricted to the devices to promote the flexibility in the financial execution, and to the settlement of accounts.

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