2021, Vol., No.35

PHILOSOPHY·THOUGHT·CULTURE 2023 KCI Impact Factor : 0.5

pISSN : 1975-1621 / eISSN : 2092-0873
https://journal.kci.go.kr/insewtdgu

The question of what is Korea's unique beauty has been constantly addressed in the art history community. Sambul Kim Won-yong clearly defined Korea's beauty as ‘naturalism’, but confusion in terms arose when the naturalist idea of Emil Zola, a 19th-century French writer, entered Korea. Despite the need for work to clarify these concepts, there has been no specific study of them. In order to properly understand Kim Won-yong's naturalism, it is necessary to study how and why the Korean beauty features, which were his problematic consciousness, were formed. In order to define Korean beauty, it is necessary to first look at ‘what is beauty.’ Then we take a look at Korea's unique beauty and naturalism. This study focuses on clearly analyzing Kim Won-yong's concept of naturalism. In this article, I point out that Kim Won-yong's naturalism should be distinguished from naturalism as a Western literary gesture, arguing that it has a unique feature that distinguishes it from discourse on other Korean regulations.

The damage caused by the COVID-19, which is believed to have occurred in China at the end of 2019, is not only on-going worldwide, but is getting worse. In March 2020, the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 pandemic and requested a global solidarity. The purpose of this paper is to find out which ethical theory is appropriate for the theoretical basis of biomedical ethics to counter the COVID-19 pandemic on the basis of solidarity. This is because a theory of biomedical ethics concerning infectious diseases requires a different approach from the established theories of biomedical ethics, which presupposes the patient as a victim alone. This paper argues that capability approach, which encompasses the concept of solidarity presented as a core value in the process of responding to the COVID-19, is an appropriate theory to effectively respond to the COVID-19 infectious disease, in which the patient is ontologically not only a victim, but also a vector. For this purpose, this paper first analyzes the ontological characteristics of the COVID-19 patient and searches for a concept of solidarity in the field of biomedical ethics to cope with the infectious diseases (Section 2). Then, this paper argues that capability approach is effective to explain this concept of solidarity and relational autonomy to supply a foundation of biomedical ethics concerning infectious diseases, because it is based on human being’s vulnerability as the COVID-19 infectious disease does (Section 3). Finally, this paper proposes that the integral strategy of institutional, non-institutional, and individual aspects in capability approach is effective to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic through solidarity to enhance human development of capability (Section4).

The purpose of this paper is to try to answer the question of whether there is a possibility to overcome death through digital uploading. Many transhumanists, who seek digital immortality, usually argue that even if our brain hardware is radically modified, our mind still exists as long as the same program is run. According to this view, the survival of a person is a matter of the survival of a software pattern. Susan Schneider criticizes patternism in Artificial You, arguing that uploading is not compatible with survival and corresponds to suicide, based on the software instantiation view of the mind. I argue against Schneider's conclusions through discussions of Parfit's view of personal identity. I argue that in order to accurately diagnose the philosophical implications of uploading, attention should be paid to the body neutrality and separability thesis which computationalism presupposes. According to the embodied mind views, the body is the constituent element that determines the intentional contents of mental states. If the body has changed, the conditions of satisfaction of our mental states would also change. This, in turn, would change the priorities of the values that we consider important. Based on these discussions, I argue that the mental states as information extracted in digital form assumed in uploading amount to incomplete duplication, and in order to be a survival worth wanting, it must be uploading including cloning of biological bodies.