IF Metall and Tekniföretagen in the Swedish manufacturing industry, after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, proposed a tripartite crisis agreement with the government in violation of the Saltsjöbaden agreement’s principle of autonomous labor relations. Despite the conservative government's refusal, IF Metall and Tekniföretagen signed a crisis agreement in March 2009, contributing to overcoming the economic crisis by reducing working hours and sharing the expenses accompanied. It is the purpose of this study to analyze and explain the content and dynamics of the crisis agreements.
This study identifies at least four points from the analysis of the 2009 crisis agreement and the 2014 crisis agreement.
First, the 2009 crisis agreement contributed to the successful overcoming of the economic crisis, and it was IF metall’s strategic choice to secure employment security in exchange of wage cuts.
Second, the 2009 crisis agreement confirmed the necessity of a new policy to support financially the reduction of working hours in times of economic crisis. The conservative government which refused to participate in the 2009 crisis agreement had to spend financial resources in the form of unemployment benefits instead of supporting the reduction of working hours, owing to the high unemployment rate.
Third, by participating in the 2014 crisis agreement, the conservative government acknowledging indirectly that it was a mistake to refuse to participate in the 2009 crisis agreement.
Fourth, the fact that IF Metall and Tekniföretagen, regardless of government’s participation or not, pursued crisis agreements twice in 2009 and in 2014 verifies that they did not go against the Saltsjöbaden agreement’s principle of autonomous labor relations.