2012, Vol., No.105

Deukyoung Kwon | 2012, (105) | pp.1~36 | number of Cited : 33

최근 예군과 예식진, 예소사, 예인수 3대의 예씨 일족 묘지명이 중국섬서성 서안시 郭杜鎭의 唐代고분에서 출토되었다. 이들 묘지명에 의하면, 예씨 일족은 원래 중국에서 건너와 熊津에 정착하여 백제인이 되었다고 한다. 그러나 관련 기록을 종합적으로 비교 분석해보면, 그것은 부정확한 口傳과 當代에 형성된 역사의식에 의하여 만들어진 측면이 많다. 그럼에도 예씨 일족은 웅진을 기반으로 한 지방세력인 것은 분명하므로, 그 들은 동성왕대 웅진귀족 苩氏가 붕괴한 후 그를 대신해 발흥한 세력이었다고 하겠다. 예씨 일족 묘지명은 7세기 중엽 백제 멸망을 전후한 시기의 한반도정세와 동아시아 국제관계에 대한 귀중한 정보를 담고 있다. 우선 예군묘지명 은 예군이 군사반란을 일으켜 웅진성에 피신해 있던 의자왕을 붙잡아 당에 넘긴 주동자였음을 증언하고 있다. 그렇다면 의자왕과 함께 당군에 투항한 정황을 서술한 삼국사기의 “熊津方領軍”이란 기사도 ‘熊津方領禰軍’으로 해석할 수 있다. 예군이 웅진방령으로서 반란의 주역이었다는 것은 기존에 전혀 알지 못했던 새로운 사실이다. 또한 예씨 일족 묘지명은 예군과 예식진 형제가 웅진도독부 설치와운영에 적극적으로 참여했다는 사실을 언급하였다. 당이 백제지역을 총괄하는 관청을 사비에서 웅진으로 옮겨간 데는 웅진이 예씨 일족의 근거지였다는 점과 관련이 있을 터인데, 그 일에 예씨 형제가 관여했을 것으로 생각된다. 그후 예군과 예식진은 각각 熊津都督府司馬와 東明州刺史로서 당의 백제고지 지배정책에 적극적으로 참여하였다.

A Study on Urasoe-Gusk(浦添城) and the History of Exchange between Goryeo and Ryukyu

YOON, YONGHYUK | 2012, (105) | pp.37~72 | number of Cited : 9

It has been known so far that the exchange between Korea and the Kingdom of Ryukyu was officially initiated in 1389 that was three years before the foundation of Joseon Dynasty. Therefore, the actual exchange with the Kingdom of Ryukyu was considered to occur during the period of Joseon Dynasty in general. However, the Goryeo style roof tiles excavated in Okinawa and Urasoe-Gusk(浦添城) indicate that the period of initial exchange between the countries needs to be dated back than current period. According to relevant researches, the Goryeo style roof tiles discovered in Urasoe Yodore are thought to be produced either in 1273, 1333 or in 1393. The result of excavation of Urasoe Yodore, which was conducted for several years in the 1990s, is significant in two aspects. Firstly, it has significantly reinforced the objectivity of historical records in relation to Eiso Dynasty(英祖王統). Secondly, it has supported the historical existence of King Eiso(英祖王) and proved that 1273 was the most possible year when the Goryeo roof tiles were made. The establishment of Yodore and the construction of Zenkan(禪鑑) and Kyokrakji(極樂寺) are believed to be closely related. Such relationship also explains the reason why Kyokrakji was located in the rough area in the back of Kyokrakji. In this respect, it is highly likely that Zenkan who established Kyokrakji in Urasoe Gusk, Okinawa in Eiso Dynasty was a Buddhist monk from Goryeo. However, it seems that the works of Goryeo roof tile engineers in the period of Eiso Dynasty were the result of one-time exchange rather than a part of continued trading between the two countries. In that case, it is reasonable to say that the presence of Goryeo roof tile engineers in Okinawa in the period of Eiso Dynasty was possible because of the special international circumstances in that period. Can the reason be found in the situation of Goryeo under the invasion of Mongol?

A Study on the Nobleman’s Tributary System Participation Method and Prefectures in the 16th Century-Focusing on 「Mukjaeilgi」 of Lee Mun-Geon-

Lee Sung-im | 2012, (105) | pp.73~106 | number of Cited : 9

The study researched the tributary system operation of Seongju area on the basis of Mukjaeilgi of Lee Mun-Geon. The study could grasp actual status of bonsaek payment and bangnap, which have been discussed in tributary system operation and specific status of sadaedong. Therefore, the study summarized entire context and suggested problem to replace conclusion with them. Suju called suhwaju was the best silk. Seongju was famous for sericulture. The area produced suju to manufacture clothe and pay it to local counties and prefectures as a tribute. Like sweet fish, silk was the tribute that was imposed to each household. In other words, each household produced silk and paid it as a tribute or paid rice, bean or cotton cloth instead of silk. Generally, collection of spots instead of payment of bonsaek was called sadaedong. Out of tributes of Seongju area, suju, hemp cloth or cotton were collected through sadaedong method. The sadaedong was very universal method in Seongju area in the middle of the 16th century. Although hemp cloth or cotton cloth were collected through sadaedong method, suju was most popular. Although suju was a single product, it was collected through the method combining bonsaek and sadaedong. It was a principle to pay bonsaek but if it was not available, munap or bangnap was used. In addition, the spots such as barn grass, bean and cotton cloth were collected through sadaedong. Although it seems that collection of suju was simple, it was complex actually so interests of many people were reflected to process. Suju was the item to guarantee good quality. Each household manufactured it through sericulture so its qualities were very different. Seongju governmental office should send collected suju to central government so it paid attention to quality maintenance to prevent gradual decay. In case of bonsaek payment,influential noblemen also experienced difficulties. Some household of Seongju purchased suju at high price to pay it as a tribute. Bangnap was the system to pay the item that is not manufactured or hard to acquire on behalf of household and receive the cost from household. Seongju Gyeongsangins were responsible for the proxy payment of item. They were the people who searched for profit by paying products to local governmental office. They were closely related with country's tax structure. After all, it was hard to guarantee quality of suju so rather than bonsaek payment, sadaedong was preferred. It was more comfortable for local governmental office to collect and pay suju costs because it can decrease burdens of work. Noblemen could enjoy many benefits by actively participating in sadaedong. They enjoyed economic benefit and displayed social influence by receiving certain roles from local governmental office. The noblemen could urge, imprison and accuse the household that did not pay a tribute. In addition, after the schedule of sadaedong, the shared profit with head of Seongju. Noblemen could participate in tributary system operation because of the friendship with local governmental office. In other words, when they had favorable friendships with local governmental office, they could participate in the operation actively but when they didn’t have, they were excluded. After all, if they did not have close relationships with local governmental office, all works that had been performed in collusion with governmental authority were damaged. It was also applied to tributary system participation process. Because of these reasons, Lee Mun-Geon tried to have a close relationship with local governmental officials. In this way, he could display the ability of influential person in Seongju area. Households could recognize political status of Lee Mun-Geon in Seongju area at that time. Therefore, they visited Lee Mun-Geon to discuss their difficulties and solve problem through personal request.

Critical Review and Suggestion about Politics of Gonglun in Joseon Era- Focusing on Yulgok Yi I’s Conception of Gonglun -

Kim, Kyung-Rae | 2012, (105) | pp.107~148 | number of Cited : 21

Politics of Gonglun(public opinion) is widely used as a typical concept of political doctrine and reality of Joseon. But, this also reflects enormous scholarly attention currently geared towards politics of Gonglun. In an attempt to overcome the remnant of colonial history, Korean historians highlights that politics of Gonglun was driven by the Sarim faction who dominated political and social spheres since the mid-Joseon dynasty, while social scientists and philosophers construe it as ‘politics of deliberation’ with consideration for modern democracy. Primarily, this study gives a critical review of misunderstanding and problem surrounding existing studies on politics of Gonglun. As part of troubleshooting actions, it then tries to shed new light on the concept of Gonglun(public opinion), the key concept of politics of Gonglun,from the neo-Confucian perspective which underpinned the thinking mechanism at that time. This study is specifically centered upon Yulgok Yi I’s conception of Gonglun which is regarded as a typical definition of Gonglun during the Joseon era. His conception is examined in two aspects. First, the study compares Gonglun with Guksi(the right of the state) which usually considered as either similar or same concept hereof. It clarifies their gap as well as commonness,and such gap offers a clearer characterization of Gonglun. Next, it examines the concept of Gonglun with regard to insim(the mind of the people). With emphasis on inner state of human mind, neo-Confucian self-cultivation focuses on the conversion of mind into the state of gong(public). By Yulgok Yi I’s definition, the meaning of gong, which qualifies lun in the context of Gonglun,should be also interpreted as an embodiment of such state of mind. Based on the above findings, this study expects to lay the ultimate foundation for new understanding of politics of Gonglun in Joseon, including power relationship between monarch and subjects and communication method in the policy-making process

The Actions of the Righteous Militia in the Gyeong’gi region, during the War with the Japanese in the 1590s - Aspects and Characteristics

Chung, Hae-Eun | 2012, (105) | pp.149~186 | number of Cited : 7

This article is a result of a preliminary examination of the actions of the righteous militia units, which originated in the Gyeong’gi region(京畿) during the war with the Japanese in the 1590s. Primary aspects of the righteous militia movements in this particular region, and their own characteristics, are discussed in details. In the early stages of the 1590s’ war, total of 35 counties out of 37 in the Gyeong’gi region, with the exception of Gang’hwa(江華) and Gyo'dong(喬桐), sustained heavy damages by the Japanese troops. The situation was even worse than the Yeongnam region(嶺南), which was the first to fall victim to the invading Japanese troops. Gyeong’gi was located in the path of the Japanese troops which was moving North, and also the path of their retreat, so that might have been the reason for such extensive damages. There are only 16 people who are confirmed by records to have been part of the Gyeong’gi region’s righteous militia, yet there were other people who were equally important as well, such as the nameless militia soldiers who fought the Japanese soldiers, under the command of local prefects or military commanders. Militia soldiers serving under governmental officials was one of the characteristics of the Gyeong’gi righteous militia movement, and it was because there was no militia leader left, and governmental commanders from various regions of the peninsula were already in the region to launch an offensive designed to guard the king and retake the capital. Since the battle of the Pyeong’yang-seong(平壤城) fortress that occurred in January 1593, the Gyeong’gi righteous militias actively coordinated their efforts with governmental troops. This aspect deserves further attention and examination, as it seems that retaking the capital became a mutual objective and even a unifying bond for both the Gyeong’gi region’s official troops and righteous militia members. In the Yeongnam region, righteous militia leaders became governmental officials, and the righteous militia soldiers’ role was reduced to delivering supplies to the Chinese Ming troops, so their overall activities eventually diminished. Yet in the Gyeong’gi region, the activities of the righteous militias were literally ‘re-energized’, with their cooperation with the governmental troops.

Attitudes and Perceptions about the First World War by Members of Joseon Society During the 1910s and 20s

TAE HUN Lee | 2012, (105) | pp.187~228 | number of Cited : 19

Offering the most extensive coverage of the First World War at the time,the “Maeil Shinbo”(Korean Daily News), stated that Japan was achieving political and military success in the Kiautschou Bay as well as Manchuria. The ultimate purpose of the war, the newspaper argued, was to prepare for a racial confrontation with the West. However, the general perception of the war within the Joseon community differed from this news propaganda. Although some accepted the First World War as a process by which weaker nations were merely integrated into more powerful countries, the newly developed group of intellectuals of Joseon society saw that the current state of Japanese imperialism had deeper implications. At a minimum, these intellectuals viewed it as a subject for criticism. Some went further to interpret it as evidence of the eventual demise of imperialism. Regardless of the Joseon intellectuals’ views, pro-Japanese supporters as well as the ethnic movement forces of the 1920s each separately used these perceptions to support their own political agendas. First, the pro-Japanese supporters argued that great nationalistic integration as strengthened by the First World War. In turn, they criticized the Russian Revolution as a phenomenon of social destruction. Furthermore, this perception was also employed as evidence for supporting the political interference in Joseon. Yet the Joseon intellectuals continued to perceive the First World War and its aftermath as a shift in the global sociopolitical structure as opposed to a destructive force upon East Asia. In other words, the group stated that the First World War destroyed imperialistic order to newly apply the modern values of freedom and equality as the principles of global reconstruction. In addition,Joseon’s new intellectuals believed that this international order would ultimately weaken the imperialistic order of Japan in East Asia in the end. Such perception regarding the First World War continued to function as a perspective on international political trend, supporting the reasoning of pro-Japanese supporters as well as the ethnic movement forces after the mid-1920s.

The Political Character of ‘the League of Interested Persons from Each Group(各派有志聯盟)’ in 1924～5

지승준 | 2012, (105) | pp.229~270 | number of Cited : 2

A Study on the supply and demand policy for daily necessities produced in South Korea during the U.S. military occupation period

Jeom Sook Kim | 2012, (105) | pp.271~320 | number of Cited : 4

This study explores the supply and demand policy for daily necessities produced in South Korea during the United States military occupation period. The policy was the most important means for economic stabilization during the period. The authorities of the Military Government aimed to provide urgently needed relief and prevent a rise in disease and unrest. That was why the authorities did not initiate any long-range socio-economic reforms or economic stabilization policy until the Joint Commission adjourned on May 8, 1946. The Military Government announced a “free” market in Korea early in October 1945 except for commodities which were normally subject to Government monopoly control - salt, ginsong, tobacco, opium, sugar, and medicines and pharmaceuticals. The American Forces Military Government revivified the former Japanese economic agencies. These were, respectively, the New Korea Company(NKC),the Korean Commodity Company(KCC), the Materials Control Corporation(MCC), and the Petroleum Distributing Agency(PDA). Among them, the MCC was designated as an agency for procurement, receiving handling, storing, safeguarding, accounting and distribution, of all civilian relief and rehabilitation supplies, surplus war materials, and surrendered or abandoned Japanese property. The authorities of the Military Government believed that the commodities,which was owned by MCC and costed about 1 billion won, would meet the demand of residences of the South Korea. However, the prices of the commodities became staggeringly high. The authorities of the Military Government repeated attempts to control profiteering but it only brought poor result. The Military Government eventually proclaimed the Ordinance # 90, 28 May 1946, which was entitled “Economic Controls.” The Military Government took steps to import from the U.S. and Japan to bring more goods into the Korean economy, with the Civilian Supply Programs which were financed by the Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Area(GARIOA). They also instituted allocation, distribution, and price control programs for certain key commodities, produced in South Korea, and resumed a rice collection program,accompanied by the rationing of rice at a price consistent with the stabilization program. To stabilize the general price level at 90 times the 1937 average, the Military Government controlled the prices of the Korean-produced commodities. The controlled prices were decided upon without any consideration of the actual market price. The controlled prices of the commodities were lower than the production costs so that productions of the controlled commodities were lagging. As the result of that, the controlled daily necessities were to be expelled from the market and the general prices on the free market were to be raised. So, the Military Government collected only very few commodities to distribute to civilians. On top of this, public officials and an association of right-wing youth were given preference in the distribution of those few goods that were available. The absence of a positive production policy, which, combined with an absolute dependence upon aid goods, is the basic characteristic and fundamental limitation of the supply and demand policy during the U.S. military occupation period. The formulation of an independent supply and demand policy was impossible when the supply of fundamental commodities relied mostly on aid goods, and also when the U. S. took charge of the introduction and purchase of aid goods. With the failure of the supply and demand policy between June 1945 and the end of 1949, retail prices had increased by 400 times. On the other hand,wages had raised by only 200 times, making the stability of the livelihood of the people impossible. Consequently, civilians had a hard life, and social stability was hampered.

Development Discourses of ‘the Sasangge Economy Team’ in the Late 1950s Early 1960s

정진아 | 2012, (105) | pp.321~364 | number of Cited : 20

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The Sasangge Economy Team organized in the late 1950s with members Lee Sang‐goo, Yoo Chang‐soon, Lee Dong‐wook and Lee Chang‐ryeol under the leadership of Seong Chang‐hwan contributed discourses for the economic section of Sasangge and led development discourses from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. 'The Sasangge Economy Team' aimed at rapid industrialization and economic growth through government‐led industrialization policies and economic development plans. With the occurrence of the 5․16 Military Coup, the Sasangge group approved it as a national revolution succeeding the 4․19 Revolution, and provided active participation and support to the military regime. The economic development plans promoted by the military regime had many things in common with the development discourses of the Sasangge Economy Team in that they concentrated on major backbone industries (electric power, coal,petroleum refining, fertilizer and iron) and labor‐intensive industries,emphasized economy in consumption and frugality, strengthened the role of internal resources, especially, the government’s financial sector rather than external resources, and targeted economic growth as high as 7%. From the beginning just after the coup d’état, the military regime organized extensive advisory committees for the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and other governmental departments and built up the framework of economic policies. The reason that Korean intellects including the Sasangge Economy Team advocated the military regime’s economic policies was that the military regime actively appropriated the development discourses that they had established. Sasangge is obviously a text full of anti‐Communist nationalism and modernism. However, the 20th century was the age of nationalism and modernism, and in those days it was almost impossible for the Korean intellectual circle, which was caught up in the cold war and the division of the country just after the Liberation, the Korean War, and postwar regime competition, to go beyond nationalism and modernism. Rather, we should take note that, as part of development discourses accumulated by the intellectual circle were reflected in the military regime’s economic development plans,government‐led planned economy was settled instead of liberal economy led by capitals and markets. After the Korean War and the emergence of the military regime,constitutional provisions for economy of equality and public interests were amended drastically. In addition, among the roles assigned to the state by the First Constitution of Korea, public areas shrank considerably and people’s life was forced out by the logic of capital and productivity‐first policies. Nevertheless, the state’s roles such as the stability and improvement of people’s life and the realization of a welfare state were still included as the basic goals of the regime’s economic development plans. This suggests that the military regime was unable to promote changes and reforms without solving problems in people’s life. In this sense, the military regime’s economic development plans are a kind of ‘passive revolution’ by nature. Critical intellects including Sasangge who found a boundary with the military government through their struggles against the extension of the military rule and the Agreement between Korea and Japan in 1965 were faced with the tasks to reflect fundamentally on the limitations of development discourses appropriated by the military regime and to develop counteracting discourses.

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The Review of Korean History 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 1.02

2012, Vol., No.105