2024, Vol.14, No.2

How to Evaluate the Belt and Road Initiative: Origins, Current Status, and Competition BaekYung kim

Baek Yung Kim | 2024, 14(2) | pp.3~9 | number of Cited : 0

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From Bandung to “One Belt One Road”: China’s Aid to Africa during the Cold War Era and Its Third World Conception

Jiwoon Baik | 2024, 14(2) | pp.11~44 | number of Cited : 0

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The Belt and Road Initiative from the Historical Context of China’s Diplomacy Towards Weaker Nations: The Fusion of Idealism and Realism in China’s Pursuit of a New International Order

Jeong Kyung Seo | 2024, 14(2) | pp.45~83 | number of Cited : 0

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Social Acceptance of the Belt and Road Initiative in the Mekong Region: Cases ofTransboundary Infrastructure Construction in Laos and Cambodia

Kiryong Choi | 2024, 14(2) | pp.85~126 | number of Cited : 0

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Ten years have passed since China’s Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) emerged in 2013. China is building transboundary infrastructure by promoting more than 200 BRIs with 150 countries around the world, including Southeast Asian countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV). For 10 years of BRI, China has been attracting attention worldwide as a major actor, but developing countries where transboundary infrastructure is being built, are not receiving attention because they are recognized or marginalized as objects. This study analyzes whether the acceptance of transboundary infrastructure being built in Laos and Cambodia under BRI is carried out through case analysis research methods. As a tool for analysis, we use a model that subdivides and supplements the three evaluation criteria used by Sobacool to measure social acceptance proposed by Wüstenhagen: Socio-political Acceptance, Community Acceptance, and Market Acceptance. Sobacool subdivided the evaluation indicators into ‘Strong institutional capacity’, ‘Political commitment’, and ‘Favourable legal and regulatory frameworks’ as socio-political acceptance. Second, community acceptance is presented by subdividing it into ‘Proficial community/individual ownership and use’, ‘Particular project sitting’, and ‘Recognition of externalities or positive public image’. Third, market acceptance is subdivided into ‘Competitive installation/production costs’, ‘Mechanisms for information and feedback’, and ‘Access to financing’. This study analyzed the social acceptance of the transboundary infrastructure of Laos’ Kunming-Boten-Vientiane high-speed rail and Cambodia’s Sihanoukville port, and socio-political acceptance was generally well achieved, but community and market acceptance were generally not well achieved. Based on this, the study points out the paradox of connectivity and the need to expand research related to China's connection strategy in the future.

China’s Belt and Road 10-Year Evaluation and Forecast: Perceptions and Responses of China and Five Central Asian countries

Jungwon Cho | 2024, 14(2) | pp.127~161 | number of Cited : 0

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This paper analyzes the perceptions and responses of China and Central Asian countries that China actively pursued from the beginning of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and diagnoses China’s achievements and problems with the BRI in Central Asia. China is using the BRI as a westward strategy to advance to Russia and Europe through the transportation and logistics network connection between China and Central Asia. Through industrial energy cooperation to build the industrial base, social overhead capital, and energy network necessary for Central Asian countries, China is promoting economic influence in Central Asia and overseas expansion to resolve the overproduction of domestic companies. Except for Turkmenistan, Central Asian countries are using China’s capital, technology, and manpower to build industrial production facilities and social overhead capital that are insufficient in the country. Kazakhstan, which built its industrial base and social overhead capital through active connection with China from the beginning, has the most business, focusing on manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and energy industries. Uzbekistan is producing results. Tajikistan is focusing on mining and transportation and logistics networks, and Kyrgyzstan is building mining and domestic power networks. Turkmenistan does not rely on China for natural gas development and exports, but has been promoting its development strategy, the revival of the Silk Road, and connection with the BRI since 2023. Kazakhstan, which is performing the best in China’s push for the BRI, has problems such as environmental pollution, the rise of anti-China sentiment in the private sector, and Kyrgyzstan’s national debt. However, other countries have not openly raised issues about China’s BRI in the private sector due to its strong dictatorship. In the future, Turkmenistan, which accumulated wealth from energy exports among Central Asian countries, is not expected to rely on China for natural gas exports because it does not prefer the existing supreme leader, Berdimuhamedov, to be economically dependent on certain countries. However, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are expected to strengthen cooperation with China to expand their domestic industrial base and social overhead capital. Therefore, China can provide the capital and manpower for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. China is expected to exert more influence than Western industrialized countries and Russia in their economic sector.

A Decade of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Sino-Japanese Relations: Securitization of Development Cooperation and New Challenges for Bilateral Collaboration

Seunghee Oh