2022, Vol.6, No.2

Analyses & Alternatives 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 1.46

pISSN : 2508-822X / eISSN : 2508-8238
https://journal.kci.go.kr/aanda

The Russia-Ukraine War was a “three-layer compounded war” between the US and Russia, Russia and Ukraine, and Ukrainian government forces and rebels. First, the war is a phenomenon that occurred when the western sphere of influence seeking to maintain and strengthen the liberal international order and the Sino-Russian sphere of influence seeking a new alternative order collided in Ukraine, a geopolitical fault zone. Second, this war is the result of a typical ‘security dilemma’ phenomenon caused by the ‘chain reaction’ game of NATO's continuous expansion and Russia's response. Third, the Russia-Ukraine war was caused by the Russian military projection to prevent the military restoration of Donbas region by Ukraine. Until now, the Western world, led by the US, showed unexpected solidarity after the war despite subtle differences in positions. However, the non-Western world, including China, is not participating in the condemnation and sanctions against Russia. This war will be an important turning point in the existence and change of the current international order that has been formed and is operating since the end of the Cold War. The direction of maintenance/restoration, revision/change, and end/transformation of the current international order is highly likely to be determined depending on the development pattern and method of ending the war.

The U.S.-led international order, sustained by overwhelming national power since the end of the Cold War, is gradually being restructured from a unipolar international system to a bipolar international system or a multipolar international system, coupled with the weakening of U.S. global leadership and the rise of regional powers. Geopolitically, discussions have been constantly raised about the security instability that the reshaping of the international order will bring about, given that East Asia is a region where the national interests of the United States and regional powers sharply overlap and conflict. This study aims to critically analyze whether security discussions in Korea are based on appropriate crisis assessment and evaluation. This paper points out that the security crisis theory emerging in Korea tends to arise due to threat exaggeration and emphasizes the need for objective evaluation and conceptualization of the nature and the level of threats that the restructured international order can pose to regional security. Based on the analysis of changes in conflict patterns (frequency and intensity), occurring in East Asia during the periods divided into a bipolar system (1950-1990), a unipolar system (1991-2008), and a multipolar system (2009-current), this study shows that East Asia has not been as vulnerable to power politics as other regions. This investigation emphasizes that the complexity of Korea’s diplomatic and security burden, which are aggravated by the reorganization of the international order, do not necessarily have to be interpreted as a grave security threat. This is because escalating unnecessary security issues could reduce the diplomatic strategic space of the Republic of Korea.

This study aims to account for electoral choice in the 2020 presidential election by focusing on social identity which forms the basis for core partisan groups. Two views compete to explain the origins of polarization, policy versus party. One emphasizes policy as more influential in choosing presidential candidates. This follows the tradition of retrospective voting theory in which voters’ choice rely on government performance. Incumbent president whose performance proves well are rewarded to be reelected. Policy performance is based on measures around distinctive preferences for government spending. Republican Individuals prefer individual responsibility to government support, while Democratic counterparts support government support. Another perspective put an emphasis on the role partisanship which favors in-party members and disfavors partisan out-groups. Interparty animosity plays the key role in determining electoral behavior. This study relies on the Views of the Electorate Research (VOTER) Survey which provides a panel data of several waves from 2011 to 2020. A comparative evaluation of two views highlights three findings. First, policy matters. Policy preferences of voters are the primary drives of political behavior. Electoral outcomes in 2020 turned out to be the results of policy considerations of voters. 53.7 percent of voters tilted toward individual responsibility voted for Trump, whereas 70.4 percent of those favorable views of government support than individual responsibility voted for Biden. Thus effects of policy correspond to a positive difference of 26.4 percent points. Second, partisanship effects are of similar extent in influencing electoral choice of candidates: Democrats are less likely to vote for Trump by 42.4 percent points, while Republicans are less likely to vote for Biden by 48.7 percent points. Third, animosity of Republicans toward Democrat core groups creates 26.5 percent points of favoring Trump over Biden. Democrat animosity toward Republican core groups creates a positive difference of 13.7 percent points of favoring Biden.